Napoleon’s rise to power in the late eighteenth century occurred at a time when the structure of most European armies was based on the paradigm army of Frederick the Great. Napoleon, however, changed all of this and in a few short years transformed the French army into the most powerful force on the continent of Europe. During the period of 1805 to 1813, Napoleon’s army had no equal with regard to operational effectiveness. Speed and positioning of forces were the two main characteristics that made the French army so successful. These same two characteristics were also inherent to French cavalry units. Thus, the central research question is: What influence did cavalry have upon Napoleon’s operations? To facilitate this study, two campaigns were examined that illustrate cavalry’s impact on Napoleon’s operations. The first campaign was the Jena Campaign of 1806; the second was the Saxony Campaign of 1813. The Jena Campaign demonstrated that with the employment of sufficient and well-trained cavalry, Napoleon could render his victories decisive through the complete destruction of the enemy army. Conversely, the Saxony Campaign demonstrated that without the effective employment of sufficient and well-trained cavalry, Napoleon could not obtain the complete destruction of the enemy army and thus, his victories were hollow, or at best Pyrrhic. Therefore, based on the analysis of these two campaigns, this study has concluded that Napoleon’s cavalry was a key element for Napoleon achieving complete destruction of the enemy army, thus rendering his victories decisive.

Some 12 years ago it was estimated that well over 300,000 works existed on this period and since then several thousand more have appeared. Therefore, it might be reasonably argued that there is little room for another volume. Nonetheless, this vast outpouring of literature has usually dealt with major leaders, specific battles or campaigns, and with certain branches of the service. Moreover, at least in English, the literature tends to concentrate primarily on the French or British armies. There appears to be a lack of works combining a description of the major changes and trends in the art of war, especially at the cutting edge of events, with a discussion of the French military establishment and the armies of the major opponents, British as well as continental. And while this book is only a brief survey, I do believe that it may serve as a contribution towards filling this gap in our historical knowledge of military institutions and fighting men.

Napoleon's rise to power in the late eighteenth century occurred at a time when the structure of most European armies was based on the paradigm army of Frederick the Great. Napoleon, however, changed all of this and in a few short years transformed the French army into the most powerful force on the continent of Europe. During the period of 1805 to 1813, Napoleon's army had no equal with regard to operational effectiveness. Speed and positioning of forces were the two main characteristics that made the French army so successful. These same two characteristics were also inherent to French cavalry units. Thus, the central research question is: What influence did cavalry have upon Napoleon's operations? To facilitate this study, two campaigns were examined that illustrate cavalry's impact on Napoleon's operations. The first campaign was the Jena Campaign of 1806; the second was the Saxony Campaign of 1813. The Jena Campaign demonstrated that with the employment of sufficient and well-trained cavalry, Napoleon could render his victories decisive through the complete destruction of the enemy army. Conversely, the Saxony Campaign demonstrated that without the effective employment of sufficient and well-trained cavalry, Napoleon could not obtain the complete destruction of the enemy army and thus, his victories were hollow, or at best Pyrrhic. Therefore, based on the analysis of these two campaigns, this study has concluded that Napoleon's cavalry was a key element for Napoleon achieving complete destruction of the enemy army, thus rendering his victories decisive.

Tracing Napoleon's development as both a general and statesman, distinguished historian James Marshall-Cornwall brings to life the career of one of history's greatest military strategists. Focusing on the two decades during which Napoleon achieved his greatest triumphs and suffered his most heartbreaking defeats, this thoroughly researched study keenly analyzes how, like Oliver Cromwell, Napoleon combined strategy and statecraft throughout his career. From his most brilliant campaigns-in particular his conquest of Piedmont and his triumphant invasion of Italy-to the disasters at Trafalgar, in the Iberian Peninsula, in Russia, at Leipzig, and his final downfall at Waterloo, Napoleon as Military Commander tells the story of a general whose defeats were as remarkable as his victories.

Napoleon's rise to power in the late eighteenth century occurred at a time when the structure of most European armies was based on the paradigm army of Frederick the Great. Napoleon, however, changed all of this and in a few short years transformed the French army into the most powerful force on the continent of Europe. During the period of 1805 to 1813, Napoleon's army had no equal with regard to operational effectiveness. Speed and positioning of forces were the two main characteristics that made the French army so successful. These same two characteristics were also inherent to French cavalry units. Thus, the central research question is: What influence did cavalry have upon Napoleon's operations? To facilitate this study, two campaigns were examined that illustrate cavalry's impact on Napoleon's operations. The first campaign was the Jena Campaign of 1806; the second was the Saxony Campaign of 1813. The Jena Campaign demonstrated that with the employment of sufficient and well-trained cavalry, Napoleon could render his victories decisive through the complete destruction of the enemy army. Conversely, the Saxony Campaign demonstrated that without the effective employment of sufficient and well-trained cavalry, Napoleon could not obtain the complete destruction of the enemy army and thus, his victories were hollow, or at best Pyrrhic. Therefore, based on the analysis of these two campaigns, this study has concluded that Napoleon's cavalry was a key element for Napoleon achieving complete destruction of the enemy army, thus rendering his victories decisive.

Focusing on the front-line soldiers who fought for their tribes, their cities, their overlords and their countries-from the Ancient Greeks who repelled the invading Persians in the 5th century to the US Marines in action in Korea, Vietnam and the Persian Gulf, this visual history paints a compelling portrait of the front-line soldier through 2,500 years of history. The third in a series of illustrated military history books, following the highly successful Battle and Weapon, Warrior features vivid accounts of daily life, training, and tactics of the ordinary fighting man. There are also features on the kit they carried and the weapons they used, as well as the part they played in significant battles. In addition to celebrated soldiers of Europe and North America there are sections on equally formidable warriors from other parts of the world, such as the Mongol horsemen of the 13th century, the Aztecs, the Samurai of 17th-century Japan, New Zealand's Maori and the Zulus of South Africa. Warrior is organized into six sections, covering six distinct periods in the history of warfare: Phalanxes and Legions deals with the warfare of Ancient Greece and Rome; Conquest and Chivalry explores the age of warriors who fought for either honor or plunder; Pikemen and Musketeers charts the advent of gunpowder in the 16th century; Empires and Frontiers deals with expansion of empires and the clashes of colonization; Trenches and Dogfights looks at the mechanized warfare of World War I and II, when the development of tanks, aeroplanes and submarines as weapons of war marks the beginning of a completely new era; and Guerillas and Commandos shows that despite the proliferation of death-dealing machines the ordinary soldier still retains a role, sometimes highly specialized, such as helicopter-borne infantry, or guerrilla forces like the Vietcong, who managed to resist the most powerful army on earth.

While artillery has been described as the queen of the Napoleonic battlefield, this was an era when cavalry could still play a decisive role in battle, as well as being vital on campaign. This volume covers both British cavalry and artillery of the Napoleonic Wars, as well as supporting units such as engineers. Gabriele Esposito describes the history, organization and uniforms of the various units in full detail, following the evolution and combat history of each. Mounted troops deployed in the various British colonies as well as foreign cavalry units in British service will be all covered in specific chapters. The technical corps, most notably the artillery (both foot and horse) and the engineers, are given similar treatment. Royal Marines naval infantry and some other 'auxiliary' corps (like the Yeomanry/militia cavalry or the Sea Fencibles, all very little known) are also included. The book is lavishly illustrated with dozens of color paintings.