Hindsight, Insight, Foresight is a tour d’horizon of security issues in the Indo-Pacific. Written by 20 current and former members of the faculty at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, its 21 chapters provide hindsight, insight, and foresight on numerous aspects of security in the region. This book will help readers to understand the big picture, grasp the changing faces, and comprehend the local dynamics of regional security.

To explore what extended competition between the United States and China might entail out to 2050, the authors of this report identified and characterized China’s grand strategy, analyzed its component national strategies (diplomacy, economics, science and technology, and military affairs), and assessed how successful China might be at implementing these over the next three decades.

Since the end of the World War II, nation states have formed regions to give them some protection from the processes of globalization and internationalization. Against this background, the contributors consider the position of China in the processes of regional competitive interdependency. This book offers analysis at three levels: internal, regional, and global. Chapters consider China’s position in regional post-socialist associations such as the BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), the Silk Road Economic Belt and the ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR). Contributors discuss how membership in these regional bodies is likely to enhance China’s economic power, strategic position, and political importance. A major theme addressed is whether these new powers will become complementary to the American-led economic core countries or evolve as countervailing powers. Contributors suggest that linkages favored by China’s regional associations are more ‘network’ based and informal in character. They are more in keeping with regionalization rather than regional blocs such as the European Union, which have ‘locked in’ members to market-driven institutions. Thus, these new developments move away from a neo-liberal market perspective and satisfy the needs of members to retain their economic and political sovereignty. This book considers whether these new regional blocs led by China will perform a ‘transformative’ process for the international order or become an alternative—supplementary to, but not replacing, the existing institutions of the North. An important topic is the relationship of Russia and China to the Central Asian countries of the former USSR and the interaction between the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union and the Chinese initiative of the Silk Road Economic Belt. There is potential for the evolution of an alliance between China and Russia against the neo-liberal order led by the USA. Concurrently, they bring out possible the tensions between Russia’s and China’s conflicting interests over influence in Central Asia. Reactions to China’s rise include the Trump administration’s movement from a multilateral to a bi-lateral trade policy and the threat of discriminatory tariffs for China. The contributors seek to promote a better appreciation of China’s role in regional associations, and the implications of contemporary developments in economic, geo-political, and international political affairs in the 21st century.

In this report, the author examines whether and how the United States can increase its cooperation with Indonesia in order to manage China's rise as a strategic competitor to the United States in the Indo-Pacific region.

Since its creation in 1963, United States Southern Command has been led by 30 senior officers representing all four of the armed forces. None has undertaken his leadership responsibilities with the cultural sensitivity and creativity demonstrated by Admiral Jim Stavridis during his tenure in command. Breaking with tradition, Admiral Stavridis discarded the customary military model as he organized the Southern Command Headquarters. In its place he created an organization designed not to subdue adversaries, but instead to build durable and enduring partnerships with friends. His observation that it is the business of Southern Command to launch "ideas not missiles" into the command's area of responsibility gained strategic resonance throughout the Caribbean and Central and South America, and at the highest levels in Washington, DC.

Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis argue that the United States has responded inadequately to the rise of Chinese power. This Council Special Report recommends placing less strategic emphasis on the goal of integrating China into the international system and more on balancing China's rise.

World events in recent years have led observers, particularly since late 2013, to conclude that the international security environment in recent years has undergone a shift from the post-Cold War era that began in the late 1980s and early 1990s, also sometimes known as the unipolar moment (with the United States as the unipolar power), to a new and different situation that features, among other things, renewed great power competition with China and Russia and challenges by these two countries and others to elements of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II. The shift to renewed great power competition has become a major factor in the debate over future U.S. defense spending levels, and has led to new or renewed emphasis on the following in discussions of U.S. defense strategy, plans, and programs: * grand strategy and geopolitics as part of the context for discussing U.S. defense budgets, plans, and programs; * nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence;* new U.S. military service operational concepts;* U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe;* capabilities for conducting so-called high-end conventional warfare (i.e., largescale, high-intensity, technologically sophisticated warfare) against countries such as China and Russia; * maintaining U.S. technological superiority in conventional weapons;* speed of weapon system development and deployment as a measure of merit in defense acquisition policy;* mobilization capabilities for an extended-length large-scale conflict against an adversary such as China or Russia;* minimizing reliance in U.S. military systems on components and materials from Russia and China; and* capabilities for countering so-called hybrid warfare and gray-zone tactics employed by countries such as Russia and China.

Based on the framework of geostrategic psychology, this book elucidates the intrinsic law of the rise and fall of great powers and gives insights into the quandary of China's rise and the mechanism behind the strategy. Conflating geopolitics and strategic psychology, geostrategic psychology is rooted in the historical study of strategy and premised on an assumption that human beings bear resemblance in psychology and behavior when facing the same structure of geopolitical circumstance. The book analyzes intriguing phenomena from strategic psychology, including trend anxiety and conflict willingness, the Old Man Phenomenon in international politics, the Santa Claus Effect, the Myth of the Sunk Cost Fallacy, Bidder Myth, Gambler's Game, Philip Trap, William's Dilemma, Heartland Myth, Domino's Fear, Golden Nation Myth, Alliance Commitment Dilemma and Corinthian Dilemma among others. The author combines theory, history and the practice of international politics, revealing how a nation can occupy a favorable position in the field of global strategic competition and prospects for China. The title will be a valuable reference for observers of international politics as well as researchers and students interested in international relations, international politics, geopolitics, strategic psychology and geostrategic psychology.