This invaluable book provides an account of Operational Research in Britain, the country of its inception, from the late 1930s to 1970. Originating in response to the country's air defence needs against the Luftwaffe, Operational Research had outstanding achievements as part of the 'secret war' against Nazi Germany. After 1945, the discipline began to be adopted in an increasing range of industries and services. In the 1960s -- by which time it was being incorporated in to university curricula -- the discipline began to penetrate into civil government departments. The history of Operational Research provides unique insights into the conduct of modern warfare, the professionalisation of business management and the modernisation of the civil service. The chronological coverage, from the late 1930s to 1970, coincides with 'golden age' of Operational Research, when the discipline was presented as a means of achieving optimum solutions to complex managerial problems. The book will be of interest to military and business historians, as well as to historians of public administration and higher education.

This is the first of two projected volumes on the history of operational research (OR) in Britain commissioned by the UK Operational Research Society. Based upon a vast array of published and unpublished sources, the book provides an original account of the discipline's pre-war and wartime origins. This serves as a prelude to a wide-ranging analysis of the diffusion of OR into the public and private sectors after 1945. The chapters on the role of OR in iron and steel and coalmining, and its rapid adoption in the UK corporate sector after 1960, will be of particular interest to practitioners. The book also analyses and explains the diffusion of OR into local and central government and provides an informed commentary on the origins and subsequent history of the OR Society. Professor Kirby has related the development of OR in the UK to contemporary developments in the USA. The book concludes with a resume of the post-1970 debates concerning the future trajectory of OR.

Arising from the urgent operational issues of World War II, the philosophy and methodology of Operations Research (OR) has permeated the resolution of decision problems in business, industry, and government. This work recounts the evolution of OR as the science of decision making. It chronicles the history of OR in the form of expository entries.

Making War and Building Peace examines how well United Nations peacekeeping missions work after civil war. Statistically analyzing all civil wars since 1945, the book compares peace processes that had UN involvement to those that didn't. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis argue that each mission must be designed to fit the conflict, with the right authority and adequate resources. UN missions can be effective by supporting new actors committed to the peace, building governing institutions, and monitoring and policing implementation of peace settlements. But the UN is not good at intervening in ongoing wars. If the conflict is controlled by spoilers or if the parties are not ready to make peace, the UN cannot play an effective enforcement role. It can, however, offer its technical expertise in multidimensional peacekeeping operations that follow enforcement missions undertaken by states or regional organizations such as NATO. Finding that UN missions are most effective in the first few years after the end of war, and that economic development is the best way to decrease the risk of new fighting in the long run, the authors also argue that the UN's role in launching development projects after civil war should be expanded.

World War II defined its heroes and villains. There are many books on national leaders like Churchill and Hitler, generals like Montgomery and Rommel. Less has been written about the civilian scientists, engineers, and technicians whose work produced military innovations that drove the direction and outcome of that terrible conflict. This book is a connected and interlaced narrative of two men who were World War II civilian scientists. It is a non-technical portrait of two twentieth-century life stories against a backdrop of war and peace, which are important in both historical context and as illustrations of the human condition lived in extraordinary circumstances. The lives of A. P. Rowe and John Strath intersected in the British development of radar in the 1930s and 1940s and then diverged into critical roles in Britain and Australia after the war. Rowe and Strath worked in Britains epic development of radar defences, without which the 1940 aerial Battle of Britain would have been lost. Rowe led what has been termed as one of the most successful research establishments of all time, focussed on the development and deployment of radar; Strath was a junior member of that establishment. After the war, both men moved to Australia where Rowe, after a short and unhappy involvement as lead scientific adviser on the development of Australia's Woomera rocket range and Australian defence, was for a decade a highly contentious vice chancellor of the University of Adelaide. Strath became involved in development of the British atomic weapon and monitoring of nuclear test effects in Australia and then became the prime mover for development of what is now Australias Jindalee Operational Radar Network, a major component of the countrys long-range defence surveillance.

Peace operations are the UN ́s flagship activity. Over the past decade, UN blue helmets have been dispatched to ever more challenging environments from the Congo to Timor to perform an expanding set of tasks. From protecting civilians in the midst of violent conflict to rebuilding state institutions after war, a new range of tasks has transformed the business of the blue helmets into an inherently knowledge-based venture. But all too often, the UN blue helmets, policemen, and other civilian officials have been "flying blind" in their efforts to stabilize countries ravaged by war. The UN realized the need to put knowledge, guidance and doctrine, and reflection on failures and successes at the center of the institution. Building on an innovative multi-disciplinary framework, this study provides a first comprehensive account of learning in peacekeeping. Covering the crucial past decade of expansion in peace operations, it zooms into a dozen cases of attempted learning across four crucial domains: police assistance, judicial reform, reintegration of former combatants, and mission integration. Throughout the different cases, the study analyzes the role of key variables as enablers and stumbling blocks for learning: bureaucratic politics, the learning infrastructure, leadership as well as power and interests of member states. Building on five years of research and access to key documents and decision-makers, the book presents a vivid portrait of an international bureaucracy struggling to turn itself into a learning organization. Aimed at policy-makers, diplomats, and a wide academic audience (including those working in international relations, peace research, political science, public administration, and organizational sociology), the book is an indispensable resource for anyone interested in the evolution of modern peace operations.

