Illuminates the influence of the US in internal Iranian politics long before the 1953 coup by examining recently declassified CIA and US State Department documents.

In October 1973 two crises – one economic, one political – intersected, with dramatic and long term consequences for international relations. On 6 October, Egypt and Syria launched an attack on Israel, and within a few days the major Arab oil producers announced their support by use of the ‘oil weapon’, including a boycott of supplies for countries friendly to Israel and a programme of production cuts. This was followed by the unilateral declaration of a steep increase in the price of oil by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The result was international panic and world recession. Crude oil prices soared by a massive fourfold in just three months. The West's vulnerability had been exposed: it was being held hostage to oil. Yet, despite efforts to address this dependence on oil imports in following years, the 1979 Iranian Revolution triggered a further upward surge in prices. Today, the importance of oil remains at the forefront of the West's foreign policy calculations in the Middle East. In this fascinating and timely new look at the oil crisis, Fiona Venn examines these issues and the more unexpected effects of the crisis. She asks just how much really changed in the economic balance of power. Most importantly she argues that OPEC was used as a scapegoat for the world recession, which had been already underway when the crisis detonated.

This work deals with the oil crises of the 1950s, precipitated by Iran's decision to nationalise the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The roots of the revolt against British imperialism are explored here, along with the long-term consequences of instability in the Middle East.

The oil industry is the world’s largest commercial enterprise. Its extent is global; international issues are consistently influenced by considerations of oil production and consumption, while the international communications networks of the larger oil companies rival those of many nations. In this, the eighth edition of Oil and World Power, published in 1986, Peter Odell explains the complexities of this gigantic empire and its influence on the world. The far-reaching chapters discuss the U.S.A, the Soviet Union, O.P.E.C., Japan and the oil-consuming countries of the developing world. Evaluating the changing patterns of oil supply and the dramatic fall in oil prices in 1986, Odell proposes a number of forward-thinking conclusions surrounding the relationship between oil in global politics and economic development. This is an exceptionally interesting and relevant work, of great value to those with an interest in the oil industry, global power and international economic development.

Relying on a rich cache of previously classified notes, transcripts, cables, policy briefs, and memoranda, Andrew Cooper explains how oil drove, even corrupted, American foreign policy during a time when Cold War imperatives still applied, and tells why in the 1970s the U.S. switched its Middle East allegiance from the Shah of Iran to the Saudi royal family. Amid the oil shocks of the early 1970s, there was one man the U.S. could rely on: the Shah of Iran. The Shah sold us oil; we sold him weapons. But the U.S. and other industrialized economies could not tolerate repeated annual double digit increases in oil prices. During the 1976 election campaign, President Gerald Ford decided that he had to find a country that would break the OPEC monopoly and sell the U.S. oil more cheaply. On the advice of Treasury Secretary William Simon -- and against the advice of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger -- Ford made a deal to sell advanced weaponry to the Saudis in exchange for a more moderate price hike in oil. The Shah's economy was destabilized, and disaffected elements mobilized to overthrow him. The U.S. had embarked on a long relationship with the autocratic Saudi kingdom that continues to this day.