The Department of Energy (DOE) mission for utilization and storage of nuclear materials has recently changed as a result of the end of the ''Cold War'' era. Past and current plutonium storage practices largely reflect a temporary, in-process, or in-use storage condition which must now be changed to accommodate longer-term storage. This report summarizes information concerning current plutonium metal and oxide storage practices which was presented at the Office of Defense programs (DP) workshop in Albuquerque, New Mexico on May 26-27, 1993 and contained in responses to questions by DP-62 from the field organizations.

This Safety Report updates IAEA Safety Series No. 39, Safe Handling of Plutonium (1974), and provides an overview of modern practices for handling and storing separated plutonium. It provides descriptions of plutonium and its properties, and of the biological effects on humans of plutonium. The principles underlying the safe design and operation of plutonium handling/storage facilities and the licensing of such facilities are also covered.

In 2018, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine issued an Interim Report evaluating the general viability of the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration's (DOE-NNSA's) conceptual plans for disposing of 34 metric tons (MT) of surplus plutonium in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), a deep geologic repository near Carlsbad, New Mexico. It provided a preliminary assessment of the general viability of DOE-NNSA's conceptual plans, focused on some of the barriers to their implementation. This final report addresses the remaining issues and echoes the recommendations from the interim study.

In 2018, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine issued an Interim Report evaluating the general viability of the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration's (DOE-NNSA's) conceptual plans for disposing of 34 metric tons (MT) of surplus plutonium in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), a deep geologic repository near Carlsbad, New Mexico. It provided a preliminary assessment of the general viability of DOE-NNSA's conceptual plans, focused on some of the barriers to their implementation. This final report addresses the remaining issues and echoes the recommendations from the interim study.

This report provides the input to and results of the Department of Energy (DOE) - Oak Ridge Operations (ORO) DOE Plutonium Environment, Safety and Health (ES & H) Vulnerability Assessment (VA) self-assessment performed by the Site Assessment Team (SAT) for the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL or X-10) and the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant (Y-12) sites that are managed by Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc. (MMES). As initiated (March 15, 1994) by the Secretary of Energy, the objective of the VA is to identify and rank-order DOE-ES & H vulnerabilities associated for the purpose of decision making on the interim safe management and ultimate disposition of fissile materials. This assessment is directed at plutonium and other co-located transuranics in various forms.

In response to a request from Congress, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Homeland Security sponsored a National Academies study to assess the safety and security risks of spent nuclear fuel stored in cooling pools and dry casks at commercial nuclear power plants. The information provided in this book examines the risks of terrorist attacks using these materials for a radiological dispersal device. Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel is an unclassified public summary of a more detailed classified book. The book finds that successful terrorist attacks on spent fuel pools, though difficult, are possible. A propagating fire in a pool could release large amounts of radioactive material, but rearranging spent fuel in the pool during storage and providing emergency water spray systems would reduce the likelihood of a propagating fire even under severe damage conditions. The book suggests that additional studies are needed to better understand these risks. Although dry casks have advantages over cooling pools, pools are necessary at all operating nuclear power plants to store at least the recently discharged fuel. The book explains it would be difficult for terrorists to steal enough spent fuel to construct a significant radiological dispersal device.

The production of nuclear materials for the national defense was an intense, nationwide effort that began with the Manhattan Project and continued throughout the Cold War. Now many of these product materials, by-products, and precursors, such as irradiated nuclear fuels and targets, have been declared as excess by the Department of Energy (DOE). Most of this excess inventory has been, or will be, turned over to DOE's Office of Environmental Management (EM), which is responsible for cleaning up the former production sites. Recognizing the scientific and technical challenges facing EM, Congress in 1995 established the EM Science Program (EMSP) to develop and fund directed, long-term research that could substantially enhance the knowledge base available for new cleanup technologies and decision making. The EMSP has previously asked the National Academies' National Research Council for advice for developing research agendas in subsurface contamination, facility deactivation and decommissioning, high-level waste, and mixed and transuranic waste. For this study the committee was tasked to provide recommendations for a research agenda to improve the scientific basis for DOE's management of its high-cost, high-volume, or high-risk excess nuclear materials and spent nuclear fuels. To address its task, the committee focused its attention on DOE's excess plutonium-239, spent nuclear fuels, cesium-137 and strontium-90 capsules, depleted uranium, and higher actinide isotopes.