This book explores the scope of Moscow's "new thinking" in its Third World context—highlighted by the USSR's surprising withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988. It reviews the foreign policy record Gorbachev inherited and assesses his economic and strategic priorities in the diplomatic arena.

Analyzes previous Soviet policies towards the third world, the dramatic initiatives introduced by Gorbachev, and the fundamental forces that shape them both. Presents case studies of countries and regions, and considerable data on arms transfers. Also available in paper ($15.95). Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

The description for this book, Moscow's Third World Strategy, will be forthcoming.

Some of the most crucial changes inspired by Gorbachev and perestroika concern Soviet and East European policies toward Third World countries. Despite countless studies of Soviet-U.S. relations and U.S. relations with the Third World, the area of Soviet relations with the Third World has been left relatively undeveloped. This is the first of several volumes intended to add to our knowledge of what the series editor Jiri Valenta characterizes as East/South relations. In this new era of cooperation and diplomacy, the superpowers are working to resolve regional conflicts in and around Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, and Cambodia. Such efforts are exceedingly complex, since they necessarily involve not only the Soviet Union, but Third World nations that may operate independently, such as Cuba and Vietnam. This volume addresses a number of such conflicts. In addition to those already mentioned, conflicts in Ethiopia, Namibia, and the Philippines are discussed, and their implications for Western policy makers are reviewed. As the contributors emphasize, despite current Soviet emphasis on peaceful solutions to regional conflicts, Gorbachev's "New Thinking" in foreign affairs is still decidedly selective. In some cases, the Soviet Union will actually encourage close ties with regional Third World powers, as it has with India. It is also too much to expect that the Soviet Union, much less Cuba and Vietnam, will completely cut ties to revolutionary allies worldwide. That said, the 1990s will undoubtedly be characterized by new Soviet foreign policy styles. Their shape and form is the subject of this book. It will be of immense interest to policymakers and researchers concerned about current developments in relations between the superpowers and with the Third World. Contributors include: Vernon Aspaturian, Bhabani Sen Gupta, William E. Griffith, Jerry F. Hough, Douglas Pike, Howard Wiarda, AH T, Sheikh, Sabahuddin Kushkaki, Colin Legum, H. de V. du Toil, Khien Theeravit, Frank Cibulka, Alvaro Taboada, Charles William Maynes, W. Bruce Weinrod, Jiri Valenta.

Several aspects of Soviet Third-World relations in a capitalist world are looked at in this book. These include tracing the roots of the Third World within the Marxist tradition, and discussing Soviet attitudes to the capitalist world market as they have evolved from the Bolshevik era to today.

In this fascinating inquiry into the Soviet retreat from the Third World, Melvin A. Goodman analyzes Gorbachev's policy from the standpoint of disillusionment with the Third World. He cites, among other reasons for the retreat, the diminished strategic significance of the Third World to current Soviet leadership, the limitations for Soviet power projection in distant areas, and the dilemmas in Moscow's relations with Third World regimes. Goodman contends that Gorbachev's foreign policy shift to achieve a more stable international arena and a less militant Soviet stance allowed Moscow to focus on its internal economic problems. This volume provides the first exploration of Afghanistan as a watershed in Soviet thinking on the Third World and discusses the current Soviet emphasis on conflict management and resolution in Third World states--particularly Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua. Gorbachev's Retreat explains how cooperation with the United States improves Moscow's image in the West and tends to stabilize Third World flash points. Up-to-the-minute data on Soviet military and economic assistance to the Third World as well as Third World responses to the new Soviet policy are also presented. The volume examines Soviet retrenchment and retreat in the Third World; analyzes Gorbachev's decisions relative to Third World relationships; zeroes in on the withdrawal from Afghanistan; explores some of the reasons for Soviet power limitations; and assesses the regional implications of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking. Gorbachev's Retreat then looks at Soviet power projection and crisis management, Soviet military and economic aid, and Soviet retreat in the 1990s. The volume will be particularly useful to undergraduate and graduate courses in foreign policy and international relations as a discussion of the impact of the new Soviet policy in the Third World and the consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations. Regional studies specialists will find its in-depth analyses of the limits on Soviet actions in the Third World cogent and timely.

Gorbachev’s accession to General Secretary promised great changes to the Soviet Union and its relationship with the rest of the world. This book, first published in 1987, discusses the problems faced by Gorbachev when he entered office and how he planned to tackle them. Gorbachev was a figure of genuine debate in the mid-1980s, raising doubts from Western specialists regarding his radicalism and ability to reform the Soviet economic system in particular. Here, Dyker and his colleagues assess the changes Gorbachev had already made to consolidate his power base, alongside those that he was proposing to make to agriculture, industry and foreign relations at the time of publication. The book speculates about how Gorbachev might implement his proposed political and economic reforms, what opposition he might encounter and how successful he would be. A fascinating insight into Soviet economic and political policy in the years leading up to the Union’s collapse, this work will be of particular importance to students and academics researching the personality of Gorbachev and the political and economic history of the Soviet Union.

Mark Katz's highly readable and useful overview of Soviet military interest in the Third World will be an important resource for anyone doing research in this field. Francis Fukuyama, Deputy Director for East-West Relations, Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State In his timely and thoughtful assessment of Gorbachev's evolving military policy, Mark Katz cautions against concluding that Moscow has lost interest in retaining and acquiring positions of influence in areas such as Angola, the Arab world, Ethiopia, and Central America. By detailing for us the `new thinking' in Moscow, and the new policies that it has spawned in the USSR's Third World Policy, he has made a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate about the challenge that Gorbachev poses to the United States. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania This book examines the changes that have occurred in Soviet military policy toward the Third World under Gorbachev. Mark Katz studies Gorbachev's active pursuit of detente with the West in terms of his ambitious economic reform efforts. Katz maintains that since Gorbachev regards detente as so essential for the achievement of perestroika, he has adopted a less aggressive military policy in the Third World. This book examines the Soviet military statements since Gorbachev came to power, which indicate that the Soviet military, for the most part, does not oppose Gorbachev's retrenchment from the Third World. The Soviet military even seems to approve the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan. The author points out that while Gorbachev has de-emphasized the expansion of Moscow's base network in the Third World, he has vigorously sought to reduce U.S. military access to it. Gorbachev has attempted to do this through a stepped-up diplomatic campaign to convince moderate Third World states that the Soviet Union is not their enemy and hence there is no need to ally with Washington against Moscow. Katz also analyzes the Soviet support of regional security proposals for Asia and the Pacific, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, parts of Africa, Central America, and elsewhere. Katz maintains that if these security proposals are accepted, U.S. military access to them would definitely be reduced and that the Soviets' de-emphasis on obtaining new bases could mean that moderate Third World governments may become more amenable to accepting these regional security proposals.

This study investigates the overall Soviet conception of non-alignment in the Third World and assesses Soviet policy in relation to this issue.