At the outset of the 1980's NATO decided to extend the scien tific program of its Scientific Affairs Division to include the social sciences. Strategic and international studies were in cluded within this domain with the express purpose of facilitating communication among experts and research centers in member coun tries as well as in the Organization itself on these important topics. This study is the result of the first Advanced Research Workshop on a subject of international relations. It focuses on the historical and theoretical aspects of geopolitics because they must necessarily precede studies of policy application. This was the intent of the organizers of the Workshop as well as of the sponsoring institution. The choice of the topic was ours. Conclusions were drawn according to our own judgments--being totally unfettered by any guidance from NATO officials. Consequently, the views and conclu sions presented in this work do not represent any NATO policy; other than the encouragement of research in political freedom, by free scholars, to strengthen freedom everywhere. We speak for all participants in the Workshop when we voice our appreciation for the financial and organizational support extended us by the Scientific Affairs Division and the Information Directorate.

This work explains the course of international politics from the rebirth of the German Empire to the rise of China, with particular, though not exclusive, reference to spatial relationships.

Geopolitical conditions influence all strategic behaviour - even when cooperation among different kinds of military power is expected as the norm, action has to be planned and executed in specific physical environments. The geographical world cannot be avoided, and it happens to be 'organized' into land, sea, air and space - and possibly the electromagnetic spectrum including 'cyberspace'. Although the meaning of geography for strategy is a perpetual historical theme, explicit theory on the subject is only one hundred years old. Ideas about the implication of geographical, especially spatial, relationships for political power - which is to say 'geopolitics'- flourished early in the twentieth century. Divided into theory and practice sections, this volume covers the big names such as Mackinder, Mahan and Haushofer, as well as looking back at the vital influence of weather and geography on naval power in the long age of sail (sixteenth to nineteenth centuries). It also looks forward to the consequences of the revival of geopolitics in post-Soviet Russia and the new space-based field of "astropolitics".

Writers, observers, and practitioners of international politics frequently invoke the term "geopolitics" to describe, explain, or analyze specific foreign policy issues and problems. Such generalized usage ignores the fact that geopolitics as a method of understanding international relations has a history that includes a common vocabulary, well-established if sometimes conflicting concepts, an extensive body of thought, and a recognized group of theorists and scholars. In Geopolitics, Francis P. Sempa presents a history of geopolitical thought and applies its classical analyses to Cold War and post-Cold War international relations. While mindful of the impact of such concepts as "globalization" and the "information revolution" on our understanding of contemporary events, Sempa emphasizes traditional geopolitical theories in explaining the outcome of the Cold War. He shows that, the struggle between the Western allies and the Soviet empire was unique in its ideological component and nuclear standoff, the Cold War fits into a recurring geopolitical pattern. It can be seen as a consequence of competition between land powers and sea powers, and between a potential Eurasian hegemonic power and a coalition of states opposed to that would-be hegemony. The collapse of the Soviet empire ended the most recent threat to global stability. Acting as a successor to the British Empire, the United States organized, funded, and led a grand coalition that successfully countered the Soviet quest for domination. No power or alliance posed an immediate threat to the global balance of power. Indeed, the end of the Cold War generated hopes for a "new world order" and predictions that economics would replace geopolitics as the driving force in international politics. Russian instability, the nuclear dimension of the India-Pakistan conflict, and Chinese bids for dominance have turned the Asia-Pacific region into what Mahan called "debatable and debated ground." Russi

On Geopolitics shows how the 'new geopolitics' combines the fields of geography and international relations to create a comprehensive overview of current political developments. Using recent developments in geographical technology as well as traditional theories and methods, Harvey Starr explores themes of spatiality and territoriality as they connect to international affairs. He also examines geopolitical dynamics beyond borders in a world now buffeted by non state actors and subject to intergovernmental institutions and norms. On Geopolitics is a brilliant synthesis of Starr's ongoing work on conflict and co-operation, alliances, opportunity, and willingness, within a geographic framework. At the same time, Starr points the way toward new tools and techniques for the study of globalisation and world politics.

NEW YORK TIMES BESTSELLER • In this “ambitious and challenging” (The New York Review of Books) work, the bestselling author of Monsoon and Balkan Ghosts offers a revelatory prism through which to view global upheavals and to understand what lies ahead for continents and countries around the world. In The Revenge of Geography, Robert D. Kaplan builds on the insights, discoveries, and theories of great geographers and geopolitical thinkers of the near and distant past to look back at critical pivots in history and then to look forward at the evolving global scene. Kaplan traces the history of the world’s hot spots by examining their climates, topographies, and proximities to other embattled lands. The Russian steppe’s pitiless climate and limited vegetation bred hard and cruel men bent on destruction, for example, while Nazi geopoliticians distorted geopolitics entirely, calculating that space on the globe used by the British Empire and the Soviet Union could be swallowed by a greater German homeland. Kaplan then applies the lessons learned to the present crises in Europe, Russia, China, the Indian subcontinent, Turkey, Iran, and the Arab Middle East. The result is a holistic interpretation of the next cycle of conflict throughout Eurasia. Remarkably, the future can be understood in the context of temperature, land allotment, and other physical certainties: China, able to feed only 23 percent of its people from land that is only 7 percent arable, has sought energy, minerals, and metals from such brutal regimes as Burma, Iran, and Zimbabwe, putting it in moral conflict with the United States. Afghanistan’s porous borders will keep it the principal invasion route into India, and a vital rear base for Pakistan, India’s main enemy. Iran will exploit the advantage of being the only country that straddles both energy-producing areas of the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea. Finally, Kaplan posits that the United States might rue engaging in far-flung conflicts with Iraq and Afghanistan rather than tending to its direct neighbor Mexico, which is on the verge of becoming a semifailed state due to drug cartel carnage. A brilliant rebuttal to thinkers who suggest that globalism will trump geography, this indispensable work shows how timeless truths and natural facts can help prevent this century’s looming cataclysms.

