The parliamentary style of politics has been formed over centuries; nobody theorised it in advance. This book presents a thought experiment to spell out key principles of the parliamentary ideal type of politics. Max Weber offers the main intellectual inspiration, Westminster parliament provides the main historical reference and the author’s studies on parliamentary procedure and rhetoric provide the background for the book. Parliamentary acting and thinking offer us the best example of politics as a contingent and controversial activity. Using a parliamentary imagination, the author constructs the ideal type in five main chapters: dissensual modes of proceeding; rhetoric of parliamentary debate; parliamentary formation and control of government; parliamentarians as politicians; and parliamentary time as their common subtext. In the last two chapters, the book outlines the possibilities of extending parliamentary judgment to politics beyond parliaments proper and the chances for parliamentary politics succeeding today.

Parliamentary theory, practices, discourses, and institutions constitute a distinctively European contribution to modern politics. Taking a broad historical perspective, this cross-disciplinary, innovative, and rigorous collection locates the essence of parliamentarism in four key aspects—deliberation, representation, responsibility, and sovereignty—and explores the different ways in which they have been contested, reshaped, and implemented in a series of representative national and regional case studies. As one of the first comparative studies in conceptual history, this volume focuses on debates about the nature of parliament and parliamentarism within and across different European countries, representative institutions, and genres of political discourse.

There has been a huge in increase in the constituency workload over the past few years adding to the pressure on Members of Parliament. Each Member has a different way of working which means in considering sitting hours there are no mainstream options which are necessarily right or wrong. The evidence suggests that the current balance of about 150 days over 34 weeks per year is broadly correct and should remain approximately as is. The Committee recommends that the House should be given the opportunity to vote on whether the House should continue to sit in September from 2013 onwards. There is widespread recognition that there is no scope for any diminution in the time available to the House for debate and scrutiny of legislation. The current pattern of 8 sitting hours on each sitting day between Monday and Thursday should therefore also continue, subject to future decisions concerning Friday sittings. Suggestions were heard that the House should sit normal working hours but that could be ill-suited to the transaction of other important Parliamentary business and needs of Members whose constituencies are some distance from Westminster. The House should be enabled to come to a decision in respect of each different day. The Committee is also currently considering whether consideration of private Members' bills should be moved from Fridays; and programming of legislation. The proposal of 'injury time' to compensate for time spent on oral statements was deemed undesirable but the Committee suggests that there should be a mechanism for backbenchers to question a Minister between 11.00 and 11.30 on Wednesdays

This book is a response to the dangers posed to constitutional democracy by the continuous growth of executive power and the simultaneous decline of parliaments’ role in policy formation. These phenomena are often manifested in the manipulation and even the violation of the rules of parliamentary law-making, called irregularities. If left without consequences, these irregularities can ultimately lead to the elimination of the procedural constraints imposed on the ruling political forces to prevent their arbitrary exercise of power. This work investigates the constitutional significance of the irregularities of parliamentary law-making and explores the role that courts play in the remedy of these flaws. The analysis is premised on the concept of equilibrium. This explanatory concept denotes an ideal state in which parliamentary law-making complies with the requirements of constitutionalism, and judicial review is conceptualized as a mechanism suitable to achieve this aim. The volume places the judicial review of the regulation and the practice of parliamentary law-making at its center and discusses all the relevant legal concepts, institutions, and doctrines. It combines theoretical analysis with case law-centered comparative research covering a large number of decisions delivered by apex courts operating in various jurisdictions. Due to this methodological choice, the book aims to simultaneously contribute to the scholarly discourse and provide useful information to practicing lawyers and policymakers working in the areas of constitutional law and politics and comparative law.