Stuart Goldman convincingly argues that a little-known, but intense Soviet-Japanese conflict along the Manchurian-Mongolian frontier at Nomonhan influenced the outbreak of World War II and shaped the course of the war. The author draws on Japanese, Soviet, and western sources to put the seemingly obscure conflict—actually a small undeclared war— into its proper global geo-strategic perspective. The book describes how the Soviets, in response to a border conflict provoked by Japan, launched an offensive in August 1939 that wiped out the Japanese forces at Nomonhan. At the same time, Stalin signed the German—Soviet Nonaggression Pact, allowing Hitler to invade Poland. The timing of these military and diplomatic strikes was not coincidental, according to the author. In forming an alliance with Hitler that left Tokyo diplomatically isolated, Stalin succeeded in avoiding a two-front war. He saw the pact with the Nazis as a way to pit Germany against Britain and France, leaving the Soviet Union on the sidelines to eventually pick up the spoils from the European conflict, while at the same time giving him a free hand to smash the Japanese at Nomonhan. Goldman not only demonstrates the linkage between the Nomonhan conflict, the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, and the outbreak of World War II , but also shows how Nomonhan influenced Japan’s decision to go to war with the United States and thus change the course of history. The book details Gen. Georgy Zhukov’s brilliant victory at Nomonhan that led to his command of the Red Army in 1941 and his success in stopping the Germans at Moscow with reinforcements from the Soviet Far East. Such a strategy was possible, the author contends, only because of Japan’s decision not to attack the Soviet Far East but to seize the oil-rich Dutch East Indies and attack Pearl Harbor instead. Goldman credits Tsuji Masanobu, an influential Japanese officer who instigated the Nomonhan conflict and survived the debacle, with urging his superiors not to take on the Soviets again in 1941, but instead to go to war with the United States.

Before World War II, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) developed an offensive tactical doctrine designed to allow its infantry forces to fight successfully against a superior foe, the Soviet Union. A battle test of that doctrine's effectiveness occurred from June trough August 1939 along the Outer Mongolian-Manchurian border. This essay follows the daily combat operations of the IJA's 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division, for a two-month period. During that time, the 2/28th Infantry was in constant contact with Soviet combined arms forces. In July the battalion participated in offensive operations against Soviet units commanded by General Georgi K. Zhukov. When Japanese tactical doctrine failed against a Soviet combined arms force, the Japanese went on the defensive. Japanese officers, however, regarded defensive doctrine as transitional in nature and adopted it only to gain time to prepare for a counterattack. Defensive doctrine that terrain be held until the resumption of offensive operations that would destroy the enemy. A lack of flexibility doomed the Japanese defensive effort. General Zhukov secretly marshalled his forces and in mid-August used his armor columns to spearhead a double envelopment of the static Japanese units in a position defense. The Soviets encircled the Japanese units, including the 2/28th Infantry, and the Japanese survivors had to fight their way back to friendly lines. The 2/28th Infantry's War Diary provides a vivid day-by-day account of its combat operations. This in turn allows the examination of how the Japanese applied their tactical doctrine on the battlefield. The Japanese tried to use and aggressive tactical doctrine tocompensate for materiel and equipment deficiencies in their army. Such an approach was successful as long as the Japanese could conduct bold offensive operations. When they were forced to adopt a defensive posture, however, discrepancies between tactical doctrine and battlefield reality became apparent. These problems, applicable to any army, highlight fundamental difficulties of force structure, preconceptions of potential enemy capabilities, and the role of doctrine in a combat environment. An examination of small unit tactics is particularly useful to illustrate the dynamics of doctrine as expressed on the battlefield.