Peacekeeping has gradually evolved to encompass a broad range of different conflict management missions and techniques, which are incorporated under the term "peace operations." Well over 100 missions have been deployed, the vast majority within the last twenty years. This book provides an overview of the central issues surrounding the development, operation, and effectiveness of peace operations. Among many features, the book: Traces the historical development of peace operations from their origins in the early 20th century through the development of modern peacebuilding missions. Tracks changes over time in the size, mission, and organization of peace operations. Analyses different organizational, financial, and troop provisions for peace operations, as well as assessing alternatives. Lays out criteria for evaluating peace operations and details the conditions under which such operations are successful. As peace operations become the primary mechanism of conflict management used by the UN and regional organizations, understanding their problems and potential is essential for a more secure world. Drawing on a wide range of examples from those between Israel and her neighbors to more recent operations in Somalia and the Congo, this book brings together the body of scholarly research on peace operations to address those concerns. It will be an indispensable guide for students, practitioners and general readers wanting to broaden their knowledge of the possibilities and limits of peace operations today.

When powerful states and international organizations decide to respond to violent conflict around the world, their preferred policy instrument is to deploy peace operations -- institutions that must serve both the international politics of their creation as well as the fractured local societies they aim to transform. But while their international face has been widely analysed, we know less about how peace operations function 'on the ground.' In How Peace Operations Work, Jeni Whalan addresses this critical dimension of peacekeeping. She analyses the effectiveness of peace operations through a local lens, asking new questions about how they work, and generating new insights about how they might be made to work better. What emerges is the overriding importance of local legitimacy -- the perception among local actors that a peace operation, its personnel, and its objectives are right, fair, and appropriate. How Peace Operations Work demonstrates that when local actors perceive a peace operation to be legitimate, they are more likely to help the operation achieve its goals. This book combines novel theoretical progress with rich empirical work, drawing on in-depth case studies of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) to propose a new approach to studying the effectiveness of peace operations, and a set of practical recommendations that challenge key elements of prevailing peace operations policy.

This book is a critical political and institutional reflection on UN peace operations. It provides constructive suggestions as to how the UN and the international system can evolve to remain relevant and tackle the peace and security challenges of the 21st century, without abandoning the principles that the UN was founded upon and on which the legitimacy of UN peace operations rests. The author analyses the evolving politics on UN peace operations of the five veto powers of the UN Security Council, as well as major troop-contributing countries and western powers. He investigates the move towards peace enforcement and counter-terrorism, and what consequences this development may have for the UN. Karlsrud issues a challenge to practitioners and politicians to make sure that the calls for reform are anchored in a desire to improve the lives of people suffering in conflicts on the ground—and not spurred by intra-organizational turf battles or solely the narrow self-interests of member states. Finally, he asks how the UN can adapt its practices to become more field- and people-centered, in line with its core, primary commitments of protecting and serving people in need.

As the U.S. experience in Iraq following the 2003 invasion made abundantly clear, failure to properly plan for risks associated with postconflict stabilization and reconstruction can have a devastating impact on the overall success of a military mission. In Waging War, Planning Peace, Aaron Rapport investigates how U.S. presidents and their senior advisers have managed vital noncombat activities while the nation is in the midst of fighting or preparing to fight major wars. He argues that research from psychology—specifically, construal level theory—can help explain how individuals reason about the costs of postconflict noncombat operations that they perceive as lying in the distant future.In addition to preparations for "Phase IV" in the lead-up to the Iraq War, Rapport looks at the occupation of Germany after World War II, the planned occupation of North Korea in 1950, and noncombat operations in Vietnam in 1964 and 1965. Applying his insights to these cases, he finds that civilian and military planners tend to think about near-term tasks in concrete terms, seriously assessing the feasibility of the means they plan to employ to secure valued ends. For tasks they perceive as further removed in time, they tend to focus more on the desirability of the overarching goals they are pursuing rather than the potential costs, risks, and challenges associated with the means necessary to achieve these goals. Construal level theory, Rapport contends, provides a coherent explanation of how a strategic disconnect can occur. It can also show postwar planners how to avoid such perilous missteps.