Syllogism is a form of logical argument allowing one to deduce a consistent conclusion based on a pair of premises having a common term. Although Aristotle was the first to conceive and develop this way of reasoning, he left open a lot of conceptual space for further modifications, improvements and systematizations with regards to his original syllogistic theory. From its creation until modern times, syllogism has remained a powerful and compelling device of deduction and argument, used by a variety of figures and assuming a variety of forms throughout history. The Aftermath of Syllogism investigates the key developments in the history of this peculiar pattern of inference, from Avicenna to Hegel. Taking as its focus the longue durée of development between the Middle Ages and the nineteenth century, this book looks at the huge reworking scientific syllogism underwent over the centuries, as some of the finest philosophical minds brought it to an unprecedented height of logical sharpness and sophistication. Bringing together a group of major international experts in the Aristotelian tradition, The Aftermath of Syllogism provides a detailed, up to date and critical evaluation of the history of syllogistic deduction.

The present book is the English version of a monograph 'Die aristotelische Syllogistik', which first appeared ten years ago in the series of Abhand 1 lungen edited by the Academy of Sciences in Gottingen. In the preface to the English edition, I would first like to express my indebtedness to Mr. J. Barnes, now fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. He not only translated what must have been a difficult text with exemplary precision and ingenuity, but followed critically every argument and check ed every reference. While translating it, he has improved the book. Of those changes which I have made on Mr. Barnes' suggestion I note only the more important ones on pages 4, 12, 24sq, 32, 39, 6lsq, and 158. Since the second edition of the German text appeared in 1963 some further reviews have been published, or come to my notice, which I have 2 been able to make use of in improving the text of this new edition. I must mention here especially the detailed critical discussions of my results and arguments published by Professor W. Wieland in the Philosophische Rundschau 14 (1966), 1-27 and by Professor E. Scheibe in Gnomon 39 (1967), 454-64. Both scholars, while agreeing with the main drift and method of my interpretation, criticise some of my results and disagree with some of my arguments. It would not be possible to discuss these technical matters here with the necessary thoroughness.

Aristotle was the founder not only of logic but also of modal logic. In the Prior Analytics he developed a complex system of modal syllogistic which, while influential, has been disputed since antiquity—and is today widely regarded as incoherent. In this meticulously argued new study, Marko Malink presents a major reinterpretation of Aristotle’s modal syllogistic. Combining analytic rigor with keen sensitivity to historical context, he makes clear that the modal syllogistic forms a consistent, integrated system of logic, one that is closely related to other areas of Aristotle’s philosophy. Aristotle’s modal syllogistic differs significantly from modern modal logic. Malink considers the key to understanding the Aristotelian version to be the notion of predication discussed in the Topics—specifically, its theory of predicables (definition, genus, differentia, proprium, and accident) and the ten categories (substance, quantity, quality, and so on). The predicables introduce a distinction between essential and nonessential predication. In contrast, the categories distinguish between substantial and nonsubstantial predication. Malink builds on these insights in developing a semantics for Aristotle’s modal propositions, one that verifies the ancient philosopher’s claims of the validity and invalidity of modal inferences. Malink recognizes some limitations of this reconstruction, acknowledging that his proof of syllogistic consistency depends on introducing certain complexities that Aristotle could not have predicted. Nonetheless, Aristotle’s Modal Syllogistic brims with bold ideas, richly supported by close readings of the Greek texts, and offers a fresh perspective on the origins of modal logic.

