This book presents an analytical account of the causes and dangerous consequences of nuclear proliferation in South Asia.

Hagerty analyzes how India and Pakistan interacted in diplomatic and military crises before their 1998 nuclear tests. He presents detailed studies of the January 1987 Indo-Pakistani crisis, precipitated by India's Brasstacks military exercises, and the 1990 confrontation over Kashmir. Hagerty concludes that relations between India and Pakistan in recent years support the argument that nuclear proliferation does not necessarily destabilize international relations and may even reduce the risk of war.

This book examines the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan, two highly antagonistic South Asian neighbors who recently moved into their third decade of overt nuclear weaponization. It assesses the stability of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrence and argues that, while deterrence dampens the likelihood of escalation to conventional—and possibly nuclear—war, the chronically embittered relations between New Delhi and Islamabad mean that deterrence failure resulting in major warfare cannot be ruled out. Through an empirical examination of the effects of nuclear weapons during five crises between India and Pakistan since 1998, as well as a discussion of the theoretical logic of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrence, the book offers suggestions for enhancing deterrence stability between these two countries.

This edited volume explores competing perspectives on the impact of nuclear weapons proliferation on the South Asian security environment. The spread of nuclear weapons is one of the world’s foremost security concerns. The effect of nuclear weapons on the behaviour of newly nuclear states, and the potential for future international crises, are of particular concern. As a region of burgeoning economic and political importance, South Asia offers a crucial test of proliferation’s effects on the crisis behaviour of newly nuclear states. This volume creates a dialogue between scholars who believe that nuclear weapons have stabilized the subcontinent, and those who believe that nuclear weapons have made South Asia more conflict prone. It does so by pairing competing analyses of four major regional crises: the 1987 "Brasstacks" crisis, the Indo-Pakistani crisis of 1990, the 1999 Kargil war, which occurred after the nuclear tests; and the 2001–2 Indo-Pakistani militarized standoff. In addition, the volume explores the implications of the South Asian nuclear experience for potential new nuclear states such as North Korea and Iran.

"In May 1998, India and Pakistan put to rest years of speculation about whether they possessed nuclear technology and openly tested their weapons. Some believed nuclearization would stabilize South Asia; others prophesized disaster. Authors of two of the most comprehensive books on South Asia's new nuclear era, Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, offer competing theories on the transformation of the region and what these patterns mean for the world's next proliferators." "With these two major interpretations, Ganguly and Kapur tackle all sides of an urgent issue that has profound regional and global consequences. Sure to spark discussion and debate, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb thoroughly maps the potential impact of nuclear proliferation."--Cubierta.

As the nuclear weapon states continue to reduce their nuclear arsenals and international efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons are reinvigorated, South Asia remains a unique region almost entirely unencumbered by nuclear arms control. Despite the recent popularity of the notion that nuclear deterrence is stabilizing the Indo-Pakistani conflict, there is good reason to believe that the risks of war and the use of nuclear weapons are not fully appreciated. Nevertheless, the prospects for negotiated measures to improve the situation are not good because of the domestic politics on both sides. Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in South Asia after the Test Ban sheds new light on the risks of the current stand-off, the hidden costs of the nuclear options, and the domestic sources of the region's inertia, bringing together Indian, Pakistani and Chinese perspectives.

An important and critical re-evaluation of South Asia's post-tests nuclear politics. Unlike other books, this volume emphasises the political dimension of South Asia's nuclear weapons, explains how the bombs are used as politico-strategic assets rather than pure battlefield weapons and how they are employed by India and Pakistan in an extremely complex and competitive South Asian strategic landscape.

Using a constructivist model, this study brings nuclear arms control and disarmament back into the debates on the future of Indo-Pakistani relations. Constructivism recognizes the independent impact of international norms, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Norm (NNPN), on India and Pakistan’s nuclear behavior. Even though the NNPN does not legally bind them, it is reinforced at the global level, and may lead the South Asian rivals to move in the direction of nuclear arms control and disarmament, thus reducing the costs, dangers, and risks of an eternal strategic rivalry. After examining the main tenets of constructivism in international relations, the works delves into the proliferation debate, discussing nuclear reversal and U.S. policy toward the subcontinent since the G. W. Bush administration. It looks at the prospects for nuclear arms control and disarmament in South Asia after the U.S.-India nuclear deal of 2008, and the nuclear abolitionist wave during the first Obama administration. It concludes with the contribution of social constructivism to understanding how changes in the India-Pakistan nuclear status quo can happen.

"This book brings together the many pieces of India's nuclear puzzle and the ramifications for South Asia. The author examines the choices facing India from New Delhi's point of view in order to discern which future courses of action appear most appealing to Indian security managers. He details how such choices, if acted upon, would affect U.S. strategic interests, India's neighbors, and the world."--BOOK JACKET.