This is the first full-length book on the concept of “People’s Diplomacy,” promoted by the president of North Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, at the peak of the Vietnam War from 1965-1972. It holds great appeal for historians, international relations scholars, diplomats, and the general reader interested in Vietnam. A form of informal diplomacy, people’s diplomacy was carried out by ordinary Vietnamese including writers, cartoonists, workers, women, students, filmmakers, medical doctors, academics, and sportspersons. They created an awareness of the American bombardment of innocent Vietnamese civilians, and made profound connections with the anti-war movements abroad. People’s diplomacy made it difficult for the United States to prolong the war because the North Vietnamese, together with the peace movements abroad, exerted popular pressure on the American presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon to end the conflict. It was much more effective than the formal North Vietnamese diplomacy in gaining the support of Westerners who were averse to communism. It damaged the reputation of the United States by casting North Vietnam as a victim of American imperialism.

This book explores how Vietnam's leadership conceptualises and conducts public diplomacy (PD) and offers a comparative analysis with regional powers. Drawing on social constructivism as its theoretical framework it investigates the rationale behind an authoritarian regime's implementation of public diplomacy to contribute to a better understanding of the broader framework of foreign-domestic policy. This theoretical and practical exploration of Vietnam's PD in cases of cultural diplomacy, South China Sea diplomacy and online activism situates it in the general academic and theoretical discussion on soft power. Key variables to the conceptualisation and conduct of Vietnam's PD, namely national interest, national identity and changing information technologies, especially the Internet and social media, are also thoroughly investigated. With crosscutting themes ranging from politics and international relations to communication studies, it will appeal to students and scholars of identity politics, populism and nationalism.

In 1960 revolutionaries in South Viet Nam created the National Liberation Front, a political and military organization committed to overthrowing the Saigon government and liberating Viet Nam south of the seventeenth parallel. The role of the NLF during the war has been hotly debated, with officials in Washington claiming from the outset that the NLF was merely a puppet of Hanoi. Based on over a hundred interviews with former Communist cadre and high ranking Party officials as well as extensive archival research in Viet Nam, Robert K. Brigham's is a definitive work that provides a focus on the NLF not found elsewhere. It contributes greatly to our understanding of the Viet Nam War and encourages a reassessment of that conflict. Brigham assesses the impact of the NLF's diplomatic strategy on the conduct and outcome of hostilities, explores the origin and pursuit of its policy objectives, and defines its true relationship with North Viet Nam. He contends that the NLF's success in convincing the world that it was independent of Hanoi was critical in upsetting the political and military balance in South Viet Nam and frustrating the U.S. war effort. In addition, he argues that differences in goals among Communists—building socialism in the north, liberating the south—resulted in disagreements over responses to American intervention, and he shows how these differences entered into foreign relations and seriously undermined revolutionary efforts.

Today Vietnam is one of America’s strongest international partners, with a thriving economy and a population that welcomes American visitors. How that relationship was formed is a twenty-year story of daring diplomacy and a careful thawing of tensions between the two countries after a lengthy war that cost nearly 60,000 American and more than two million Vietnamese lives. Ted Osius, former ambassador during the Obama administration, offers a vivid account, starting in the 1990s, of the various forms of diplomacy that made this reconciliation possible. He considers the leaders who put aside past traumas to work on creating a brighter future, including senators John McCain and John Kerry, two Vietnam veterans and ideological opponents who set aside their differences for a greater cause, and Pete Peterson—the former POW who became the first U.S. ambassador to a new Vietnam. Osius also draws upon his own experiences working first-hand with various Vietnamese leaders and traveling the country on bicycle to spotlight the ordinary Vietnamese people who have helped bring about their nation’s extraordinary renaissance. With a foreword by former Secretary of State John Kerry, Nothing Is Impossible tells an inspiring story of how international diplomacy can create a better world.

