These essays of Shubik's represent how his work connects ideas, precision and the methods of mathematics in the area of game theory and economic problems. They through light on price systems and money.

During the 1940s "game theory" emerged from the fields of mathematics and economics to provide a revolutionary new method of analysis. Today game theory provides a language for discussing conflict and cooperation not only for economists, but also for business analysts, sociologists, war planners, international relations theorists, and evolutionary biologists. Toward a History of Game Theory offers the first history of the development, reception, and dissemination of this crucial theory. Drawing on interviews with original members of the game theory community and on the Morgenstern diaries, the first section of the book examines early work in game theory. It focuses on the groundbreaking role of the von Neumann-Morgenstern collaborative work, The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944). The second section recounts the reception of this new theory, revealing just how game theory made its way into the literatures of the time and thus became known among relevant communities of scholars. The contributors explore how game theory became a wedge in opening up the social sciences to mathematical tools and use the personal recollections of scholars who taught at Michigan and Princeton in the late 1940s to show why the theory captivated those practitioners now considered to be "giants" in the field. The final section traces the flow of the ideas of game theory into political science, operations research, and experimental economics. Contributors. Mary Ann Dimand, Robert W. Dimand, Robert J. Leonard, Philip Mirowski, Angela M. O'Rand, Howard Raiffa, Urs Rellstab, Robin E. Rider, William H. Riker, Andrew Schotter, Martin Shubik, Vernon L. Smith

This two-volume set provides an overview of the work of Selten, the Nobel Prize winner who refined the Nash equilibrium concept of non- cooperative games for analyzing dynamic strategic interaction and applied these concepts to analyses of oligopoly. Twenty-five essays discuss topics including axiomatic characterizations, learning, political and social interaction, theories of oligopolistic competition, oligopoly experiments, and bilateral and coalition bargaining. Lacks a subject index. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Economic Theory, academic policy analysis and public policy design are becoming more interdependent. Hence, the demands for close interactions between the policy community and the research community have been rising significantly. This book assesses how recent economic thinking has advanced under these influences. Furthermore, it evaluates the important contribution economics can add to the design and evaluation of public policy, now more than ever before. The study is of interest to policy makers, policy analysts, researchers and students of economics at all levels. The authors, which include many of Germany's most eminent economists, draw on their wide experience in research and consultancy to present a coherent view of where European economic theory stands today and how it can play a role in the management of the economy of the new millennium.

This book, which comprises eight chapters, presents a comprehensive critical survey of the results and methods of laboratory experiments in economics. The first chapter provides an introduction to experimental economics as a whole, with the remaining chapters providing surveys by leading practitioners in areas of economics that have seen a concentration of experiments: public goods, coordination problems, bargaining, industrial organization, asset markets, auctions, and individual decision making. The work aims both to help specialists set an agenda for future research and to provide nonspecialists with a critical review of work completed to date. Its focus is on elucidating the role of experimental studies as a progressive research tool so that wherever possible, emphasis is on series of experiments that build on one another. The contributors to the volume--Colin Camerer, Charles A. Holt, John H. Kagel, John O. Ledyard, Jack Ochs, Alvin E. Roth, and Shyam Sunder--adopt a particular methodological point of view: the way to learn how to design and conduct experiments is to consider how good experiments grow organically out of the issues and hypotheses they are designed to investigate.