Bogen handler om om den østrigske Ærkehertug Charles og den Østrig-Ungarske hær, under Habsburgerne, Napoleon's "store fjende og modstander", men som idag er blegnet og næsten glemt, modsat bl.a. Wellington og Blücher. Bogen forsøger at råde bod på dette, og beskrive den østrigske hærs historie under Napoleonstiden. Den bygger på omfattende forskning i den østrigske hærs arkiver. "The largest force continually engaged against Napoleon and the forces of the French Revolution from 1792 to 1814 was the Austrian Army. It was this army which, throughout Europe, carried the burden of war on land. Though repeatedly defeated it always rose again. In 1809 it inflichted the first setback on Napoleon himself and in 1813 contributed the largest contingent to the allied effort in Germany". Ærkehertug Charles (Charles Louis John, Archduke of Austria, Duke of Teschen) 1771-1847, østrigsk general og feltmarskal, tredie søn af Leopold II (af det Hellige Romerske Kejserrige) var en dygtig militær hærfører og strateg, taktiker og organisator, både Wellington og Napoleon havde høje tanker om hans militære dygtighed, og han regnes stadig, trods mere eller mindre glemsel, som en af Napoleon's mest formidable militære modstandere.

"The largest force continually engaged against Napoleon and the forces of Revolutionary, later Imperial, France from 1792 to 1814 was the Imperial and Royal Austrian army. It was this army which, throughout Europe, carried the burden of the war on land. Though defeated repeatedly by Napoleon, its record against French armies generally was good. Rising from its previous defeats, in 1809, the Austrian army inflicted the first defeat on Napoleon and in 1813, contributed the largest contingent to the Allied effort in Germany." "The effects of the political, economic and social constraints are clearly explained to put the Austrian army in to the context of its day. The major campaigns and important battles are covered in detail; the strategy and tactics of its commanders are explained and analysed; the initial organisation and subsequent reforms delineated to produce a thorough survey of the Austrian army."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved

One of the most colorful characters in the Napoleonic pantheon, Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher (1742–1819) is best known as the Prussian general who, along with the Duke of Wellington, defeated Napoleon at the Battle of Waterloo. Throughout his long career, Blücher distinguished himself as a bold commander, but his actions at times appeared erratic and reckless. This magnificent biography by Michael V. Leggiere, an award-winning historian of the Napoleonic Wars, is the first scholarly book in English to explore Blücher’s life and military career—and his impact on Napoleon. Drawing on exhaustive research in European archives, Leggiere eschews the melodrama of earlier biographies and offers instead a richly nuanced portrait of a talented leader who, contrary to popular perception, had a strong grasp of military strategy. Nicknamed “Marshal Forward” by his soldiers, he in fact retreated more often than he attacked. Focusing on the campaigns of 1813, 1814, and 1815, Leggiere evaluates the full effects of Blücher’s operations on his archenemy. In addition to providing military analysis, Leggiere draws extensively from Blücher’s own writings to reveal the man behind the legend. Though tough as nails on the outside, Blücher was a loving family man who deplored the casualties of war. This meticulously written biography, enhanced by detailed maps and other illustrations, fills a large gap in our understanding of a complex man who, for all his flaws and eccentricities, is justly credited with releasing Europe from the yoke of Napoleon’s tyranny.

Some 12 years ago it was estimated that well over 300,000 works existed on this period and since then several thousand more have appeared. Therefore, it might be reasonably argued that there is little room for another volume. Nonetheless, this vast outpouring of literature has usually dealt with major leaders, specific battles or campaigns, and with certain branches of the service. Moreover, at least in English, the literature tends to concentrate primarily on the French or British armies. There appears to be a lack of works combining a description of the major changes and trends in the art of war, especially at the cutting edge of events, with a discussion of the French military establishment and the armies of the major opponents, British as well as continental. And while this book is only a brief survey, I do believe that it may serve as a contribution towards filling this gap in our historical knowledge of military institutions and fighting men.

In Napoleon and the Operational Art of War, the leading scholars of Napoleonic military history provide the most authoritative analysis of Napoleon’s battlefield success and ultimate failure. Napoleon’s development and mastery of the operational art of warfare is revealed as each chapter analyzes one Napoleonic war or major campaign of a war. To achieve this, the essays conform to the common themes of Napoleon’s planning, his command and control, his execution of plans, and the response of his adversaries. Napoleon's sea power and the British response to the French challenge at sea is also investigated. Overall, this volume reflects the finest scholarship and cutting-edge research to be found in Napoleonic Military History. Contributors include Jonathan Abel, Robert M. Citino, Huw Davies, Mark T. Gerges; John H. Gill; Jordan Hayworth, Kenneth G. Johnson, Michael V. Leggiere, Kevin D. McCranie, Alexander Mikaberidze, Frederick C. Schneid, John Severn, Dennis Showalter, Geoffrey Wawro, and John F. Weinzierl.

Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Alexander the Great offers a considerable range of topics, of interest to students and academics alike, in the long tradition of this subject’s significant impact, across a sometimes surprising and comprehensive variety of areas. Arguably no other historical figure has cast such a long shadow for so long a time. Every civilisation touched by the Macedonian Conqueror, along with many more that he never imagined, has scrambled to “own” some part of his legacy. This volume canvasses a comprehensive array of these receptions, beginning from Alexander’s own era and journeying up to the present, in order to come to grips with the impact left by this influential but elusive figure.

This is the book on war that Napoleon never had the time or the will to complete. In exile on the island of Saint-Helena, the deposed Emperor of the French mused about a great treatise on the art of war, but in the end changed his mind and ordered the destruction of the materials he had collected for the volume. Thus was lost what would have been one of the most interesting and important books on the art of war ever written, by one of the most famous and successful military leaders of all time. In the two centuries since, several attempts have been made to gather together some of Napoleon's 'military maxims', with varying degrees of success. But not until now has there been a systematic attempt to put Napoleon's thinking on war and strategy into a single authoritative volume, reflecting both the full spectrum of his thinking on these matters as well as the almost unparalleled range of his military experience, from heavy cavalry charges in the plains of Russia or Saxony to counter-insurgency operations in Egypt or Spain. To gather the material for this book, military historian Bruno Colson spent years researching Napoleon's correspondence and other writings, including a painstaking examination of perhaps the single most interesting source for his thinking about war: the copy-book of General Bertrand, the Emperor's most trusted companion on Saint-Helena, in which he unearthed a Napoleonic definition of strategy which is published here for the first time. The huge amount of material brought together for this ground-breaking volume has been carefully organized to follow the framework of Carl von Clausewitz's classic On War, allowing a fascinating comparison between Napoleon's ideas and those of his great Prussian interpreter and adversary, and highlighting the intriguing similarities between these two founders of modern strategic thinking.

Although little studied today, this Austrian commander fought against Napoleon at the height of his power and came close to defeating him.