Prominent philosophers explore themes in the work of Owen Flanagan, focusing on debates about the nature of mind, the self, and morality. Owen Flanagan's work offers a model for how to be a naturalistic and scientifically informed philosopher who writes beautifully and deeply about topics as varied as consciousness and Buddhism, moral psychology and dreaming, identity and addiction, literature and neuroscience. In this volume, leading philosophers--Flanagan's friends, colleagues, and former students--explore themes in his work, focusing on debates over the nature of mind, the self, and morality. Some contributors address Flanagan's work directly; others are inspired by his work or methodology. Their essays are variously penetrating and synoptic, cautious and speculative.

Contemporary Western moral philosophy in harmony with classical Chinese philosophy, especially Buddhism.

Variations -- On being imprisoned by one's upbringing -- Moral psychologies and moral ecologies -- Bibliographical essay -- First nature -- Classical Chinese sprouts -- Modern moral psychology -- Beyond moral modularity -- Destructive emotions -- Bibliographic essay -- Collisions -- When values collide -- Moral geographies of anger -- Weird anger -- For love's and justice's sake -- Bibliographical essay -- Anthropologies -- Self-variations: philosophical archaeologies -- The content of character.

Moral sensitivity affects whether and how we see others, note moral concerns, respond with delicacy, and navigate complex social interactions. Scholars from a variety of fields explore the concept of moral sensitivity and how it develops, beginning with a natural moral capacity for sensitivity towards others that is shaped in a variety of ways through relationships, forms of teaching, and social institutions. Each of these influences alters the capacity as well as one’s responses in complex ways. The concept of moral sensitivity deepens as progressive chapters demonstrate its increasing complexity through development within individuals, over time, as they mature, and as their relationships and social contexts expand. The chapters integrate research from philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, literature, education, and media and technology studies, with key chapters by Darcia Narváez, Nancy E. Snow, Michael S. Pritchard, and Stephen J. Thoma and a Foreword by Owen Flanagan. It is the only comprehensive presentation of interdisciplinary work on moral sensitivity that integrates a theoretical, methodological, and pedagogical analysis. This highly interdisciplinary approach provides a new way of thinking about the relationship of individuals to society and moral sensitivity as a social phenomenon, extending current research in ethics, moral psychology, and psychology toward situated, embodied, and contextual analyses.

Many people are drawn towards virtue ethics because of the central place it gives to emotions in the good life. Yet it may seem odd to evaluate emotions as virtuous or non-virtuous, for how can we be held responsible for those powerful feelings that simply engulf us? And how can education help us to manage our emotional lives? The aim of this book is to offer readers a new Aristotelian analysis and moral justification of a number of emotions that Aristotle did not mention (awe, grief, and jealousy), or relegated, at best, to the level of the semi-virtuous (shame), or made disparaging remarks about (gratitude), or rejected explicitly (pity, understood as pain at another person's deserved bad fortune). Kristján Kristjánsson argues that there are good Aristotelian reasons for understanding those emotions either as virtuous or as indirectly conducive to virtue. Virtuous Emotions begins with an overview of Aristotle's ideas on the nature of emotions and of emotional value, and concludes with an account of Aristotelian emotion education.

Well-being is topic of perennial concern. It has been of significant interest to scholars across disciplines, culture, and time. But like morality, conceptions of well-being are deeply shaped and influenced by one’s particular social and cultural context. We ought to pursue, therefore, a cross-cultural understanding of well-being and moral psychology by taking seriously reflections from a variety of moral traditions. This book develops a Confucian account of well-being, considering contemporary accounts of ethics and virtue in light of early Confucian thought and philosophy. Its distinctive approach lies in the integration of Confucian moral philosophy, contemporary empirical psychology, and contemporary philosophical accounts of well-being. Richard Kim organizes the book around four main areas: the conception of virtues in early Confucianism and the way that they advance both individual and communal well-being; the role of Confucian ritual practices in familial and communal ties; the developmental structure of human life and its culmination in the achievement of sagehood; and the sense of joy that the early Confucians believed was central to the virtuous and happy life.

