In this book, scholars examine the nature and significance of Peirce’s work on perception, iconicity, and diagrammatic thinking. Abjuring any strict dichotomy between presentational and representational mental activity, Peirce’s theories transform the Aristotelian, Humean, and Kantian paradigms that continue to hold sway today and forge a new path for understanding the centrality of visual thinking in science, education, art, and communication. This book is a key resource for scholars interested in Perice’s philosophy and its relation to contemporary issues in mathematics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of perception, semiotics, logic, visual thinking, and cognitive science.

This is a study edition of Charles Sanders Peirce's manuscripts for lectures on pragmatism given in spring 1903 at Harvard University. Excerpts from these writings have been published elsewhere but in abbreviated form. Turrisi has edited the manuscripts for publication and has written a series of notes that illuminate the historical, scientific, and philosophical contexts of Peirce's references in the lectures. She has also written a Preface that describes the manner in which the lectures came to be given, including an account of Peirce's life and career pertinent to understanding the philosopher himself. Turrisi's introduction interprets Peirce's brand of pragmatism within his system of logic and philosophy of science as well as within general philosophical principles.

In this book, T. L. Short corrects widespread misconceptions of Peirce's theory of signs and demonstrates its relevance to contemporary analytic philosophy of language, mind and science. Peirce's theory of mind, naturalistic but nonreductive, bears on debates of Fodor and Millikan, among others. His theory of inquiry avoids foundationalism and subjectivism, while his account of reference anticipated views of Kripke and Putnam. Peirce's realism falls between 'internal' and 'metaphysical' realism and is more satisfactory than either. His pragmatism is not verificationism; rather, it identifies meaning with potential growth of knowledge. Short distinguishes Peirce's mature theory of signs from his better-known but paradoxical early theory. He develops the mature theory systematically on the basis of Peirce's phenomenological categories and concept of final causation. The latter is distinguished from recent and similar views, such as Brandon's, and is shown to be grounded in forms of explanation adopted in modern science.

A case study of multimodal systems and a new interpretation of Charles S. Peirce's theory of reasoning and signs based on an analysis of his system of Existential Graphs. At the dawn of modern logic, Charles S. Peirce invented two types of logical systems, one symbolic and the other graphical. In this book Sun-Joo Shin explores the philosophical roots of the birth of Peirce's Existential Graphs in his theory of representation and logical notation. Shin demonstrates that Peirce is the first philosopher to lay a solid philosophical foundation for multimodal representation systems. Shin analyzes Peirce's well-known, but much-criticized nonsymbolic representation system. She presents a new approach to his graphical system based on her discovery of its unique nature and on a reconstruction of Peirce's theory of representation. By seeking to understand graphical systems on their own terms, she uncovers the reasons why graphical systems, and Existential Graphs in particular, have been underappreciated among logicians. Drawing on perspectives from the philosophy of mind, cognitive science, logic, and computer science, Shin provides evidence for a genuinely interdisciplinary project on multimodal reasoning.

A reprint of the Harvard University Press edition of 1961. Includes a new preface and a new appendix with footnotes keyed to the manuscript classifications by Max Fisch.

Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) is generally considered the most significant American philosopher. He was the founder of pragmatism, the view popularized by William James and John Dewey, that our philosophical theories must be linked to experience and practice. The essays in this volume reveal how Peirce worked through this idea to make important contributions to most branches of philosophy.

Diagrammatology investigates the role of diagrams for thought and knowledge. Based on the general doctrine of diagrams in Charles Peirce's mature work, Diagrammatology claims diagrams to constitute a centerpiece of epistemology. This book reflects Peirce's work on the issue in Husserl's contemporaneous doctrine of categorical intuition and charts the many unnoticed similarities between Peircean semiotics and early Husserlian phenomenology.

No reasonable person would deny that the sound of a falling pin is less intense than the feeling of a hot poker pressed against the skin, or that the recollection of something seen decades earlier is less vivid than beholding it in the present. Yet John Locke is quick to dismiss a blind man's report that the color scarlet is like the sound of a trumpet, and Thomas Nagel similarly avers that such loose intermodal analogies are of little use in developing an objective phenomenology. Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), by striking contrast, maintains rather that the blind man is correct. Peirce's reasoning stems from his phenomenology, which has received little attention as compared with his logic, pragmatism, or semiotics. Peirce argues that one can describe the similarities and differences between such experiences as seeing a scarlet red and hearing a trumpet's blare or hearing a falling pin and feeling a hot poker. Drawing on the Kantian idea that the analysis of consciousness should take as its guide formal logic, Peirce contends that we can construct a table of the elements of consciousness, just as Dmitri Mendeleev constructed a table of the chemical elements. By showing that the elements of consciousness fall into distinct classes, Peirce makes significant headway in developing the very sort of objective phenomenology which vindicates the studious blind man Locke so derides. Charles S. Peirce's Phenomenology shows how his phenomenology rests on his logic, gives an account of Peirce's phenomenology as science, and then shows how his work can be used to develop an objective phenomenological vocabulary. Ultimately, Richard Kenneth Atkins shows how Peirce's pioneering and distinctive formal logic led him to a phenomenology that addresses many of the questions philosophers of mind continue to raise today.

Charles Sanders Peirce argued that the aim of inquiry is the fixation of belief, and that the scientific method is the most effective way of so doing.