This provocative and timely work examines various scenarios in which the deployment of nuclear weapons could occur, the probable consequences of such an escalation, the likely world reactions, and the plausible policy ramifications. Rather than projecting the physical damage that would result from nuclear attacks, George H. Quester offers an exploration of the political, psychological, and social aftermath of nuclear conflict. The prospect of nuclear attack -- sixty years after atomic bombs destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki -- is difficult to confront on many levels. We may avoid the discussion for emotional reasons, for fear of generating a self-confirming hypothesis, or simply because of the general "nuclear taboo." But there are also self-denying propositions to be harnessed here: if the world gives some advance thought to how nuclear weapons might be used again, such attacks may be headed off. If the world avoids nuclear weapons use until the year 2045, it will be able to celebrate one hundred years of nuclear concord. Quester suggests that this may be achieved through the careful consideration of possible nuclear deployment scenarios and their consequences. In this insightful analysis, he provides a starting point for informed and focused reflection and preparation. -- Martha Smith-Norris

A former design engineer for Lockheed presents a comprehensive survey of U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces and strategic doctrines that exposes the U.S. military's dangerous bid for "first strike" capability and describes corporate imperatives for perpetuating the arms race and circumventing arms control.

A former design engineer for Lockheed presents a comprehensive survey of U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces and strategic doctrines that exposes the U.S. military's dangerous bid for first strike capability and describes corporate imperatives for perpetuating the arms race and circumventing arms control.

Strike warfare is a term that is rarely used in the popular media even though reports of conflicts often describe its application or effects. Those brief snippets of information seldom provide a complete picture of what is happening at the time, and they almost never explain the operational or technical background that influences how such actions occur. This leaves the average reader or viewer with an information void, a gap in understanding. This book is intended to fill that gap. It does so in a logical and methodical fashion, building the picture piece by piece using easily understandable language. It begins with a discussion of the more newsworthy side of the subject, strike warfare operations. All of the key elements are addressed: targets, defenses, resources, and the several steps required to prosecute an attack. The book’s goal is to eliminate the uncertainty, the mystery and the outright fiction that sometimes exists in popular versions of the story. The second half of the book deals with an even less understood part of the subject, the development of strike weapons. The average citizen may occasionally hear of cost overruns, development test failures or some other negative aspect of military development programs, but there is hardly any background information available to the American taxpayer on how such programs function in general. Again, the book aims to correct a deficiency with respect to an accurate account of how strike weapons are actually developed. The entire development and life cycle is described, step by step, at the summary level. The author then closes with some thoughts about lessons learned and trends for the future. This is recommended reading for anyone with an interest in or a connection with strike warfare or strike weapons development. It should prove helpful to military or civilian newcomers to the field, members of the news media, and legislators or members of their staff dealing with military matters. But first and foremost, it was written to provide the average American taxpayer a better understanding of an important and powerful military capability."

This paper considers the morality of a first strike attack against a nonstate terrorist organization that possesses nuclear weapon capability. Nuclear first strike is the policy that reserves the right to use nuclear weapons against an enemy before that enemy employs a like weapon without any constraints on the decision to employ the weapon. First strike has been part of the strategies on nuclear weapon use since the earliest debates on nuclear arms, when the United States was the only nuclear power (Brodie, "The Atomic Dilemma," 32). For the purposes of this paper, first strike is expanded to include the use of conventional weapons to attack a terrorist-controlled nuclear weapon that would result in nuclear casualties either from the detonation of a nuclear bomb or fallout from a nuclear dirty bomb. Parallel to the United States and global policy debates on the use of nuclear weapons is a debate among social, religious, medical, and legal experts on the morality of the use of nuclear weapons. This dialog, grounded in the concepts of the principles of just war, shaped the historical United States nuclear policy debates of massive retaliation, mutually assured destruction (MAD), graduated response, and deterrence. All these polices were predicated on the assumption that the United States "would not deliberately initiate a total war for the sake of securing for ourselves the military advantage of first blow" (Brodie, World Politics, 174). As the community of nuclear powers expanded, the US nuclear arms policy was revisited and debated. Through it all, one of the fundamentals remained that nuclear capability was developed and maintained by nation states. However, the cast of potential nuclear players may change shortly to include nonstate terrorist organizations. Recent US policy states that our nation is reevaluating deterrence, now that these organizations are attempting to acquire nuclear capability. It is against this backdrop that this paper considers the moral authority of a US pre-emptive strike against such an organization with a confirmed nuclear capability. Moral authority is defined for this paper as being in compliance with the traditional principles of just war. The paper provides a brief history of the development of nuclear weapons and nuclear employment strategies to include first strike. It also provides a very concise evolution of just war theories with references for further study. An analysis is done of each of the eight traditional just war principles against the scenario of US first strike. The conclusion is that as long as the US employs this tactic as a last resort against the terrorist threat, it has the moral authority to employ first strike against nuclear-armed terrorists even if that attack may result in nuclear casualties.

The lifting of the Iron Curtain in response to pressures for democratic reform in the Eastern Bloc nations and the refusal of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to use the Red Army to police countries of the Warsaw Pact have led to a radically changed international environment. Preceded by over 40 years of peace and stability, unprecedented in the history of modern Europe, the Cold War ended in a climate of upheaval and uncertainty. This volume addresses issues associated with the political and military vacuum created by recent events and explores in depth a problem of military uncertainty: first strike stability. Stephen J. Cimbala argues that war in a system undergoing rapid change, including reductions in forces and political realignment, remains disturbingly possible due to the unforeseeable, inadvertent, and uncontrollable uncertainties that plague decision making and military planning in Washington, Moscow, and other international power centers, hence, first strike instability. This timely volume clarifies the kind of bargain superpowers and their allies have made in regard to nuclear weapons and command systems. Cimbala provides enhanced understandings of the concept and practice of nuclear deterrence and of first strike stability in a post-Cold War world that can help direct arms control efforts toward those areas that are most important to actual security. Broad aspects of the problem of first strike stability are set forth in the first chapter which also anticipates some of the connections between political and military levels of analysis discussed in the conclusion. Chapter two introduces the concepts of the state of nature and the state of war, explains how they apply to the problem of first strike stability, and why the possibility of war, including nuclear war, cannot be excluded. Chapter three focuses on the New Soviet Thinking and why the probability of accidental and inadvertent war and escalation is not affected by reducing the levels of armaments alone. Chapter four emphasizes the problems facing the United States and NATO, and the approaches to escalation control which NATO assumes will be implemented, should deterrence fail. The results of the theoretical and administrative confusion over approaches to escalation control, outlined in chapter four, reappear in chapter five in the form of problems for war termination. The controversial issue of eliminating nuclear deterrence, with emphasis on the proposal for elimination by preclusive antinuclear strategic defenses is the focus of chapter six. The final chapter reviews the implications of the preceding chapters and arrives at some startling conclusions. Scholars and students of military affairs, political scientists, government officials, and members of the military establishment will find the up-to-the-minute information and judgements contained in First Strike Stability invaluable aids to their own decision making on this profoundly important world issue.

What does it mean for Iran to have nuclear weapon capabilities? And what should the United States do about this threatening situation?

From the author of the classic The Wizards of Armageddon and Pulitzer Prize finalist comes the definitive history of American policy on nuclear war—and Presidents’ actions in nuclear crises—from Truman to Trump. Fred Kaplan, hailed by The New York Times as “a rare combination of defense intellectual and pugnacious reporter,” takes us into the White House Situation Room, the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s “Tank” in the Pentagon, and the vast chambers of Strategic Command to bring us the untold stories—based on exclusive interviews and previously classified documents—of how America’s presidents and generals have thought about, threatened, broached, and just barely avoided nuclear war from the dawn of the atomic age until today. Kaplan’s historical research and deep reporting will stand as the permanent record of politics. Discussing theories that have dominated nightmare scenarios from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Kaplan presents the unthinkable in terms of mass destruction and demonstrates how the nuclear war reality will not go away, regardless of the dire consequences.

Aims to demystify aspects and effects of nuclear weapons so that civil and military defence planners have a reasonable idea about the scale and magnitude of disaster that will follow a nuclear attack. As a natural corollary, the book examines the type and nature of post-attack disaster management operations that may have to be launched following a counter-value strike.