If the power to tax stems from the need to finance standing armies, as Schumpeter claims, what about the more expensive navies? The answer demonstrated in this book is that Schumpeter was right. We cannot document a single case of a tax financed navy. This work has been generously supported by the Kyriazis family foundation. (Series: Wirtschaft: Forschung und Wissenschaft - Vol. 27) *** "The purpose of this work is to examine the economic theories of Joseph Alois Schumpeter (1883-1950), who proposed that 'creative destruction' of older economic models is necessary for economic progress. . . . will prove of great interest to students of the rise of permanent military institutions." - The NYMAS Review, No. 57, Winter-Spring 2014 [Subject: Military Studies, Naval Studies]Ã?Â?Ã?Â?

Spanning from the Caribbean to East Asia and covering almost 3,000 years of history, from Classical Antiquity to the eve of the twenty-first century, Persistent Piracy is an important contribution to the history of the state formation as well as the history of violence at sea.

Warfare at Sea, 1500-1650 is the first truly international study of warfare at sea in this period. Commencing in the late fifteenth century with the introduction of gunpowder in naval warfare and the rapid transformation of maritime trade, Warfare at Sea focuses on the scope and limitations of war before the advent of the big battle fleets from the middle of the seventeenth century. The book also compares the social history of seamen and the early officer corps in several European countries and includes discussion on Spain, Portugal, France, Venice, the Ottoman Empire and the Baltic states.

Jeremiah Reynolds and the empire of knowledge -- The United States exploring expedition as Jacksonian capitalism -- The United States exploring expedition in popular culture -- The Dead Sea expedition and the empire of faith -- Proslavery explorations of South America -- Arctic exploration and US-UK rapprochement.

A navy is a state's main instrument of maritime force. What it should do, what doctrine it holds, what ships it deploys, and how it fights are determined by practical political and military choices in relation to national needs. Choices are made according to the state's goals, perceived threat, maritime opportunity, technological capabilities, practical experience, and, not the least, the way the sea service defines itself and its way of war. This book is a history of the modern U.S. Navy. It explains how the Navy, in the century after 1890, was formed and reformed in the interaction of purpose, experience, and doctrine.

The 16th and 17th centuries saw many ambitious European rulers develop permanent armies and navies. Jan Glete examines this military change as a central part of the political, social and economic transformation of early modern Europe.

From the decision to build six heavy frigates through the cliffhanger campaign against Tripoli to the war that shook the world in 1812, Toll tells the grand tale of the founding of the U.S. Navy.

Americans think of the Korean War as death and hardship in the bitter hills of Korea. It was certainly this, and for those who fought this is what they generally saw. Yet every foot of the struggles forward, every step of the retreats, the overwhelming victories, the withdrawals and last ditch stands had their seagoing support and overtones. The spectacular ones depended wholly on amphibious power -- the capability of the twentieth century scientific Navy to overwhelm land-bound forces at the point of contact. Yet the all pervading influence of the sea was present even when no major landing or retirement or reinforcement highlighted its effect. When navies clash in gigantic battle or hurl troops ashore under irresistible concentration of ship-borne guns and planes, nations understand that sea power is working. It is not so easy to understand that this tremendous force may effect its will silently, steadily, irresistibly even though no battles occur. No clearer example exists of this truth in wars dark record than in Korea. Communist-controlled North Korea had slight power at sea except for Soviet mines. So beyond this strong underwater phase the United States Navy and allies had little opposition on the water. It is, therefore, easy to fail to recognize the decisive role navies played in this war fought without large naval battles.

Although Theodore Roosevelt has been the subject of numerous books, there has not been a single volume that traces Roosevelt's interaction with the U.S. Navy from his work as a naval historian in the 1880s through his leadership of the Navy as president in the early twentieth century. The editors of this volume fill in this gap in the historical literature. Each essay in this collection by leading historians of American naval history will cover one aspect of Roosevelt's relationship with the Navy while addressing the unifying theme of his use of history and America's naval heritage to advocate for strengthening and modernizing the Navy during his own lifetime. In addition to the book editors, contributors are: Sarah Goldberger, James R. Holmes, David Kohnen, Branden Little, Jon Scott Logel, Edward J. Marolda, Kevin D. McCranie, Matthew Oyos, Jason W. Smith, and Craig L. Symonds.