We can see a theft, hear a lie, and feel a stabbing. These are morally important perceptions. But are they also moral perceptions--distinctively moral responses? In this book, Robert Audi develops an original account of moral perceptions, shows how they figure in human experience, and argues that they provide moral knowledge. He offers a theory of perception as an informative representational relation to objects and events. He describes the experiential elements in perception, illustrates moral perception in relation to everyday observations, and explains how moral perception justifies moral judgments and contributes to objectivity in ethics. Moral perception does not occur in isolation. Intuition and emotion may facilitate it, influence it, and be elicited by it. Audi explores the nature and variety of intuitions and their relation to both moral perception and emotion, providing the broadest and most refined statement to date of his widely discussed intuitionist view in ethics. He also distinguishes several kinds of moral disagreement and assesses the challenge it poses for ethical objectivism. Philosophically argued but interdisciplinary in scope and interest, Moral Perception advances our understanding of central problems in ethics, moral psychology, epistemology, and the theory of the emotions.

This collection of Laurence Blum's essays examines the moral import of emotion, motivation, judgement, perception, and group identifications.

Perception and the language of the mind -- Motivation -- Emotions -- Preliminary passions -- Progress in joy: preliminaries to good emotions -- Cognitive therapies -- Inspiration.

The idea that reading literature changes the reader seems as old as literature itself. Through the ages philosophers, writers, and literary scholars have suggested it affects norms, empathic ability, self-concept, beliefs, etc. This book examines what we actually know about these effects. And it finds strong evidence for the old claims. However, it remains unclear what aspects of the reading experience are responsible for these effects. Applying methods of the social sciences to this particular problem of literary theory, this book presents a psychological explanation based upon the conception of literature as a moral laboratory. A series of experiments examines whether imagining oneself in the shoes of characters affects beliefs about what it must be like to be someone else, and whether it affects beliefs about consequences of behavior. The results have implications for the role literature could play in society, for instance, in an alternative for traditional moral education.

The deployment of Autonomous Weapons gives rise to ongoing debate in society and at the United Nations, in the context of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. Yet little empirical research has been done on this topic. This volume fills that gap by offering an empirical study based on military personnel and civilians working at the Dutch Ministry of Defence. It yields insight into how Autonomous Weapons are perceived by the military and general public; and which moral values are considered important in relation to their deployment. The research approach used is the Value-Sensitive Design (VSD) method that allows for the consideration of human values throughout the design process of technology. The outcome indicates that military personnel and civilians attribute more agency (the capacity to think and plan) to an Autonomous Weapon than to a Human Operated Drone. In addition, it is clear that common ground exists between military and societal groups in their perception of the values of human dignity and anxiety. These two values arise often in the discourse, and addressing them is essential when considering the ethics of the deployment of Autonomous Weapons. The text of this volume is also offered in parallel French and German translation.

This journal has been discontinued. Any issues are available to purchase separately.

Compared to other kinds of knowledge, how fragile is our knowledge of morality? Does knowledge of the difference between right and wrong fundamentally differ from knowledge of other kinds, in that it cannot be forgotten? What makes reliable evidence in fundamental moral convictions? And what are the associated problems of using testimony as a source of moral knowledge? Sarah McGrath provides novel answers to these questions and many others, as she investigates the possibilities, sources, and characteristic vulnerabilities of moral knowledge. She also considers whether there is anything wrong with simply outsourcing moral questions to a moral expert and evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the method of equilibrium as an account of how we make up our mind about moral questions. Ultimately, McGrath concludes that moral knowledge can be acquired in any of the ways in which we acquire ordinary empirical knowledge. Our efforts to acquire and preserve such knowledge, she argues, are subject to frustration in all of the same ways that our efforts to acquire and preserve ordinary empirical knowledge are.

In Perception, Empathy, and Judgment Arne Johan Vetlesen focuses on the indispensable role of emotion, especially the faculty of empathy, in morality. He contends that moral conduct is severely threatened once empathy is prevented from taking part in an interplay with cognitive faculties (such as abstraction or imagination) in acts of moral perception and judgment. Drawing on developmental psychology, especially British "object relations" theory, to illuminate the nature and functioning of empathy, Vetlesen shows how moral performance is constituted by a sequence involving perception, judgment, and action, with an interplay between the agent's emotional (empathic) and cognitive faculties occurring at each stage. In the powerful tradition from Kant to present-day theorists such as Kohlberg, Rawls, and Habermas, reason is privileged over feeling and judgment over perception, in such a way that basic philosophical questions remain unasked. Vetlesen focuses our attention on these questions and challenges the long-standing assertion that emotions are damaging to moral response. In the final chapter he relates his argument to recent feminist critiques that have also castigated moral theorists in the Kantian tradition for their refusal to recognize a role for emotion in morality. While the book's argument is philosophical, its method and scope are interdisciplinary. In addition to critiques of such philosophers as Arendt, MacIntyre, and Habermas, it contains discussions of specific historical, ideological, and sociological factors that may cause "numbing"—selective or broad-ranging, pathological insensitivity—in humans. The Nazis' mass killing of Jews is studied to illuminate these and other relevant empirical aspects of large-scale immoral action.

This book offers a new philosophical theory of risk emotions, arguing why and how moral emotions should play an important role in decisions surrounding risky technologies.

This comprehensive and cutting-edge volume maps out the terrain of moral psychology, a dynamic and evolving area of research. In 57 concise chapters, leading authorities and up-and-coming scholars explore fundamental issues and current controversies. The volume systematically reviews the empirical evidence base and presents influential theories of moral judgment and behavior. It is organized around the key questions that must be addressed for a complete understanding of the moral mind.