Naval communications is constantly evolving and adopting modern technology drawn from all aspects of engineering disciplines. This all-in-one reference is designed specifically for engineers who understand communications, but who need to become familiar with the specifics of U.S. Naval shipboard communications and methods. KEY TOPICS: Explores, from a theoretical and practical engineering system level point of view, both external and intra-platform components -- communication requirements, technical background for understanding the naval communications architecture, the communications subsystems used by the navy (from ELF to EHF), equipment for implementation, operation procedures, configuration control, and logistical support considerations. MARKET: For engineers who understand communications, but who need to become familiar with the specifics of U.S. Naval shipboard communications and methods.

The Navy has put forth a new construct for its strike forces that enables more effective forward deterrence and rapid response. A key aspect of this construct is the need for flexible, adaptive command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. To assist development of this capability, the Navy asked the NRC to examine C4ISR for carrier, expeditionary, and strike and missile defense strike groups, and for expeditionary strike forces. This report provides an assessment of C4ISR capabilities for each type of strike group; recommendations for C4ISR architecture for use in major combat operations; promising technology trends; and an examination of organizational improvements that can enable the recommended architecture.

In 1963, the US Naval Communication Station at North West Cape in Western Australia became the first US defense facility to be established on Australian soil in peacetime. During America's Cold War struggle against communism, North West Cape's primary function was to communicate with the US fleet in the Indian and Western Pacific Oceans, especially nuclear missile submarines - the Navy's most powerful deterrent force. Seen as a vital outpost of US defense throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the whole venture was just as monumental for Australia.This book represents an important and long-overdue history of the significance of North West Cape for Australia-US relations and Australian politics, paying special attention to the town of Exmouth that was uniquely created to support the base. Drawing on archival records and oral interviews, A Little America in Western Australia brings to light the experiences of Australian civilians and US Navy personnel in a fascinating and often humorous portrait of life at the Cape. *** Librarians: ebook available on ProQuest and EBSCO *** "...welcome addition to military and nautical history collections, highly recommended especially for college library shelves." - Midwest Book Review, Library Bookwatch: September 2015, The Nautical Shelf [Subject: Military History, Naval Studies, US Studies, Australian Studies, Politics]

This is the story of the U.S. Navy's communications intelligence (COMINT) effort between 1924 and 1941. It races the building of a program, under the Director of Naval Communications (OP-20), which extracted both radio and traffic intelligence from foreign military, commercial, and diplomatic communications. It shows the development of a small but remarkable organization (OP-20-G) which, by 1937, could clearly see the military, political, and even the international implications of effective cryptography and successful cryptanalysis at a time when radio communications were passing from infancy to childhood and Navy war planning was restricted to tactical situations. It also illustrates an organization plagues from its inception by shortages in money, manpower, and equipment, total absence of a secure, dedicated communications system, little real support or tasking from higher command authorities, and major imbalances between collection and processing capabilities. It explains how, in 1941, as a result of these problems, compounded by the stresses and exigencies of the time, the effort misplaced its focus from Japanese Navy traffic to Japanese diplomatic messages. Had Navy cryptanalysts been ordered to concentrate on the Japanese naval messages rather than Japanese diplomatic traffic, the United States would have had a much clearer picture of the Japanese military buildup and, with the warning provided by these messages, might have avoided the disaster of Pearl Harbor.