After the American Civil War, agricultural reformers in the South called for an end to unrestricted grazing of livestock on unfenced land. They advocated the stock law, which required livestock owners to fence in their animals, arguing that the existing system (in which farmers built protective fences around crops) was outdated and inhibited economic growth. The reformers steadily won their battles, and by the end of the century the range was on the way to being closed. In this original study, Kantor uses economic analysis to show that, contrary to traditional historical interpretation, this conflict was centered on anticipated benefits from fencing livestock rather than on class, cultural, or ideological differences. Kantor proves that the stock law brought economic benefits; at the same time, he analyzes why the law's adoption was hindered in many areas where it would have increased wealth. This argument illuminates the dynamics of real-world institutional change, where transactions are often costly and where some inefficient institutions persist while others give way to economic growth.

This book addresses a puzzle in political economy: why is it that political instability does not necessarily translate into economic stagnation or collapse? In order to address this puzzle, it advances a theory about property rights systems in many less developed countries. In this theory, governments do not have to enforce property rights as a public good. Instead, they may enforce property rights selectively (as a private good), and share the resulting rents with the group of asset holders who are integrated into the government. Focusing on Mexico, this book explains how the property rights system was constructed during the Porfirio Díaz dictatorship (1876-1911) and then explores how this property rights system either survived, or was reconstructed. The result is an analytic economic history of Mexico under both stability and instability, and a generalizable framework about the interaction of political and economic institutions.

A new understanding of the causes and consequences of incomplete property rights in countries across the world.

This book looks at how top-down efforts to strengthen property rights are unlikely to succeed without demand for law from private firms.

In sub-Saharan Africa, property relationships around land and access to natural resources vary across localities, districts, and farming regions. These differences produce patterned variations in relationships between individuals, communities, and the state. This book captures these patterns in an analysis of structure and variation in rural land tenure regimes. In most farming areas, state authority is deeply embedded in land regimes, drawing farmers, ethnic insiders and outsiders, lineages, villages, and communities into direct and indirect relationships with political authorities at different levels of the state apparatus. The analysis shows how property institutions - institutions that define political authority and hierarchy around land - shape dynamics of great interest to scholars of politics, including the dynamics of land-related competition and conflict, territorial conflict, patron-client relations, electoral cleavage and mobilization, ethnic politics, rural rebellion, and the localization and "nationalization" of political competition.

This book provides unique insight into the relationship of institutions that govern land rights to local and national politics in African countries.

This book explains the origins of Chinese land politics and explores how property rights and urban growth strategies differ among Chinese cities.

This book provides new insight into the high-stakes struggle to control land in the Global South through the lens of land titling in Zambia and Senegal. Based on extensive fieldwork, it shows how chiefs and communities challenge the state, in an era of increasing scarcity and booming global land markets.

Globalization is an extraordinary phenomenon affecting virtually everything in our lives. And it is imperative that we understand the operation of economic power in a globalized world if we are to address the most challenging issues our world is facing today, from climate change to world hunger and poverty. This revolutionary work rethinks globalization as a power system feeding from, and in competition with, the state system. Cutting across disciplines of law, politics and economics, it explores how multinational enterprises morphed into world political organisations with global reach and power, but without the corresponding responsibilities. In illuminating how the concentration of property rights within corporations has led to the rejection of democracy as an ineffective system of government and to the rise in inequality, Robé offers a clear pathway to a fairer and more sustainable power system.

One strand of research argues that polarized societies find it difficult to reach political consensus on appropriate responses to crises. Another strand focuses on redistribution, asking whether income inequality stifles growth by increasing political incentives to redistribute. Which is right?