This book provides an in-depth analysis of the close cultural links between India and Vietnam. It discusses the issues of trade negotiations under the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Indo-Pacific construct. Issues such as strengthening the economic partnership, contemporary development challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, including weakening supply chains, and geo-strategic tensions are explored in this book. It enriches understanding of the potential of the two countries to develop as manufacturing hubs for the region and beyond. Given the more aggressive posturing by China in 2020, the concluding chapter includes the policy prescriptions with a futuristic vision, for India and Vietnam to catalyze their strategic and bilateral partnership. Well researched and analytical, the book draws extensively from several interviews of experts, diplomats, journalists, businesspersons, and members of the diaspora. It is a must read for students, researchers, think tanks, area study centers, and all institutions engaged in Asian studies, encompassing narratives extending from the developmental to political, from the bilateral to the multilateral and from the geo-economic to the geo-strategic.

John Colvin's career as one of Her Majesty's Representatives in Foreign Parts never scaled the greatest heights of the ambassadorial ladder, but it did lead to two unusual postings, which he describes in this book. In 1966 he was sent to Hanoi at a time when the Vietnam War began to assume its full rigour, and his verdict on the American involvement, contrary to the widely-held view, is that they did not leave Indo-China without credit or achievement. His next posting was as Ambassador to the People's Republic of Mongolia. His memories of that remote but lovely country, which dwell as much upon topographical as political aspects, provide an insight into life in what was then a Russian satellite state, far removed from the centre of world affairs.

After a war breaks out, what factors influence the warring parties' decisions about whether to talk to their enemy, and when may their position on wartime diplomacy change? How do we get from only fighting to also talking? In The Costs of Conversation, Oriana Skylar Mastro argues that states are primarily concerned with the strategic costs of conversation, and these costs need to be low before combatants are willing to engage in direct talks with their enemy. Specifically, Mastro writes, leaders look to two factors when determining the probable strategic costs of demonstrating a willingness to talk: the likelihood the enemy will interpret openness to diplomacy as a sign of weakness, and how the enemy may change its strategy in response to such an interpretation. Only if a state thinks it has demonstrated adequate strength and resiliency to avoid the inference of weakness, and believes that its enemy has limited capacity to escalate or intensify the war, will it be open to talking with the enemy. Through four primary case studies—North Vietnamese diplomatic decisions during the Vietnam War, those of China in the Korean War and Sino-Indian War, and Indian diplomatic decision making in the latter conflict—The Costs of Conversation demonstrates that the costly conversations thesis best explains the timing and nature of countries' approach to wartime talks, and therefore when peace talks begin. As a result, Mastro's findings have significant theoretical and practical implications for war duration and termination, as well as for military strategy, diplomacy, and mediation.

Ten American and Japanese specialists offer a comprehensive analysis of one of the most dramatic developments in Asia today: the re-emergence of Vietnam - not as the belligerent champion of a militant ideology and socialist cause, but as an open, friendly country seeking a respected place in the world community. Basing their observations on five years of study, visits to Vietnam, and numerous interviews with knowledgeable officials, scholars and businessmen there and in the United States and Japan, the authors evaluate the political, ecnomic, social and foreign policy changes that have been taking place in Vietnam over the past decade, trace the responses of the United States and Japan and offer a policy prescription for responding to the challenges of the future.

"Nine U.S. activists discuss the parts they played in opposing the war at home and their risky travels to Vietnam in the midst of the conflict to engage in people-to-people diplomacy. In 2013, the 'Hanoi 9' activists revisited Vietnam together; this book presents their thoughtful reflections on those experiences, as well as the stories of five U.S. veterans who returned to make reparations. Their successes in antiwar organizing will challenge the myths that still linger from that era, and inspire a new generation seeking peaceful solutions to war and conflict today"--

This study of ten fateful decisions made on Indochina between 1961-75 highlights the ascent of the civilian militarists and of strategy over diplomacy in United States policymaking and reveals the inexorably interlinked and escalating character of the decisions and the central purpose of American presidents: not to have to face the expected domestic political consequences of defeat in Indochina. As a result, we were led into a prolonged stalemate in which "acting" and the management of programs became a more important preoccupation than thinking about our purposes and values, in which analysis become wholly subjective and therefore defective, and in which decision-making occurred in a closed system which did not allow for divergent inputs.