Explores the diplomatic and political developments that led to the outbreak of war in 1939 and its transformation into a global conflict in 1941.

Every phase of the Third Reich s foreign policy was determined by its authoritarian leader, Adolf Hitler. Following his rise to power, his political acuity and utter lack of scruple enabled him to achieve numerous diplomatic successes against the well-intentioned but largely ineffectual Anglo-French democracies. First by duplicity, then by bluff and bluster, and finally by brinkmanship, Hitler succeeded in establishing a strengthened and united Greater Germany (Grossdeutschland) in preparation for a Second Great War. This book examines in depth the revanchist foreign policy of Hitler s Germany from 1933 to 1939: the withdrawal of Germany from the League of Nations, German rearmament, the introduction of compulsory military service and the enlargement of the German Armed Forces, the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the notorious Hossbach Conference, the Austrian Anschluss , the Munich Conference, the brazen seizures of Bohemia-Moravia and the Memel District, the Danzig crisis, the cynical brokering of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and the German invasion of Western Poland.

Charles Callan Tansill, America's diplomatic historian, convincingly argues that Franklin Roosevelt wished to involve the United States in World War II. When his efforts appeared to come to naught, Roosevelt provoked Japan into an attack on American territory, and so doing enter the war through the "back door".

The dramatic story of Hitler and Stalin's marriage of convenience has been recounted frequently over the past 60 years, but with remarkably little consensus. As the first English-language study to analyze the development, extent, and importance of the Nazi-Soviet economic relationship from Hitler's ascension to power to the launching of Operation Barbarossa in June 1941, this book highlights the crucial role that Soviet economic aid played in Germany's early successes in World War II. When Hitler's rearmament efforts left Germany dangerously short of raw materials in 1939, Stalin was able to offer valuable supplies of oil, manganese, grain, and rubber. In exchange, the Soviet Union would gain territory and obtain the technology and equipment necessary for its own rearmament efforts. However, by the summer of 1941, Stalin's well-calculated plan had gone awry. Germany's continuing reliance on Soviet raw materials would, Stalin hoped, convince Hitler that he could not afford to invade the USSR. As a result, the Soviets continued to supply the Reich with the resources that would later carry the Wehrmacht to the gates of Moscow and nearly cost the Soviets the war. The extensive use in this study of neglected source material in the German archives helps resolve the long-standing debate over whether Stalin's foreign policy was one of expansionism or appeasement.

These two volumes are designed to explain the origins of World Way II by focusing on the role of German foreign policy under Hitler. New light is shed on German rearmament, on the efforts of Britain and France to avert war, on the annexation of Austria, on the Munich Agreement, and on the final steps to war in 1939. Both specialists and general readers will find much of interest in these two volumes. The German foreign policy, as determined by Adolf Hitler, is analyzed on the basis of comprehensive research in German, British, and American archives. The published documents of France, Italy, Russia, and numerous other countries as well as the extensive literature on the subject and the papers of many participants have been researched to present what still remains the only comprehensive study in any language of the road to way in 1939. This edition adds a new preface relating these volumes to the evidence, the controversies, and the literature of the years since they were first written.

In this short outline history of Hitler's foreign policy, Professor Hildebrand contends that the National Socialist Party achieved popularity largely because it integrated all the political, economic and socio-political expectations prevailing in Germany since Bismarck. Thus, foreign policy under Hitler was a logical extension of the aims of the newly created German nation-state of 1871. Trading on his domestic economic successes, Hitler relied on the traditional methods of power politics-backing diplomacy with force. Had he pursued expansionist aims alone, using specific lighting wars as threats or instruments of conquest he might have been more successful. As it was, the scheme went awry when the first phase-European hegemony-was overtaken by and forced to run parallel with the second and third phases: American intervention and “racial purification.” The ideology became too great a burden to bear, stimulating internal resistance, and the Allies of course determined to wage total for a total surrender.

