As the one year milestone approaches thousands of American soldiers remain in Bosnia, the cost of the mission have more than doubled and its prospects for success have not brighten. Operations like Bosnia are slowly diminishing the ability of our armed forces to meet the national military strategy. Important modernization and readiness programs are being mortgaged to pay for these indefinite contingency missions. One year into this operation, it is legitimate to ask whether the benefits of U.S. participation have out weighed the costs and whether the American presence in Bosnia has helped to create the condition for a just and lasting peace. While the large scale fighting has ceased, the bitter divisions that gave rise to the conflict in the first place have intensified and are likely to remain for years. Human rights violations continue on all sides. In reality, the Dayton accords have served to ratify the ethnic partition of the country. In short, one year after Dayton, NATO is no closer to ensuring lasting peace in Bosnia and the United States is no closer to developing a credible exit strategy that will lead to the withdrawal of U.S. ground troops from that troubled land.

The Clinton administration's defense budget request of $265.3 billion for Fiscal Year (FY) 1998 represents a 2 percent real decrease from current (FY 1997) spending. As such, it continues a 13-year-long trend of real defense spending decline and it marks a 38 percent real reduction in spending from defense budgets in the mid-l98Os. The FY 1998 defense budget request represents 3.1 percent of the nation's gross domestic product, down more than 50 percent from the 1985 level of 6.4 percent. The FY 1998 defense budget request, when measured in constant dollars, represents the smallest defense budget since 1950.

This new work defines national security strategy, its objectives, the problems it confronts, and the influences that constrain and facilitate its development and implementation in a post-Cold War, post-9/11 environment. The authors note that making and implementing national strategy centers on risk management and present a model for assessing strategic risks and the process for allocating limited resources to reduce them. The major threats facing the United States now come from its unique status as "the sole remaining superpower" against which no nation-state or other entity can hope to compete through conventional means. The alternative is what is now called asymmetrical or fourth generation warfare. Drew and Snow discuss all these factors in detail and bring them together by examining the continuing problems of making strategy in a changed and changing world. Originally published in 2006.

The Council on Foreign Relations sponsors Independent Task Forces to assess issues of current and critical importance to U.S. foreign policy and provide policymakers with concrete judgments and recommendations. Diverse in backgrounds and perspectives, Task Force members aim to reach a meaningful consensus on policy through private and non-partisan deliberations. Once launched, Task Forces are independent of CFR and solely responsible for the content of their reports. Task Force members are asked to join a consensus signifying that they endorse "the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation." Each Task Force member also has the option of putting forward an additional or a dissenting view. Members' affiliations are listed for identification purposes only and do not imply institutional endorsement. Task Force observers participate in discussions, but are not asked to join the consensus. --Book Jacket.

The support of the American public is widely held to be a critical prerequisite for undertaking military action abroad. This monograph describes American public opinion toward wars and other large military operations over the last decade, to delineate the sources of support and opposition for each war or operation, to identify the principal fault lines in support, and to illuminate those factors that are consistent predictors of support for and opposition to military operations.

After war, police forces are often unable or unwilling to put pressure on suspected war criminals, organized crime groups, and other spoilers of sustainable peace. This book sheds light on the role of international military forces in post-conflict law enforcement. Drawing on numerous interviews, it shows that EU and NATO military forces have not systematically fought serious crime in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. International actors need to better balance their own interests as well as the requirement to separate military and police functions with the urgent need to protect individuals in war-torn countries. The policy recommendations in the book are aimed at contributing to more effective, efficient, and legitimate peace operations in the Balkans and beyond.

The most comprehensive account to date of the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon and aftermath, this volume includes unprecedented details on the impact on the Pentagon building and personnel and the scope of the rescue, recovery, and caregiving effort. It features 32 pages of photographs and more than a dozen diagrams and illustrations not previously available.