The study deals with the origins of the U.S. 6th Fleet and its role in the Mediterranean region in the aftermath of World War II. The research is based on two great themes. First the postwar American strategists and foreign policymakers reacted to hostile moves by the Soviets with great hesitancy since they lacked sufficient force to uphold a policy of greater stiffness. The second theme is the enduring utility of naval power, and its richness and flexibility.

"The essays in this volume grew out of a lecture series at Temple University during the 1970-71 academic year." Includes bibliographical references and index.

Military intervention always has been and always will be an important part of foreign policy, a tool to further national interests and influence world events. Many scholars have tried to explain the intervention behavior of states in crises, conflicts, and wars. When and why do states intervene, and what are reasons for nonintervention? What conflicts and crises are more likely to call for intervention, and why? When is intervention successful? The explanations are manifold and include political, military, economic, social, environmental, domestic, and humanitarian factors. The theoretical literature covers a gamut of realist intentions, ranging from security, power, and national interests, as guides to state action; to emphasis on international trade and economics; and to domestic politics. Some argue for explanations based on idealistic aspirations, such as democracy and human rights. Many studies focus on a mix of different reasons. From this vast field, the author has selected international crises involving any form of U.S. activity in the years 1946-2006. Within these U.S. activities, the author distinguishes between crisis response with and without naval forces, as this study intends to advance the knowledge of the use of U.S. naval forces as a response to international crises and to contribute to a better understanding of when and how the U.S. Navy is deployed.

First published in 1977, this study offers a comprehensive, systematic and integrated survey of the important relationship between navies and the making and execution of foreign policy. Ken Booth explains the functions navies can perform in both war and peace, the influence they have on particular situations, and how the relevant organisations can affect the character of naval actions. Ultimately, navies are regarded as indispensable instruments of the state by a number of countries, whilst all countries with a coast find some need to threaten a degree of force at sea. This book provides students and academics with the intellectual framework with which to assess the changing character of the navy.

Examines U.S. security strategy & the appropriate response by our naval services. Papers: global trends & American strategic traditions; Russia in strategic perspective; beyond Korea: Pacific peace? Pacific contention?; the U.S. in the face of the Islamic revival; a strategic checklist for the Post-Cold War world; leveraging strategic assets to enhance international security; the strategy of selective engagement; U.S. grand strategy: mission impossible; strategic concepts for the future; naval diplomacy in the 21st century; grand strategy & naval force structure; classic roles & future challenges; & naval power in national strategy in the 2nd American century.

Deterrence as a strategic concept evolved during the Cold War. During that period, deterrence strategy was aimed mainly at preventing aggression against the United States and its close allies by the hostile Communist power centers--the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its allies, Communist China and North Korea. In particular, the strategy was devised to prevent aggression involving nuclear attack by the USSR or China. Since the end of the Cold War, the risk of war among the major powers has subsided to the lowest point in modern history. Still, the changing nature of the threats to American and allied security interests has stimulated a considerable broadening of the deterrence concept. Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence examines the meaning of deterrence in this new environment and identifies key elements of a post-Cold War deterrence strategy and the critical issues in devising such a strategy. It further examines the significance of these findings for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. Quantitative and qualitative measures to support judgments about the potential success or failure of deterrence are identified. Such measures will bear on the suitability of the naval forces to meet the deterrence objectives. The capabilities of U.S. naval forces that especially bear on the deterrence objectives also are examined. Finally, the book examines the utility of models, games, and simulations as decision aids in improving the naval forces' understanding of situations in which deterrence must be used and in improving the potential success of deterrence actions.

This book examines the use of military force as a coercive tool by the United States, using lessons drawn from the post-Cold War era (1991–2018). The volume reveals that despite its status as sole superpower during the post-Cold War period, US efforts to coerce other states failed as often as they succeeded. In the coming decades, the United States will face states that are more capable and creative, willing to challenge its interests and able to take advantage of missteps and vulnerabilities. By using lessons derived from in-depth case studies and statistical analysis of an original dataset of more than 100 coercive incidents in the post-Cold War era, this book generates insight into how the US military can be used to achieve policy goals. Specifically, it provides guidance about the ways in which, and the conditions under which, the US armed forces can work in concert with economic and diplomatic elements of US power to create effective coercive strategies. This book will be of interest to students of US national security, US foreign policy, strategic studies and International Relations in general.

The Navy in the Post-Cold War World is the first book to invite the reader to think strategically&—that is, in means-ends terms&—about the navy in the new post-Soviet era. It provides a unique synthesis of strategic theory, defense analysis, and history. Colin Gray first explains how sea power &"works&"; explores the strategic relationship among sea, land, and air power, with particular attention to the course of a conflict viewed as a whole; and ventures boldly into the region of the meaning of space strategy for maritime power and the relevance of that power in the still emerging post-Cold War security environment. The Navy in the Post-Cold War World is unusual because it is written by an internationally recognized general strategic theorist and analyst rather than by a long-standing naval writer. Gray is thus better able to view naval issues in proper perspective. Gray delves deeply into the role of sea power as an enabling agent and team player in the overall enterprise of national and international security. He provides the most current assessment of what sea and space power mean for each other as well as envisioning the future of maritime-oriented defense.