Covers the entire range of the history of U.S. foreign relations from the colonial period to the beginning of the 21st century. A Companion to U.S. Foreign Relations is an authoritative guide to past and present scholarship on the history of American diplomacy and foreign relations from its seventeenth century origins to the modern day. This two-volume reference work presents a collection of historiographical essays by prominent scholars. The essays explore three centuries of America’s global interactions and the ways U.S. foreign policies have been analyzed and interpreted over time. Scholars offer fresh perspectives on the history of U.S. foreign relations; analyze the causes, influences, and consequences of major foreign policy decisions; and address contemporary debates surrounding the practice of American power. The Companion covers a wide variety of methodologies, integrating political, military, economic, social and cultural history to explore the ideas and events that shaped U.S. diplomacy and foreign relations and continue to influence national identity. The essays discuss topics such as the links between U.S. foreign relations and the study of ideology, race, gender, and religion; Native American history, expansion, and imperialism; industrialization and modernization; domestic and international politics; and the United States’ role in decolonization, globalization, and the Cold War. A comprehensive approach to understanding the history, influences, and drivers of U.S. foreign relation, this indispensable resource: Examines significant foreign policy events and their subsequent interpretations Places key figures and policies in their historical, national, and international contexts Provides background on recent and current debates in U.S. foreign policy Explores the historiography and primary sources for each topic Covers the development of diverse themes and methodologies in histories of U.S. foreign policy Offering scholars, teachers, and students unmatched chronological breadth and analytical depth, A Companion to U.S. Foreign Relations: Colonial Era to the Present is an important contribution to scholarship on the history of America’s interactions with the world.

“Monumental.” —The New York Times Book Review Pulitzer Prize-finalist Stephen Kotkin has written the definitive biography of Joseph Stalin, from collectivization and the Great Terror to the conflict with Hitler's Germany that is the signal event of modern world history In 1929, Joseph Stalin, having already achieved dictatorial power over the vast Soviet Empire, formally ordered the systematic conversion of the world’s largest peasant economy into “socialist modernity,” otherwise known as collectivization, regardless of the cost. What it cost, and what Stalin ruthlessly enacted, transformed the country and its ruler in profound and enduring ways. Building and running a dictatorship, with life and death power over hundreds of millions, made Stalin into the uncanny figure he became. Stephen Kotkin’s Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929–1941 is the story of how a political system forged an unparalleled personality and vice versa. The wholesale collectivization of some 120 million peasants necessitated levels of coercion that were extreme even for Russia, and the resulting mass starvation elicited criticism inside the party even from those Communists committed to the eradication of capitalism. But Stalin did not flinch. By 1934, when the Soviet Union had stabilized and socialism had been implanted in the countryside, praise for his stunning anti-capitalist success came from all quarters. Stalin, however, never forgave and never forgot, with shocking consequences as he strove to consolidate the state with a brand new elite of young strivers like himself. Stalin’s obsessions drove him to execute nearly a million people, including the military leadership, diplomatic and intelligence officials, and innumerable leading lights in culture. While Stalin revived a great power, building a formidable industrialized military, the Soviet Union was effectively alone and surrounded by perceived enemies. The quest for security would bring Soviet Communism to a shocking and improbable pact with Nazi Germany. But that bargain would not unfold as envisioned. The lives of Stalin and Hitler, and the fates of their respective dictatorships, drew ever closer to collision, as the world hung in the balance. Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929–1941 is a history of the world during the build-up to its most fateful hour, from the vantage point of Stalin’s seat of power. It is a landmark achievement in the annals of historical scholarship, and in the art of biography.

This book presents a unique collection of some of the most influential recent writing on vital aspects of Nazi Germany.

What Hitler Knew is a fascinating study of how the climate of fear in Nazi Germany affected Hitler's advisers and shaped the decision making process. It explores the key foreign policy decisions from the Nazi seizure of power up to the hours before the outbreak of World War II. Zachary Shore argues persuasively that the tense environment led the diplomats to a nearly obsessive control over the "information arsenal" in a desperate battle to defend their positions and to safeguard their lives. Unlike previous studies, this book draws the reader into the diplomats' darker world, and illustrates how Hitler's power to make informed decisions was limited by the very system he created. The result, Shore concludes, was a chaotic flow of information between Hitler and his advisers that may have accelerated the march toward war.