Have you ever read a legal opinion and come across an odd term like the fallacy of denying the antecedent, the fallacy of the undistributed middle, or the fallacy of the illicit process and wondered how you missed that in law school? You’re not alone: every day, lawyers make arguments that fatally trespass the rules of formal logic—without realizing it—because traditional legal education often overlooks imparting the practical wisdom of ancient philosophy as it teaches students how to “think like a lawyer.” In his book, The Force of Logic: Using Formal Logic as a Tool in the Craft of Legal Argument, lawyer and law professor Stephen M. Rice guides you to develop your powers of legal reasoning in a new way, through effective tips and tactics that will forever change the way you argue your cases. Rice contends that formal logic provides tools that help lawyers distinguish good arguments from bad ones and, moreover, that they are simple to learn and use. When you know how to recognize logical fallacies, you will not only strengthen your own arguments, but you will also be able to punch holes in your opponent’s—and that can make the difference between winning and losing. In this book, Rice builds on the theoretical foundation of formal logic by demonstrating logical fallacies through the use of anecdotes, examples, graphical illustrations, and exercises for you to try that are derived from common case documents. It is a hands-on primer that presents a practical approach for understanding and mastering the place of formal logic in the art of legal reasoning. Whether you are a lawyer, a judge, a scholar, or a student, The Force of Logic will inspire you to love legal argument, and appreciate its beauty and complexity in a brand new way.

Symbolic logic may be superior to classical Aristotelian logic for the sciences, but not for the humanities. This text is designed for do-it-yourselfers as well as classrooms.

Originally published in 1966 On the Syllogism and Other Logical Writings assembles for the first time the five celebrated memoirs of Augustus De Morgan on the syllogism. These are collected together with the more condensed accounts of his researches given in his Syllabus of a Proposed System of Logic an article on Logic contributed to the English Cyclopaedia. De Morgan was among the most distinguished of nineteenth century British mathematicians but is chiefly remembered today as one of the founders of modern mathematical logic. His writings on this subject have been little read, however since apart from his Formal Logic, they lie buried for the most part in inaccessible periodicals. De Morgan’s own later amendments are inserted in the text and the editorial introduction gives a summary of the whole and traces in some detail the course of the once-famous feud with Sir William Hamilton of Edinburgh.

Central to rhetorical theory, the enthymeme is most often defined as a truncated syllogism. Suppressing a premise that the audience already knows, this rhetorical device relies on the audience to fill in the missing information, thereby making the argument more persuasive. James Fredal argues that this view of the enthymeme is wrong. Presenting a new exegesis of Aristotle and classic texts of Attic oratory, Fredal shows that the standard reading of Aristotle’s enthymeme is inaccurate—and that Aristotle himself distorts what enthymemes are and how they work. From close analysis of the Rhetoric, Topics, and Analytics, Fredal finds that Aristotle’s enthymeme is, in fact, not syllogistic and is different from the enthymeme as it was used by Attic orators such as Lysias and Isaeus. Fredal argues that the enthymeme, as it was originally understood and used, is a technique of storytelling, primarily forensic storytelling, aimed at eliciting from the audience an inference about a narrative. According to Fredal, narrative rather than formal logic is the seedbed of the enthymeme and of rhetoric more broadly. The Enthymeme reassesses a fundamental doctrine of rhetorical instruction, clarifies the viewpoints of the tradition, and presents a new form of rhetoric for further study and use. This groundbreaking book will be welcomed by scholars and students of classical rhetoric, the history of rhetoric, and rhetorical theory as well as communications studies, classical studies, and classical philosophy.

This text looks at Aristotle's claims, particularly the much-maligned doctrine of the mean.

Part I of this coherent, well-organized text deals with formal principles of inference and definition. Part II explores elementary intuitive set theory, with separate chapters on sets, relations, and functions. Ideal for undergraduates.

The Cambridge Descartes Lexicon is the definitive reference source on René Descartes, 'the father of modern philosophy' and arguably among the most important philosophers of all time. Examining the full range of Descartes' achievements and legacy, it includes 256 in-depth entries that explain key concepts relating to his thought. Cumulatively they uncover interpretative disputes, trace his influences, and explain how his work was received by critics and developed by followers. There are entries on topics such as certainty, cogito ergo sum, doubt, dualism, free will, God, geometry, happiness, human being, knowledge, Meditations on First Philosophy, mind, passion, physics, and virtue, which are written by the largest and most distinguished team of Cartesian scholars ever assembled for a collaborative research project - 92 contributors from ten countries.