Every day thousands of individuals need to make critical decisions about their health based on numerical information, yet recent surveys have found that over half the population of the United States is unable to complete basic math problems. How does this lack of numerical ability (also referred to as low numeracy, quantitative illiteracy or statistical illiteracy) impact healthcare? What can be done to help people with low numeracy skills? Numerical Reasoning in Judgments and Decision Making about Health addresses these questions by examining and explaining the impact of quantitative illiteracy on healthcare and in specific healthcare contexts, and discussing what can be done to reduce these healthcare disparities. This book will be a useful resource for professionals in many health fields including academics, policy makers, physicians and other healthcare providers.

This book provides information about how the numeric ability of individuals can impact the decisions they make about healthcare.

Provides information about how the numeric ability of individuals can impact the decisions they make about healthcare.

This book reviews the latest research from psychology, neuroscience, and behavioral economics evaluating how people make financial choices in real-life circumstances. The volume is divided into three sections investigating financial decision making at the level of the brain, the level of an individual decision maker, and the level of the society, concluding with a discussion of the implications for further research. Among the topics discussed: Neural and hormonal bases of financial decision making Personality, cognitive abilities, emotions, and financial decisions Aging and financial decision making Coping methods for making financial choices under uncertainty Stock market crashes and market bubbles Psychological perspectives on borrowing, paying taxes, gambling, and charitable giving Psychological Perspectives on Financial Decision Making is a useful reference for researchers both in and outside of psychology, including decision-making experts, consumer psychologists, and behavioral economists.

We confess that the first part of our title is somewhat of a misnomer. Bayesian reasoning is a normative approach to probabilistic belief revision and, as such, it is in need of no improvement. Rather, it is the typical individual whose reasoning and judgments often fall short of the Bayesian ideal who is the focus of improvement. What have we learnt from over a half-century of research and theory on this topic that could explain why people are often non-Bayesian? Can Bayesian reasoning be facilitated, and if so why? These are the questions that motivate this Frontiers in Psychology Research Topic. Bayes' theorem, named after English statistician, philosopher, and Presbyterian minister, Thomas Bayes, offers a method for updating one’s prior probability of an hypothesis H on the basis of new data D such that P(H|D) = P(D|H)P(H)/P(D). The first wave of psychological research, pioneered by Ward Edwards, revealed that people were overly conservative in updating their posterior probabilities (i.e., P(D|H)). A second wave, spearheaded by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, showed that people often ignored prior probabilities or base rates, where the priors had a frequentist interpretation, and hence were not Bayesians at all. In the 1990s, a third wave of research spurred by Leda Cosmides and John Tooby and by Gerd Gigerenzer and Ulrich Hoffrage showed that people can reason more like a Bayesian if only the information provided takes the form of (non-relativized) natural frequencies. Although Kahneman and Tversky had already noted the advantages of frequency representations, it was the third wave scholars who pushed the prescriptive agenda, arguing that there are feasible and effective methods for improving belief revision. Most scholars now agree that natural frequency representations do facilitate Bayesian reasoning. However, they do not agree on why this is so. The original third wave scholars favor an evolutionary account that posits human brain adaptation to natural frequency processing. But almost as soon as this view was proposed, other scholars challenged it, arguing that such evolutionary assumptions were not needed. The dominant opposing view has been that the benefit of natural frequencies is mainly due to the fact that such representations make the nested set relations perfectly transparent. Thus, people can more easily see what information they need to focus on and how to simply combine it. This Research Topic aims to take stock of where we are at present. Are we in a proto-fourth wave? If so, does it offer a synthesis of recent theoretical disagreements? The second part of the title orients the reader to the two main subtopics: what works and why? In terms of the first subtopic, we seek contributions that advance understanding of how to improve people’s abilities to revise their beliefs and to integrate probabilistic information effectively. The second subtopic centers on explaining why methods that improve non-Bayesian reasoning work as well as they do. In addressing that issue, we welcome both critical analyses of existing theories as well as fresh perspectives. For both subtopics, we welcome the full range of manuscript types.

The proposal to vaccinate adolescent girls against the human papilloma virus ignited political controversy, as did the advent of fracking and a host of other emerging technologies. These disputes attest to the persistent gap between expert and public perceptions. Complicating the communication of sound science and the debates that surround the societal applications of that science is a changing media environment in which misinformation can elicit belief without corrective context and likeminded individuals are prone to seek ideologically comforting information within their own self-constructed media enclaves. Drawing on the expertise of leading science communication scholars from six countries, The Oxford Handbook of the Science of Science Communication not only charts the media landscape - from news and entertainment to blogs and films - but also examines the powers and perils of human biases - from the disposition to seek confirming evidence to the inclination to overweight endpoints in a trend line. In the process, it draws together the best available social science on ways to communicate science while also minimizing the pernicious effects of human bias. The Handbook adds case studies exploring instances in which communication undercut or facilitated the access to scientific evidence. The range of topics addressed is wide, from genetically engineered organisms and nanotechnology to vaccination controversies and climate change. Also unique to this book is a focus on the complexities of involving the public in decision making about the uses of science, the regulations that should govern its application, and the ethical boundaries within which science should operate. The Handbook is an invaluable resource for researchers in the communication fields, particularly in science and health communication, as well as to scholars involved in research on scientific topics susceptible to distortion in partisan debate.

In this book, some of the world's foremost 'experts on expertise' provide scientific knowledge on expertise and expert performance.

How to assess critical aspects of cognitive functioning that are not measured by IQ tests: rational thinking skills. Why are we surprised when smart people act foolishly? Smart people do foolish things all the time. Misjudgments and bad decisions by highly educated bankers and money managers, for example, brought us the financial crisis of 2008. Smart people do foolish things because intelligence is not the same as the capacity for rational thinking. The Rationality Quotient explains that these two traits, often (and incorrectly) thought of as one, refer to different cognitive functions. The standard IQ test, the authors argue, doesn't measure any of the broad components of rationality—adaptive responding, good judgment, and good decision making. The authors show that rational thinking, like intelligence, is a measurable cognitive competence. Drawing on theoretical work and empirical research from the last two decades, they present the first prototype for an assessment of rational thinking analogous to the IQ test: the CART (Comprehensive Assessment of Rational Thinking). The authors describe the theoretical underpinnings of the CART, distinguishing the algorithmic mind from the reflective mind. They discuss the logic of the tasks used to measure cognitive biases, and they develop a unique typology of thinking errors. The Rationality Quotient explains the components of rational thought assessed by the CART, including probabilistic and scientific reasoning; the avoidance of “miserly” information processing; and the knowledge structures needed for rational thinking. Finally, the authors discuss studies of the CART and the social and practical implications of such a test. An appendix offers sample items from the test.

What is intuition? What constitutes an intuitive process? Why are intuition concepts important? After many years of scholarly neglect, interest in intuition is now exploding in psychology and cognitive science. Moreover, intuition is also enjoying a renaissance in philosophy. Yet no single definition of intuition appears in contemporary scholarship; there is no consensus on the meaning of this concept in any discipline. Rational Intuition focuses on conceptions of intuition in relation to rational processes. Covering a broad range of historical and contemporary contexts, prominent philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists explore how intuition is implicated in rational activity in its diverse forms. In bringing the philosophical history of intuition into novel dialogue with contemporary philosophical and empirical research, Lisa M. Osbeck and Barbara S. Held invite a comparison of the conceptions and functions of intuition, thereby clarifying and advancing conceptual analysis across disciplines.