Recent interest in Confucianism has a tendency to suffer from essentialism and idealism, manifested in a variety of ways. One example is to think of Confucianism in terms of the views attributed to one representative of the tradition, such as Kongzi (Confucius) (551-479 BCE) or Mengzi (Mencius) (372 - 289 BCE) or one school or strand of the tradition, most often the strand or tradition associated with Mengzi or, in the later tradition, that formed around the commentaries and interpretation of Zhu Xi (1130-1200). Another such tendency is to think of Confucianism in terms of its manifestations in only one country; this is almost always China for the obvious reasons that China is one of the most powerful and influential states in the world today. A third tendency is to present Confucianism in terms of only one period or moment in the tradition; for example, among ethical and political philosophers, pre-Qin Confucianism--usually taken to be the writings attributed to Kongzi, Mengzi, and, if we are lucky, Xunzi (479-221 BCE)--often is taken as "Confucianism." These and other forms of essentialism and idealism have led to a widespread and deeply entrenched impression that Confucianism is thoroughly homogenous and monolithic (these often are "facts" mustered to support the purportedly oppressive, authoritarian, and constricted nature of the tradition); such impressions can be found throughout East Asia and dominate in the West. This is quite deplorable for it gives us no genuine sense of the creatively rich, philosophically powerful, highly variegated, and still very much open-ended nature of the Confucian tradition. This volume addresses this misconstrual and misrepresentation of Confucianism by presenting a philosophically critical account of different Confucian thinkers and schools, across place (China, Korea, and Japan) and time (the 10th to 19th centuries).

At the center of a constellation of key ideas in East Asian philosophical traditions, there lies a conception of oneness among human beings. Human beings are intricately and inextricably intertwined and share a common destiny with other people, creatures, and things. The ramifications of this idea are wide-reaching, and resonate with important debates and concerns in contemporary Western philosophy, but many at the forefront of their fields in the West are unaware of the fundamental shift in perspective that might be available to them. One of Ivanhoe's aims in this work is to challenge the dominant paradigm of hyper-individualism, which still enjoys a commanding position in a great deal of contemporary theory and practice in the humanities and social sciences, and to describe and advocate for an alternative conception and sense of self, world, and the relationship between them. In particular, Ivanhoe, who has an extensive background in and has published influential work on virtue ethics and Asian philosophy, investigates the implications of oneness for conceptions of the self, virtue, and human happiness. Through the lens of oneness, he explores topics such as conceptions of the self, selfishness and self-centeredness, virtues, spontaneity, and happiness, drawing support from wide-ranging, interdisciplinary sources. Rather than starting from the standpoint of Western philosophy and then reaching out to Asian philosophy from a distance, Ivanhoe advances a thesis drawn from East Asian sources and explicitly challenges the theoretical asymmetry that is characteristic of most comparative study, which often simply applies Western theories to non-Western material.

Contemporary political philosophy - especially in the works of Martha Nussbaum, John Rawls and Amartya Sen - has assumed that it can separate itself off from other philosophical positions and frameworks. In this book, Den Uyl and Rasmussen challenge this trend by moving from the liberalism they advocate in their earlier work to what they call 'individualistic perfectionism' in ethics. They continue to challenge the assumption that a neo-Aristotelian ethical framework cannot support a liberal, non-perfectionist political theory by filling in the nature of the perfectionist ethical approach utilised in their previous political theorising. By developing the central features and principles of individualistic perfectionism they show that it is a major and powerful alternative to much contemporary ethical thinking - particularly to constructivism - and that it is capable of overcoming standard objections to perfectionism.

Naturalism, Human Flourishing, and Asian Philosophy: Owen Flanagan and Beyond is an edited volume of philosophical essays focusing on Owen Flanagan’s naturalized comparative philosophy and moral psychology of human flourishing. Flanagan is a philosopher well-known for his naturalized approach to philosophical issues such as meaning, physicalism, causation, and consciousness in the analytic school of Western philosophy. Recently, he develops his philosophical interest in Asian philosophy and discusses diverse philosophical issues of human flourishing, Buddhism and Confucianism from comparative viewpoints. The current volume discusses his philosophy of human flourishing and his naturalized approaches to Buddhism and Confucianism. The volume consists of five sections with eleven chapters written by leading experts in the fields of philosophy, religion, and psychology. The first section is an introduction to Flanagan’s philosophy. The introductory chapter provides a general overview of Flanagan’s philosophy, i.e., his philosophy of naturalization, comparative approach to human flourishing, and detailed summaries of the following chapters. In the second section, the three chapters discuss Flanagan’s naturalized eudaimonics of human flourishing. The third section discusses Flanagan’s naturalized Buddhism. The fourth section analyzes Flanagan’s interpretation of Confucian philosophy (specifically Mencius’s moral sprouts), from the viewpoint of moral modularity and human flourishing. The fifth section is Flanagan’s responses to the comments and criticisms developed in this volume.