From a prominent criminal law professor, a provocative and timely exploration of how plea bargaining prevents true criminal justice reform and how we can fix it—now in paperback When Americans think of the criminal justice system, the image that comes to mind is a trial-a standard court­room scene with a defendant, attorneys, a judge, and most important, a jury. It's a fair assumption. The right to a trial by jury is enshrined in both the body of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. It's supposed to be the foundation that undergirds our entire justice system. But in Punishment Without Trial: Why Plea Bargaining Is a Bad Deal, University of North Carolina law professor Carissa Byrne Hessick shows that the popular conception of a jury trial couldn't be further from reality. That bed­rock constitutional right has all but disappeared thanks to the unstoppable march of plea bargaining, which began to take hold during Prohibition and has skyrocketed since 1971, when it was affirmed as constitutional by the Supreme Court. Nearly every aspect of our criminal justice system encourages defendants-whether they're innocent or guilty-to take a plea deal. Punishment Without Trial showcases how plea bargaining has undermined justice at every turn and across socioeconomic and racial divides. It forces the hand of lawyers, judges, and defendants, turning our legal system into a ruthlessly efficient mass incarceration machine that is dogging our jails and pun­ishing citizens because it's the path of least resistance. Professor Hessick makes the case against plea bargaining as she illustrates how it has damaged our justice system while presenting an innovative set of reforms for how we can fix it. An impassioned, urgent argument about the future of criminal justice reform, Punishment Without Trial will change the way you view the criminal justice system.

The full-blown trial with its guarantees of presumption of innocence, due process, and constitutional evidence is no longer affordable. With the rise in crime and the more cost-, and labor-intensive procedures required by modern notions of due process, legislatures and courts around the world are gradually giving priority to the principle of procedural economy and introducing forms of consensual and abbreviated criminal procedure to deal with overloaded dockets. This book, which combines chapters from distinct countries which were originally written for the XVII Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law in Utrecht, The Netherlands, in July 2006, also includes theoretical contributions by Mirjan Damaska on the role of plea bargaining in the international criminal tribunals and Maximo Langer on the "Americanization" of world criminal procedure and the "translation" of American plea bargaining into the legal language of inquisitorial legal systems. The book concludes with the editor's comprehensive analysis of the typologies of plea bargaining and their historical and doctrinal roots.

"That relatively few criminal cases in this country are resolved by full Perry Mason-style strials is fairly common knowledge. Most cases are settled by a guilty plea after some form of negotiation over the charge or sentence. But why? The standard explanation is case pressure: the enormous volume of criminal cases, to be processed with limited staff, time and resources. . . . But a large body of new empirical research now demands that we re-examine plea negotiation. Milton Heumann's book, Plea Bargaining, strongly and explicitly attacks the case-pressure argument and suggests an alternative explanation for plea bargaining based on the adaptation of attorneys and judges to the local criminal court. The book is a significant and welcome addition to the literature. Heumann's investigation of case pressure and plea negotiation demonstrates solid research and careful analysis."—Michigan Law Review

Though originally an interloper in a system of justice mediated by courtroom battles, plea bargaining now dominates American criminal justice. This book traces the evolution of plea bargaining from its beginnings in the early nineteenth century to its present pervasive role. Through the first three quarters of the nineteenth century, judges showed far less enthusiasm for plea bargaining than did prosecutors. After all, plea bargaining did not assure judges “victory”; judges did not suffer under the workload that prosecutors faced; and judges had principled objections to dickering for justice and to sharing sentencing authority with prosecutors. The revolution in tort law, however, brought on a flood of complex civil cases, which persuaded judges of the wisdom of efficient settlement of criminal cases. Having secured the patronage of both prosecutors and judges, plea bargaining quickly grew to be the dominant institution of American criminal procedure. Indeed, it is difficult to name a single innovation in criminal procedure during the last 150 years that has been incompatible with plea bargaining’s progress and survived.

The book sets out in-depth studies of consensual case dispositions in the UK, examining how plea bargaining has developed and spread in England and Wales. It also goes on to discusses in detail the problems that this practise poses for the rule of law by avoiding procedural safe-guards. The book draws on empirical research in its examination of the absence of informal settlements in the former GDR, offering a unique insight into criminal procedure in a socialist legal system that has been little studied.

