Examines NATO's Balkan interventions over the entire decade starting with the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1992. Focusing on the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, it traces the record of early transatlantic failures and later successes as once bitterly divided allies were able, finally, to unite around some basic principles. By the time of the Kosovo intervention in spring 1999, the allies agreed on the necessity of taking sides and using military force in conflicts that were complicated, but far from morally opaque. The book concludes with some lessons around which the transatlantic allies might reasonably hope - despite other pressing concerns - to stay engaged and stay united.

A number of distinguished dissidents voice their opinions on the intervention by NATO in the former Yugoslavia. The collection also provides background historical information on the conflict in the Balkans.

The Clinton administration and the other NATO governments boast that the alliance won a great victory in its war against Yugoslavia.

This book considers the lessons for Britain, the British armed forces and for NATO from the Yugoslav wars of dissolution (1991-1999), with particular emphasis on Kosovo. It represents a significant advance in this emerging debate.

After eleven weeks of bombing in the spring of 1999, the United States and NATO ultimately won the war in Kosovo. Serbian troops were forced to withdraw, enabling an international military and political presence to take charge in the region. But was this war inevitable or was it the product of failed western diplomacy prior to the conflict? And once it became necessary to use force, did NATO adopt a sound strategy to achieve its aims of stabilizing Kosovo? In this first in-depth study of the Kosovo crisis, Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon answer these and other questions about the causes, conduct, and consequences of the war. Based on interviews with many of the key participants, they conclude that notwithstanding important diplomatic mistakes before the conflict, it would have been difficult to avoid the Kosovo war. That being the case, U.S. and NATO conduct of the war left much to be desired. For more than four weeks, the Serbs succeeded where NATO failed, forcefully changing Kosovo's ethnic balance by forcing 1.5 million Albanians from their home and more than 800,000 from the country. Had they chosen to massacre more of their victims, NATO would have been powerless to stop them. In the end, NATO won the war by increasing the scope and intensity of bombing, making serious plans for a ground invasion, and moving diplomacy into full gear in order to convince Belgrade that this was a war Serbia would never win. The Kosovo crisis is a cautionary tale for those who believe force can be used easily and in limited increments to stop genocide, mass killing, and the forceful expulsion of entire populations. Daalder and O'Hanlon conclude that the crisis holds important diplomatic and military lessons that must be learned so that others in the future might avoid the mistakes that were made in this case.

This thesis examines Bulgarian political and economic issues regarding NATO's military intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999. It studies: Bulgarian policy regarding Kosovo crisis; the domestic political attitudes and discussions over NATO's military intervention and over government's foreign policy on this issue; the impact of the war in Yugoslavia and post-war order on Bulgarian economy and Bulgarian domestic and foreign politics. The thesis attempts to evaluate some cost-effective assessments about short and long term consequences for Bulgaria. In spite of the initial highly negative and catastrophic expectations of the Bulgarian public, the country gained significant political dividends. Bulgarian prospects for EU and NATO membership now seem to be much more realistic than ever in the past. At the same time, NATO intervention and the postwar settlements have not solved the ethnic, political, military and economic problem on the Balkans, but complicated them and posed serious new risks for Bulgaria and for the Balkans in general. The war also brought certain negative ecologic effects. The intervention in Yugoslavia and its support by the Bulgarian government complicated Bulgarian- Russian relations, which most probably will have long-term negative effect on Bulgarian economy.

Conflicts involve powerful experiences. The residue of these experiences is captured by the concept and language of emotion. Indiscriminate killing creates fear; targeted violence produces anger and a desire for vengeance; political status reversals spawn resentment; cultural prejudices sustain ethnic contempt. These emotions can become resources for political entrepreneurs. A broad range of Western interventions are based on a view of human nature as narrowly rational. Correspondingly, intervention policy generally aims to alter material incentives ('sticks and carrots') to influence behavior. In response, poorer and weaker actors who wish to block or change this Western implemented 'game' use emotions as resources. This book examines the strategic use of emotion in the conflicts and interventions occurring in the Western Balkans over a twenty-year period. The book concentrates on the conflicts among Albanian and Slavic populations (Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia, South Serbia), along with some comparisons to Bosnia.

Examines NATO's Balkan interventions over the entire decade starting with the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1992. Focusing on the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, it traces the record of early transatlantic failures and later successes as once bitterly divided allies were able, finally, to unite around some basic principles. By the time of the Kosovo intervention in spring 1999, the allies agreed on the necessity of taking sides and using military force in conflicts that were complicated, but far from morally opaque. The book concludes with some lessons around which the transatlantic allies might reasonably hope - despite other pressing concerns - to stay engaged and stay united.