The form of bounded rationality characterizing the representative agent is key in the choice of the optimal monetary policy regime. While inflation targeting prevails for myopia that distorts agents' inflation expectations, price level targeting emerges as the optimal policy under myopia regarding the output gap, revenue, or interest rate. To the extent that bygones are not bygones under price level targeting, rational inflation expectations is a minimal condition for optimality in a behavioral world. Instrument rules implementation of this optimal policy is shown to be infeasible, questioning the ability of simple rules à la Taylor (1993) to assist the conduct of monetary policy. Bounded rationality is not necessarily associated with welfare losses.

This book provides a thorough survey of the model-based literature on optimal monetary in a stochastic setting. The survey begins with the literature of the 1970s which focused on the information problem in policy design and extends to the New Keynesian approach of the 1990s which centered on evaluating alternative targeting strategies. New to the second edition is consideration of research since the world financial crisis on the role of financial markets and institutions in the conduct of monetary policy.

It is widely recognised that the market and the monetary authorities face a high degree of uncertainty about the appropriate models to use for policy decisions and forecasting. This paper reviews the main theoretical results of the literature on bounded rationality and discusses the implications for the design of optimal policy rules. In the final section, we propose an original method to evaluate policy rules that are 'robust' to uncertainty about the expectation formation process.

This paper presents a framework for analyzing how bounded rationality affects monetary and fiscal policy. The model is a tractable and parsimonious enrichment of the widely-used New Keynesian model – with one main new parameter, which quantifies how poorly agents understand future policy and its impact. That myopia parameter, in turn, affects the power of monetary and fiscal policy in a microfounded general equilibrium. A number of consequences emerge. (i) Fiscal stimulus or \helicopter drops of money" are powerful and, indeed, pull the economy out of the zero lower bound. More generally, the model allows for the joint analysis of optimal monetary and fiscal policy. (ii) The Taylor principle is strongly modified: even with passive monetary policy, equilibrium is determinate, whereas the traditional rational model yields multiple equilibria, which reduce its predictive power, and generates indeterminate economies at the zero lower bound (ZLB). (iii) The ZLB is much less costly than in the traditional model. (iv) The model helps solve the “forward guidance puzzle”: the fact that in the rational model, shocks to very distant rates have a very powerful impact on today's consumption and inflation: because agents are partially myopic, this effect is muted. (v) Optimal policy changes qualitatively: the optimal commitment policy with rational agents demands “nominal GDP targeting”; this is not the case with behavioral firms, as the benefits of commitment are less strong with myopic forms. (vi) The model is “neo-Fisherian” in the long run, but Keynesian in the short run: a permanent rise in the interest rate decreases inflation in the short run but increases it in the long run. The non-standard behavioral features of the model seem warranted by the empirical evidence.

Casting a wide net in this, their second edition, Froyen and Guender provide coverage of the model-based literature on optimal monetary policy in the presence of uncertainty, with both open- and closed-economy frameworks considered. The authors have grounded New Keynesian research of the 1990s and 2000s in the literature of the 1970s, which viewed optimal policy as primarily a question of the optimal use of information, and studies in the 1980s that gave primacy to time inconsistency problems. The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-09 led to the recognition that financial markets and institutions required greater attention in policy modelling. Herein, the authors provide a thorough survey of the post-crisis literature that resulted from this recognition.Researchers in academia and at central banks, students and policy makers will value the wide scope of coverage provided in this examination, leading them to a better understanding of issues such as discretion versus commitment, target versus instrument rules, policy in closed versus open economies and the proper mandate for central banks, including the relationship between interest rate policy and macro-prudential instruments.

Over the past fifteen years, a significant number of industrialized and middle-income countries have adopted inflation targeting as a framework for monetary policymaking. As the name suggests, in such inflation-targeting regimes, the central bank is responsible for achieving a publicly announced target for the inflation rate. While the objective of controlling inflation enjoys wide support among both academic experts and policymakers, and while the countries that have followed this model have generally experienced good macroeconomic outcomes, many important questions about inflation targeting remain. In Inflation Targeting, a distinguished group of contributors explores the many underexamined dimensions of inflation targeting—its potential, its successes, and its limitations—from both a theoretical and an empirical standpoint, and for both developed and emerging economies. The volume opens with a discussion of the optimal formulation of inflation-targeting policy and continues with a debate about the desirability of such a model for the United States. The concluding chapters discuss the special problems of inflation targeting in emerging markets, including the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary.