A former design engineer for Lockheed presents a comprehensive survey of U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces and strategic doctrines that exposes the U.S. military's dangerous bid for "first strike" capability and describes corporate imperatives for perpetuating the arms race and circumventing arms control.

Strike warfare is a term that is rarely used in the popular media even though reports of conflicts often describe its application or effects. Those brief snippets of information seldom provide a complete picture of what is happening at the time, and they almost never explain the operational or technical background that influences how such actions occur. This leaves the average reader or viewer with an information void, a gap in understanding. This book is intended to fill that gap. It does so in a logical and methodical fashion, building the picture piece by piece using easily understandable language. It begins with a discussion of the more newsworthy side of the subject, strike warfare operations. All of the key elements are addressed: targets, defenses, resources, and the several steps required to prosecute an attack. The book’s goal is to eliminate the uncertainty, the mystery and the outright fiction that sometimes exists in popular versions of the story. The second half of the book deals with an even less understood part of the subject, the development of strike weapons. The average citizen may occasionally hear of cost overruns, development test failures or some other negative aspect of military development programs, but there is hardly any background information available to the American taxpayer on how such programs function in general. Again, the book aims to correct a deficiency with respect to an accurate account of how strike weapons are actually developed. The entire development and life cycle is described, step by step, at the summary level. The author then closes with some thoughts about lessons learned and trends for the future. This is recommended reading for anyone with an interest in or a connection with strike warfare or strike weapons development. It should prove helpful to military or civilian newcomers to the field, members of the news media, and legislators or members of their staff dealing with military matters. But first and foremost, it was written to provide the average American taxpayer a better understanding of an important and powerful military capability."

Nuclear war may kill millions, Nuclear Winter will kill billions First Strike depicts a world on the edge of nuclear Armageddon

From the author of the classic The Wizards of Armageddon and Pulitzer Prize finalist comes the definitive history of American policy on nuclear war—and Presidents’ actions in nuclear crises—from Truman to Trump. Fred Kaplan, hailed by The New York Times as “a rare combination of defense intellectual and pugnacious reporter,” takes us into the White House Situation Room, the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s “Tank” in the Pentagon, and the vast chambers of Strategic Command to bring us the untold stories—based on exclusive interviews and previously classified documents—of how America’s presidents and generals have thought about, threatened, broached, and just barely avoided nuclear war from the dawn of the atomic age until today. Kaplan’s historical research and deep reporting will stand as the permanent record of politics. Discussing theories that have dominated nightmare scenarios from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Kaplan presents the unthinkable in terms of mass destruction and demonstrates how the nuclear war reality will not go away, regardless of the dire consequences.

For decades, the reigning scholarly wisdom about nuclear weapons policy has been that the United States only needs the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and still be able to respond with a devastating counterattack. So long as the US, or any other nation, retains such an assured retaliation capability, no sane leader would intentionally launch a nuclear attack against it, and nuclear deterrence will hold. According to this theory, possessing more weapons than necessary for a second-strike capability is illogical. This argument is reasonable, but, when compared to the empirical record, it raises an important puzzle. Empirically, we see that the United States has always maintained a nuclear posture that is much more robust than a mere second-strike capability. In The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy, Matthew Kroenig challenges the conventional wisdom and explains why a robust nuclear posture, above and beyond a mere second-strike capability, contributes to a state's national security goals. In fact, when a state has a robust nuclear weapons force, such a capability reduces its expected costs in a war, provides it with bargaining leverage, and ultimately enhances nuclear deterrence. This book provides a novel theoretical explanation for why military nuclear advantages translate into geopolitical advantages. In so doing, it helps resolve one of the most-intractable puzzles in international security studies. Buoyed by an innovative thesis and a vast array of historical and quantitative evidence, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy will force scholars to reconsider their basic assumptions about the logic of nuclear deterrence.

“This is a brilliant and hardheaded book. It will frighten those who prefer not to dwell on the unthinkable and infuriate those who have taken refuge in stereotypes and moral attitudinizing.”—Gordon A. Craig, New York Times Book Review Originally published more than fifty years ago, this landmark book explores the ways in which military capabilities—real or imagined—are used, skillfully or clumsily, as bargaining power. Anne-Marie Slaughter’s new introduction to the work shows how Schelling’s framework—conceived of in a time of superpowers and mutually assured destruction—still applies to our multipolar world, where wars are fought as much online as on the ground.

"The Hunt for Red October" meets "Blind Man's Bluff" in this chilling, true story of a rogue Soviet submarine that sank while trying to provoke a war between the U.S. and China.

What does it mean for Iran to have nuclear weapon capabilities? And what should the United States do about this threatening situation?

This provocative and timely work examines various scenarios in which the deployment of nuclear weapons could occur, the probable consequences of such an escalation, the likely world reactions, and the plausible policy ramifications. Rather than projecting the physical damage that would result from nuclear attacks, George H. Quester offers an exploration of the political, psychological, and social aftermath of nuclear conflict. The prospect of nuclear attack -- sixty years after atomic bombs destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki -- is difficult to confront on many levels. We may avoid the discussion for emotional reasons, for fear of generating a self-confirming hypothesis, or simply because of the general "nuclear taboo." But there are also self-denying propositions to be harnessed here: if the world gives some advance thought to how nuclear weapons might be used again, such attacks may be headed off. If the world avoids nuclear weapons use until the year 2045, it will be able to celebrate one hundred years of nuclear concord. Quester suggests that this may be achieved through the careful consideration of possible nuclear deployment scenarios and their consequences. In this insightful analysis, he provides a starting point for informed and focused reflection and preparation. -- Martha Smith-Norris

U.S. security does not require nearly 1,600 nuclear weapons deployed on a triad of systems—bombers, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)—to deliver them. A new paper from Benjamin H. Friedman, Christopher A. Preble and Matt Fay encourages abandonment of the triad and skepticism about the received wisdom justifying U.S. nuclear weapons’ policies. The authors suggest that shifting to a submarine-based monad would serve U.S. deterrent needs and eventually save taxpayers roughly $20 billion a year.