Field Marshal Helmuth Graf von Moltke is best known for his direction of the German/Prussian campaigns against Austria in 1866 and France in 1870-71, yet it was during his service as chief of the General Staff that he laid the foundation for the German way of war which would continue through 1945. Professor Daniel Hughes of the Air War College, in addition to editing and assisting with the translation of this selection of Moltke’s thoughts and theories on the art of war, has written an insightful commentary on “Moltke the Elder” that places him in the broader context of Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s sometimes abstract philosophical ideas. The book also contains an extensive bibliographic and historiographic commentary that includes references to Moltke and his theories in the current literature in Germany, England, and the United States—a valuable aid to anyone doing research on the subject. This volume, in addition to its appeal to scholars, serves as an introduction to the theory of the German army, as well as a summary of Moltke’s enduring theoretical legacy. Praise for Moltke on the Art of War “Moltke molded the Prussian and ultimately the German army at a time of technological and economic change. For that reason . . . this book deserves a much wider audience than those interested in nineteenth-century military history. Readers will be particularly grateful for the editor’s careful explanation of terms that are easily mistranslated in English, and for concise and useful footnotes and bibliography. A model of fine editing.”—Foreign Affairs Magazine “This valuable work ably compiles the selected writings on the art of war of one of military history’s greatest geniuses. [Moltke’s] impact on American military thinking persists, especially in various military staff college curricula. Strongly recommended.”—Armed Forces Journal “A thoughtfully edited, well-translated anthology that merits a place in any serious collection on the craft of war in the modern Western world."—Journal of Military History

Field Marshal Helmuth Graf von Moltke is best known for his direction of the German/Prussian campaigns against Austria in 1866 and France in 1870-71, yet it was during his service as chief of the General Staff that he laid the foundation for the German way of war which would continue through 1945. Professor Daniel Hughes of the Air War College, in addition to editing and assisting with the translation of this selection of Moltke's thoughts and theories on the art of war, has written an insightful commentary on "Moltke the Elder" that places him in the broader context of Prussian and military thought. Hughes notes that Moltke's writings helped shape the practical application of influential Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz's sometimes abstract philosophical ideas. The book also contains an extensive bibliographic and historiographic commentary that includes references to Moltke and his theories in the current literature in Germany, England, and the United States - a valuable aid to anyone doing research on the subject. This volume, in addition to its appeal to scholars, serves as an introduction to the theory of the German army, as well as a summary of Moltke's enduring theoretical legacy.

The Prussian Army invented the systems of modern war, and Helmuth von Moltke was the first modern war planner. His accomplishment was to develop, bring to fruition and validate--in the three wars of German unification against Denmark (1864), Austria (1865), and France (1870-71)--the war processes invented during his lifetime. These processes have been used in all modern 20th-century wars because they respond to the size, space, time, and technology mandates of industrial mass warfare. This book describes and analyzes these developments as an aspect of Moltke's life as a professional soldier.

Two classic works of military strategy that shaped the way we think about warfare: The Art of War by Sun Tzu and On War by Karl von Clausewitz, together in one volume “Civilization might have been spared much of the damage suffered in the world wars . . . if the influence of Clausewitz’s On War had been blended with and balanced by a knowledge of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War.”—B. H. Liddel Hart For two thousand years, Sun Tzu’s The Art of War has been the indispensable volume of warcraft. Although his work is the first known analysis of war and warfare, Sun Tzu struck upon a thoroughly modern concept: “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” Karl von Clausewitz, the canny military theorist who famously declared that war is a continuation of politics by other means, also claims paternity of the notion “total war.” On War is the magnum opus of the era of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. Now these two great minds come together in a single volume that also features an introduction by esteemed military writer Ralph Peters and the Modern Library War Series introduction by Caleb Carr, New York Times bestselling author of The Alienist. (The cover and text refer to The Art of War as The Art of Warfare, an alternate translation of the title.)

A study of the influence of German Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke, 1906-1914.