This book argues that in the twenty-first century Eastern Eurasia will replace Europe as the theatre of decision in international affairs, and that this new geographic and cultural context will have a strong influence on the future of world affairs. For half a millennium, the great powers have practised what might be called ‘world politics’, yet during that time Europe, and small portions of the Near East and North Africa strategically vital to Europe, were the ‘centres of gravity’ in international politics. This book argues that the ‘unipolar moment’ of the post-Cold War era will not be replaced by a US-China ‘Cold War’, but rather by a long period of multipolarity in the twenty-first century. Examining the policy goals and possible military-political strategies of several powers, this study explains how Washington may play a key role in eastern Eurasian affairs if it can learn to operate in a very different political context. Dale Walton also considers the rapid pace of technological change and how it will impact on great power politics. Considering India, China, the US, Russia, Japan, and other countries as part of a multipolar system, he addresses the central questions that will drive US policy in the coming decades. Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the 21st Centurywill be of interest to students of international security, military history, geopolitics, and international relations.

Writers, observers, and practitioners of international politics frequently invoke the term "geopolitics" to describe, explain, or analyze specific foreign policy issues and problems. Such generalized usage ignores the fact that geopolitics as a method of understanding international relations has a history that includes a common vocabulary, well-established if sometimes conflicting concepts, an extensive body of thought, and a recognized group of theorists and scholars. In Geopolitics, Francis P. Sempa presents a history of geopolitical thought and applies its classical analyses to Cold War and post-Cold War international relations. While mindful of the impact of such concepts as "globalization" and the "information revolution" on our understanding of contemporary events, Sempa emphasizes traditional geopolitical theories in explaining the outcome of the Cold War. Using the work of Halford Mackinder, James Burnham, Nicholas Spykman, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and others, he shows that, even though the struggle between the Western allies and the Soviet empire was unique in its ideological component and nuclear standoff, the Cold War fits into a recurring geopolitical pattern. It can be seen as a consequence of competition between land powers and sea powers, and between a potential Eurasian hegemonic power and a coalition of states opposed to that would-be hegemony. The collapse of the Soviet empire ended the most recent threat to global stability. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, no power or alliance of powers poses an immediate threat to the global balance of power. Indeed, the end of the Cold War generated hopes for a "new world order" and predictions that economics would replace geopolitics as the driving force in international politics. However, as Sempa points out, Russian instability, the nuclear dimension of the India-Pakistan conflict, and Chinese bids for dominance have turned the Asia-Pacific region into what Mahan called "debatable and debated ground." Russia, Turkey, Iran, India, Pakistan, China, Japan, the Koreas, and the United States all have interests that collide in one or more of the areas of this region. The timeliness and deep historical perspective of Sempa's analysis will remind statesmen, strategists, and interested citizens that the current world situation will not last forever. The defeat of one would-be hegemonic power is likely to be followed by a new challenger or challengers to current stability in the international system.

Realism, the dominant theory of international relations, particularly regarding security, seems compelling in part because of its claim to embody so much of Western political thought from the ancient Greeks to the present. Its main challenger, liberalism, looks to Kant and nineteenth-century economists. Despite their many insights, neither realism nor liberalism gives us adequate tools to grapple with security globalization, the liberal ascent, and the American role in their development. In reality, both realism and liberalism and their main insights were largely invented by republicans writing about republics. The main ideas of realism and liberalism are but fragments of republican security theory, whose primary claim is that security entails the simultaneous avoidance of the extremes of anarchy and hierarchy, and that the size of the space within which this is necessary has expanded due to technological change. In Daniel Deudney's reading, there is one main security tradition and its fragmentary descendants. This theory began in classical antiquity, and its pivotal early modern and Enlightenment culmination was the founding of the United States. Moving into the industrial and nuclear eras, this line of thinking becomes the basis for the claim that mutually restraining world government is now necessary for security and that political liberty cannot survive without new types of global unions. Unique in scope, depth, and timeliness, Bounding Power offers an international political theory for our fractious and perilous global village.

Some innovations create new strategic property and new conflicts. Demarest argues that we have not reached the end of history and modern man will continue to fight over property as before, but the property will be of a post-modern character, such as electronic wavelengths and genetic codes.