Belief systems are supposed to be governed by norms of rationality. Yet some people seem to believe quite extraordinary things: for example, that they are dead, or that their closest relatives have been replaced by impostors, or that the person they see in the mirror is not really them, or that someone else's thoughts are being inserted into their mind. Do people really believe such things? Could beliefs like these simply be rational interpretations of unusual experiences? Why are these beliefs maintained despite their utter implausibility and the uniform skepticism with which others greet them? In this book, psychologists and philosophers describe and discuss a range of case studies of delusional beliefs, drawing out general lessons both for the cognitive architecture of the mind and for the notion of rationality, and exploring connections between the delusional beliefs that occur in schizophrenia and the flawed understanding of beliefs that is characteristic of autism.

This volume is an interdisciplinary examination of the relationship between delusions and self-deception, bringing recent work on motivated reasoning to bear on the problems posed by these forms of pathological belief. The volume will appeal to cognitive scientists, clinicians and philosophers interested in the nature of belief and the disturbances to which it is subject.

This book explores how the human mind works through the lens of psychological disorders, challenging many existing theoretical constructs, especially in the fields of psychology, psychiatry and philosophy of mind. Drawing on the expertise of leading academics, the book discusses how psychopathology can be used to inform our understanding of the human mind. The book argues that studying mental disorders can deepen the understanding of psychological mechanisms such as reasoning, emotions, and beliefs alongside fundamental philosophical questions, including the nature of the self, the universal aspects of morality, and the role of rationality and normativity in human nature. By crossing different domains, this book offers a fresh perspective on the human mind based on the dialogue between philosophy, cognitive science and clinical psychology. Mental disorders discussed include schizophrenia, anxiety disorders, major depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder and paranoia. This book caters to the increasing interest in interdisciplinary approach to solving some of the problems in psychopathology. Since this book treats psychological engagement with empirically informed philosophy of mind, this book is essential reading for students and researchers of cognitive psychology, clinical psychology, and philosophy, as well as being of interest to clinicians and psychiatrists.

'Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience' is a philosophical analysis of the study of psychpathology, considering how cognitive neuroscience has been applied in psychiatry. The text examines many neuroscientific methods, such as neuroimaging, and a variety of psychiatric disorders, including depression, and schizophrenia.

Schizophrenia has been investigated predominantly from psychological, psychiatric and neurobiological perspectives. This text examines it from a philosophical point of view.

"Pathologies of Power" uses harrowing stories of life and death to argue thatthe promotion of social and economic rights of the poor is the most importanthuman rights struggle of our times.

A woman glances at a broken clock and comes to believe it is a quarter past seven. Yet, despite the broken clock, it really does happen to be a quarter past seven. Her belief is true, but it isn't knowledge. This is a classic illustration of a central problem in epistemology: determining what knowledge requires in addition to true belief. In this provocative book, Richard Foley finds a new solution to the problem in the observation that whenever someone has a true belief but not knowledge, there is some significant aspect of the situation about which she lacks true beliefs--something important that she doesn't quite "get." This may seem a modest point but, as Foley shows, it has the potential to reorient the theory of knowledge. Whether a true belief counts as knowledge depends on the importance of the information one does or doesn't have. This means that questions of knowledge cannot be separated from questions about human concerns and values. It also means that, contrary to what is often thought, there is no privileged way of coming to know. Knowledge is a mutt. Proper pedigree is not required. What matters is that one doesn't lack important nearby information. Challenging some of the central assumptions of contemporary epistemology, this is an original and important account of knowledge.

Psychopathology lies at the centre of effective psychiatric practice and mental health care, and Fish's Clinical Psychopathology has shaped the training and clinical practice of psychiatrists for over fifty years. The fourth edition of this modern classic presents the clinical descriptions and psychopathological insights of Fish's to a new generation of students and practitioners. It includes recent revisions of diagnostic classification systems, as well as new chapters that consider the controversies of classifying psychiatric disorder and the fundamental role and uses of psychopathology. Clear and readable, it provides concise descriptions of the signs and symptoms of mental illness and astute accounts of the varied manifestations of disordered psychological function, and is designed for use in clinical practice. An essential text for students of medicine, trainees in psychiatry and practising psychiatrists, it will also be useful to psychiatric nurses, mental health social workers and clinical psychologists.

Examines what can be learnt about the brain mechanisms underlying religious practice from studying people with neurological disorders.