"By looking at the motivations of the three critical parties to any plea bargain-the prosecutor, defense attorney/defendant, and the judge-Plea Bargaining Made Real explains why in the words of former Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, "criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials." By looking at the impact these motivations play in the conduct and decisions of these parties, the book offers a clearer and more realistic understanding of the process. Through comparing plea-bargaining court decisions with the actual ways in which guilty pleas come about, the book illustrates not just the dishonesty of the judicial approach to issues arising from plea bargaining, but also the damage that such dishonesty causes. The book discusses other important and controversial aspects of plea bargaining such as types of guilty pleas, the impact of systemic racism in plea bargaining and the applicability of contract law principles to plea agreements. The negotiation of a disposition in a criminal case is a most human process. This book examines the law of plea bargaining without ever losing sight of this critical perspective. It offers suggestions for how prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges and the criminal justice system itself can make the plea bargaining system fairer and more transparent"--

A blistering critique of America’s assembly-line approach to criminal justice and the shameful practice at its core: the plea bargain Most Americans believe that the jury trial is the backbone of our criminal justice system. But in fact, the vast majority of cases never make it to trial: almost all criminal convictions are the result of a plea bargain, a deal made entirely out of the public eye. Law professor and civil rights lawyer Dan Canon argues that plea bargaining may swiftly dispose of cases, but it also fuels an unjust system. This practice produces a massive underclass of people who are restricted from voting, working, and otherwise participating in society. And while innocent people plead guilty to crimes they did not commit in exchange for lesser sentences, the truly guilty can get away with murder. With heart-wrenching stories, fierce urgency, and an insider’s perspective, Pleading Out exposes the ugly truth about what’s wrong with America’s criminal justice system today—and offers a prescription for meaningful change.

"This book is the first textbook of its kind that covers all of the processes through which criminal cases are resolved in the United States beyond trials. Negotiating Crime brings together criminal procedure, current policy debates, and dispute resolution concepts to examine the practice of criminal law in the 21st century. The first half of the book is devoted to plea bargaining, first covering the basic caselaw, practice, policy concerns, and reform proposals. In addition, this section explains negotiation theory and applies it to the practice of plea bargaining. The second half of the book covers problem solving and therapeutic justice courts, including drug courts and mental health courts; restorative justice; and juvenile justice"--

The practice of plea bargaining plays a hugely significant role in the adjudication of criminal charges and has provoked intense debate about its legitimacy. This book offers the first full-length philosophical analysis of the ethics of plea bargaining. It develops a sustained argument for restrained forms of the practice and against the free-wheeling versions that predominate in the United States. In countries that have endorsed plea bargains, such as the United States, upwards of ninety percent of criminal defendants plead guilty rather than go to trial. Yet trials, which grant a presumption of innocence to defendants and place a substantial burden of proof on the state to establish guilt, are widely regarded as the most appropriate mechanisms for fairly and accurately assigning criminal sanctions. How is it that many countries have abandoned the formal rules and rigorous standards of public trials in favor of informal and veiled negotiations between state officials and criminal defendants concerning the punishment to which the latter will be subjected? More importantly, how persuasive are the myriad justifications that have been provided for plea bargaining? These are the questions addressed in this book. Examining the legal processes by which individuals are moved through the criminal justice system, the fairness of those processes, and the ways in which they reproduce social inequality, this book offers an ethical argument for restrained forms of plea bargaining. It also provides a comparison between the different plea bargaining regimes that exist within the US, where it is well-established, England and Wales, where the practice is coming under considerable critique, and the European Union, where debate continues on whether it coheres with inquisitorial legal regimes. It suggests that rewards for admitting guilt are distinguished from penalties for exercising the right to trial, and argues for modest, fixed sentence reductions for defendants who admit their guilt. These suggestions for reform include discouraging the current practice of deliberate over-charging by prosecutors and charge bargaining, and require judges to scrutinize more closely the evidence against those accused of crimes before any guilty pleas are entered by them. Arguing that the negotiation of charges and sentences should remain the exception, not the rule, it nevertheless puts forward a normative defense for the reform and retention of the plea bargaining system.