Oversight of funds provided to Iraqi ministries through the national budget process .

"This audit report discusses the oversight of the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) funds provided to the Interim Iraq Government (IIG) ministries through the national budget process"--Page [i].

In June 2005, we initiated this audit to determine whether the information systems used by U.S. government organizations resulted in the effective management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) programs. Issuance of this audit report was delayed to take into consideration significant management improvement actions that took place in September 2005. At that time, the Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO), required a unified IRRF reporting system be developed and directed all agencies spending IRRF dollars to load and update project data in the system. Preliminary findings from this audit were used as input for the development of the requirements contained in the September 20, 2005, Action Memorandum issued by the IRMO Director (see Appendix B). This audit report is one of a series of reports addressing the information technology (IT) and management information systems being used to support IRRF programs and their ability to produce reliable and accurate information. This report discusses the development, management and evolution of the Iraq Reconstruction Management System (IRMS).

We know more today.about how the Administration has mismanaged the contracts to reconstruct Iraq. And what we have learned shows that the problems are even worse than we thought. All.perspectives point to the same conclusion: Halliburton is gouging the taxpayer and the Bush Administration doesn't seem to care.-Statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman, U.S. House of Representatives' Committee on Government ReformREBUILDING IRAQ: U.S. Mismanagement in the Middle East discussed the oversight of the Development Fund for Iraq funds through the national budgetary process. Originally issued in late January 2005 by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, the main objective of this audit was to determine whether the Coalition's Provisional Authority (CPA) implemented adequate procedures for the recording, reviewing and reporting disbursements for the reconstruction of Iraq. The results of the audit contain detailed information relating to managerial, financial, and contract controls as well as formal recommendations about the oversight of the Development Fund for Iraq funds.Organized chronologically from early December 2004 through end of July 2005, additional documents contained in this report include numerous Facts Sheets on the value of Halliburton contracts including a comprehensive overview of the total value these contracts as well as information pointing to serious problems from severe contract abuses to the mismanagement of funds in Iraq.

This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. Since 2003, the United States has reported obligating $642 billion for U.S. military operations in Iraq and provided about $24 billion for training, equipment, and other services for Iraqi security forces. To assist Congress in overseeing efforts to encourage the Iraqi government to contribute more toward the cost of securing and stabilizing Iraq, this report provides information on: (1) the amount and availability of Iraq's budget surplus or deficit; (2) the amount of Iraq's financial deposit balances; and (3) the extent to which Iraq has spent its financial resources on security costs. To conduct this audit, the report analyzed Iraqi financial data, reviewed U.S. and Iraqi documents, and interviewed U.S. and Iraqi officials. Charts and tables.

Since 2001, Congress has appropriated nearly $700 billion for the global war on terrorism. The majority of these funds have supported U.S. efforts in Iraq. Congressional oversight is crucial to improve performance, ensure accountability, and protect U.S. programs from fraud, waste, and abuse. Since 2003, there have been nearly 130 Iraq-related reports and testimonies. This testimony addresses: (1) factors contributing to poor contracting outcomes and accountability; (2) long-standing issues in the Dept. of Defense¿s management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces; and (3) efforts to improve the capacity of the Iraqi government Includes recommendations. Charts and tables.

Consistent with the literature on state building, failed states, peacekeeping and foreign assistance, this book argues that budgeting is a core state activity necessary for the operation of a functional government. Employing a historical institutionalist approach, this book first explores the Ottoman, British and Ba'athist origins of Iraq's budgetary institutions. The book next examines American pre-war planning, the Coalition Provisional Authority's rule-making and budgeting following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the mixed success of the Coalition's capacity-building programs initiated throughout the occupation. This book sheds light on the problem of 'outsiders' building states, contributes to a more comprehensive evaluation of the Coalition in Iraq, addresses the question of why Iraqis took ownership of some Coalition-generated institutions, and helps explain the nature of institutional change.