This engrossing anthology gathers together a remarkable collection of writings on the use of strategy in war. Gérard Chaliand has ranged over the whole of human history in assembling this collection—the result is an integration of the annals of military thought that provides a learned framework for understanding global political history. Included are writings from ancient and modern Europe, China, Byzantium, the Arab world, Persia, and the Ottoman Empire. Alongside well-known militarists such as Julius Caesar, Napoleon, Walter Raleigh, Rommel, and many others are "irregulars" such as Cortés, Lawrence of Arabia, and even Gandhi. Contrary to standard interpretations stressing competition between land and sea powers, or among rival Christian societies, Chaliand shows the great importance of the struggles between nomadic and sedentary peoples, and of the conflicts between Christianity and Islam. With the invention of firepower, a relatively recent occurrence in the history of warfare, modes of organization and strategic concepts—elements reflecting the nature of a society—have been key to how war is waged. Unparalleled in its breadth, this anthology will become the standard work for understanding a fundamental part of human history—the conduct of war. "This anthology is not only an unparalleled corpus of information and an aid to failing memory; it is also and above all a reliable and liberating guide for research. . . . Ranging "from the origins to the nuclear age," it compels us to widen our narrow perspectives on conflicts and strategic action and open ourselves up to the universal."—from the Foreword

"The Moltke Myth is author Terence Zuber's groundbreaking book on Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke, the chief of staff of the Prussian Army for thirty years. Often referred to as Moltke the Elder, he is portrayed today as the nearly-infallible victor of the Prussian wars in 1864 against Denmark, in 1866 against Austria, and in 1871 against France. Moltke the Elder is known as a brilliant, innovative planner and master of the battlefield. The Moltke Myth shows that this "common knowledge" is based solely on hero-worship and simplistic generalizations." "Zuber, a career infantry officer, subjects Moltke's plans and orders to a militarily professional analysis. He asserts a new premise that Moltke was a normal human being who made grave errors like systematically failing to use cavalry reconnaissance and never knowing the location of his enemy. Zuber presents the true story about how realistic peacetime training and tactical excellence in combat helped the Prussian army win battles. The Moltke Myth offers stimulating new perspectives on tactics and strategy in the Wars of German Unification."--BOOK JACKET.

"Authoritative and convincing."—New York Times Book Review The classic reference on the theory and practice of war The essays in this volume analyze war, its strategic characterisitics, and its political and social functions over the past five centuries. The diversity of its themes and the broad perspectives applied to them make the book a work of general history as much as a history of the theory and practice of war from the Renaissance to the present. Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age takes the first part of its title from an earlier collection of essays that became a classic of historical scholarship. Three essays are repinted from the earlier book while four others have been extensively revised. The rest—twenty-two essays—are new. The subjects addressed range from major theorists and political and military leaders to impersonal forces. Machiavelli, Clausewitz, and Marx and Engels are discussed, as are Napoleon, Churchill, and Mao. Other essays trace the interaction of theory and experience over generations—the evolution of American strategy, for instance, or the emergence of revolutionary war in the modern world. Still others analyze the strategy of particular conflicts—the First and Second World Wars—or the relationship between technology, policy, and war in the nuclear age. Whatever its theme, each essay places the specifics of military thought and action in their political, social, and economic environment. Together, the contributors have produced a book that reinterprets and illuminates war, one of the most powerful forces in history and one that cannot be controlled in the future without an understanding of its past.

Surrounded by potential adversaries, nineteenth-century Prussia and twentieth-century Germany faced the formidable prospect of multifront wars and wars of attrition. To counteract these threats, generations of general staff officers were educated in operational thinking, the main tenets of which were extremely influential on military planning across the globe and were adopted by American and Soviet armies. In the twentieth century, Germany's art of warfare dominated military theory and practice, creating a myth of German operational brilliance that lingers today, despite the nation's crushing defeats in two world wars. In this seminal study, Gerhard P. Gross provides a comprehensive examination of the development and failure of German operational thinking over a period of more than a century. He analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of five different armies, from the mid--nineteenth century through the early days of NATO. He also offers fresh interpretations of towering figures of German military history, including Moltke the Elder, Alfred von Schlieffen, and Erich Ludendorff. Essential reading for military historians and strategists, this innovative work dismantles cherished myths and offers new insights into Germany's failed attempts to become a global power through military means.

Frederick the Great (1712–1786), King of Prussia, initiated the Seven Years' War in 1756; outfought the formidable French, Russian, and Austrian armies aligned against him; and established Prussia as a major power, thereby decisively influencing the next two centuries of European history. He was also a brilliant military thinker whose observations arose from extensive battlefield experience.This volume presents a balanced selection from Frederick's writings on strategy, tactics, and mobility; the problems of logistics and a two-front war; the combined use of infantry, cavalry, and artillery; the history of the Prussian army; the critical battles of the Seven Years' War; generalship as an art; and much more. A majority of this material is translated here for the first time in English and available nowhere else. The result is an invaluable glimpse into the inner thoughts of a military genius.