This Plutonium Vulnerability Management Plan describes the Department of Energy's response to the vulnerabilities identified in the Plutonium Working Group Report which are a result of the cessation of nuclear weapons production. The responses contained in this document are only part of an overall, coordinated approach designed to enable the Department to accelerate conversion of all nuclear materials, including plutonium, to forms suitable for safe, interim storage. The overall actions being taken are discussed in detail in the Department's Implementation Plan in response to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 94-1. This is included as Attachment B.

This appendix contains documentation prepared by the Plutonium ES and H Vulnerability Working Group for conducting the Plutonium ES and H Vulnerability Assessment and training the assessment teams. It has the following five parts. (1) The Project Plan describes the genesis of the project, sets forth the goals, objectives and scope, provides definitions, the projected schedule, and elements of protocol. (2) The Assessment Plan provides a detailed methodology necessary to guide the many professionals who have been recruited to conduct the DOE-wide assessment. It provides guidance on which types and forms of plutonium are to be considered within the scope of the assessment, and lays out the assessment methodology to be used. (3) The memorandum from the Project to Operations Office Managers provides the protocol and direction for participation in the assessment by external stakeholders and members of the public; and the guidance for the physical inspection of plutonium materials in storage. (4) The memorandum from the Project to the assessment teams provides guidance for vulnerability screening criteria, vulnerability evaluation and prioritization process, and vulnerability quantification for prioritization. (5) The Team Training manual was used at the training session held in Colorado Springs on April 19--21, 1994 for all members of the Working Group Assessment Teams and for the leaders of the Site Assessment Teams. The goal was to provide the same training to all of the individuals who would be conducting the assessments, and thereby provide consistency in the conduct of the assessments and uniformity in reporting of the results. The training manual in Section A.5 includes supplemental material provided to the attendees after the meeting.

This appendix contains documentation prepared by the Plutonium ES and H Vulnerability Working Group for conducting the Plutonium ES and H Vulnerability Assessment and training the assessment teams. It has the following five parts. (1) The Project Plan describes the genesis of the project, sets forth the goals, objectives and scope, provides definitions, the projected schedule, and elements of protocol. (2) The Assessment Plan provides a detailed methodology necessary to guide the many professionals who have been recruited to conduct the DOE-wide assessment. It provides guidance on which types and forms of plutonium are to be considered within the scope of the assessment, and lays out the assessment methodology to be used. (3) The memorandum from the Project to Operations Office Managers provides the protocol and direction for participation in the assessment by external stakeholders and members of the public; and the guidance for the physical inspection of plutonium materials in storage. (4) The memorandum from the Project to the assessment teams provides guidance for vulnerability screening criteria, vulnerability evaluation and prioritization process, and vulnerability quantification for prioritization. (5) The Team Training manual was used at the training session held in Colorado Springs on April 19--21, 1994 for all members of the Working Group Assessment Teams and for the leaders of the Site Assessment Teams. The goal was to provide the same training to all of the individuals who would be conducting the assessments, and thereby provide consistency in the conduct of the assessments and uniformity in reporting of the results. The training manual in Section A.5 includes supplemental material provided to the attendees after the meeting.

The U.S. Energy Dept. is storing at least 820 million kg of nuclear & non-nuclear materials in inventory at 44 sites in 19 states: spent nuclear fuel, plutonium, natural & enriched uranium, depleted uranium, lithium, sodium, lead, chemicals, weapons components, scrap metal & material. Three materials make up an estimated 95% of the total: depleted uranium, scrap metal, & lithium. Left unattended, much of this material could present environmental, health, or safety risks. Maintaining these materials in a safe condition costs millions of dollars/year.