During the first half of the 20th Century, the former Czarist Russia and then the former Soviet Union, and the Empire of Japan fought a series of undeclared wars in the Far East. The first of these, fought 1904-1905 over rival imperial ambitions in Manchuria and Korea, ended in a clear-cut Japanese victory. Following the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, in 1931, Japan turned its interest to nearby Soviet territories. The result was a series of border incidents - starting with the Battle of Lake Khasan in 1938. Maintaining that the border between their proxy-state, Manchukuo, and the Soviet-dominated Mongolian People's Republic was the Khalkhyn Gol (or Khalkha River), the Japanese deployed some of best units of their army to occupy and secure this area. Following a military build-up, a series of bitter clashes took place mid-May and June 1939, after which the Japanese launched an all-out assault in July. Due to heavy casualties, the battle resulted in a stalemate. Concerned about the possibility of facing a two-front war, the Soviets reacted with a major counter-offensive, in August 1939, and defeated the Japanese. While little known in the West, this short but bitter war - known as Nomohan Incident in Japan, or the Battle of Khalkhyn Gol in the Soviet Union - was a crucial overture for the subsequent World War II. Having secured its border in the Far East, the Soviet Union was free to concentrate on war in Europe. Although continuing to underestimate their opponents, the Japanese introduced a major reform of their army. Furthermore, after realizing the massive material disparity vis- -vis the former USSR, Tokyo joined the Axis with Nazi Germany and Italy.

From May to September 1939 Japan and the Soviet Union fought a fierce, large-scale undeclared war on the Mongolian plains that ended with a decisive Soviet victory with two important results: Japan reoriented its strategic emphasis towards the south, leading to war with the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands; and Russia freed itself from the fear of fighting on two fronts, thus vitally affecting the course of the war with Germany.

An account of the little-known battle between Russia and Japan just before the outbreak of the Second World War.

In a remote area of Mongolia the 'Nomonhan Incident' lasted four months. This border skirmish between the Russians and Japanese ended in 1939, just 15 days after Germany invaded Poland and an isolated 35 by 20 mile section of land became a battlefield for more than 900 Soviet and 450 Japanese aircraft. Using the Ki-27 Nate fighter, Japanese pilots clashed with Soviet I-15 and I-153 biplanes and their I-16 monoplane. The soon to be antiquated massive TB-3 heavy bombers were also used and the Ki-21 Sally made its combat debut, eventually continuing service throughout the Pacific War. This was one of the first large aerial battles of modern times and the pilots used the conflict to practice and refine new fighting tactics which moved air power into the future of war. They sharpened up their missions and learned to place emphasis on reconnaissance, fighter sweeps, bomber escort, and infantry support. Both sides discovered and ignored tactical and design lessons from the combat to the detriment and advantage of each. Covering both the Japanese and Russian sides In The Skies of Nomonhanincludes loss lists, color profiles from both sides, plus more than 50 photos from Japanese and Russian archives all of which provide a new perspective on this interesting and largely unknown pre World War II encounter.

Before World War II, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) developed an offensive tactical doctrine designed to allow its infantry forces to fight successfully against a superior foe, the Soviet Union. A battle test of that doctrine's effectiveness occurred from June through August 1939 along the Outer Mongolian-Manchurian border, This essay follows the daily combat operations of the lJA's 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division, for a two-month period. During that time, the 2/28th Infantry was in constant contact with Soviet combined arms forces. In July the battalion participated in offensive operations against Soviet units commanded by General Georgi K. Zhukov. When Japanese tactical doctrine failed against a Soviet combined arms force, the Japanese went on the defensive. Japanese officers, however, regarded defensive doctrine as transitional in nature and adopted it only to gain time to prepare for a counterattack. Defensive doctrine dictated that terrain be held until the resumption of offensive operations that would destroy the enemy.

The battles of Khalkhyn Gol was the decisive engagement of the undeclared Soviet-Japanese Border Wars fought between the Soviet Union, Mongolia and the Empire of Japan in 1939. This book looks at the impact and retaliation from the Soviet perspective.

In a definitive new account of the Soviet Union at war, Alexander Hill charts the development, successes and failures of the Red Army from the industrialisation of the Soviet Union in the late 1920s through to the end of the Great Patriotic War in May 1945. Setting military strategy and operations within a broader context that includes national mobilisation on a staggering scale, the book presents a comprehensive account of the origins and course of the war from the perspective of this key Allied power. Drawing on the latest archival research and a wealth of eyewitness testimony, Hill portrays the Red Army at war from the perspective of senior leaders and men and women at the front line to reveal how the Red Army triumphed over the forces of Nazi Germany and her allies on the Eastern Front, and why it did so at such great cost.