The philosophy of Plotinus is usually depicted as a quest for the absolute, outside and beyond the world of human knowledge and experience. Yet in the late treatise Ennead 5.3 [49], Plotinus shows himself a philosopher of the transcendental, rather than of the transcendent. Starting from a critical analysis of the idea of self-knowledge, he develops a world-view in which central notions of his metaphysics are represented, not as different “hypostases” or transcendent beings, but as limiting cases of reality as we human beings know it. Fundamental to this world-view is Plotinus' assumption that a close analogy can be established between the psychological and the physical description of man.

Kant's influence on the history of philosophy is vast and protean. The transcendental turn denotes one of its most important forms, defined by the notion that Kant's deepest insight should not be identified with any specific epistemological or metaphysical doctrine, but rather concerns the fundamental standpoint and terms of reference of philosophical enquiry. To take the transcendental turn is not to endorse any of Kant's specific teachings, but to accept that the Copernican revolution announced in the Preface of the Critique of Pure Reason sets philosophy on a new footing and constitutes the proper starting point of philosophical reflection. The aim of this volume is to map the historical trajectory of transcendental philosophy and the major forms that it has taken. The contributions, from leading contemporary scholars, focus on the question of what the transcendental turn consists in--its motivation, justification, and implications; and the limitations and problems which it arguably confronts--with reference to the relevant major figures in modern philosophy, including Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Wittgenstein. Central themes and topics discussed include the distinction of realism from idealism, the relation of transcendental to absolute idealism, the question of how transcendental conclusions stand in relation to (and whether they can be made compatible with) naturalism, the application of transcendental thought to foundational issues in ethics, and the problematic relation of phenomenology to transcendental enquiry.

This book examines Husserl's treatment of time-consciousness and its significance for his conception of subjectivity.

The first collective commentary in English on Kant's landmark 1871 publication.

Dan Zahavi offers an in-depth and up-to-date analysis of central and contested aspects of the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology. What is ultimately at stake in Husserl's phenomenological analyses? Are they primarily to be understood as investigations of consciousness or are they equally about the world? What is distinctive about phenomenological transcendental philosophy, and what kind of metaphysical import, if any, might it have? Husserl's Legacy offers an interpretation of the more overarching aims and ambitions of Husserlian phenomenology and engages with some of the most contested and debated questions in phenomenology. Central to its interpretative efforts is the attempt to understand Husserl's transcendental idealism. Zahavi argues that Husserl was not a sophisticated introspectionist, not a phenomenalist, nor an internalist, not a quietist when it comes to metaphysical issues, and not opposed to all forms of naturalism. Husserl's Legacy argues that Husserl's phenomenology is as much about the world as it is about consciousness, and that a proper grasp of Husserl's transcendental idealism reveals the fundamental importance of facticity and intersubjectivity.

“One who sings and chants these supremely confidential teachings to My devotees will attain supreme devotion for Me and will attain Me. There is no doubt in this matter.” —Sri Krishna, Bhagavad-gita 18.68 If sharing the confidential meaning of the yoga of devotional love, bhakti-yoga, is the standard for spiritual advancement, then this is the definitive edition of the Bhagavad-gita. It is the first English translation that includes summaries of the commentaries of four of the most prominent expounders of the tradition of bhakti-yoga: Srimad Bhaktivinoda ?hakura, Srimad Visvanatha Cakravarti Thakura, Srila Bhakti Pramode Puri Gosvami, and Sri Kanailal Pancatirtha—alongside the highly acclaimed translation of the text itself by Srila Bhakti Rakshak Sridhar Dev Gosvami. Taken together, no other edition of this sacred text has so comprehensively conveyed the timeless spiritual wisdom of the Bhagavad-gita.

The Argument of the "Tractatus" presents a single unified interpretation of the Tractatus based on Wittgenstein's own view that the philosophy of logic is the real foundation of his philosophical system. It demonstrates that on this interpretation Wittgenstein's views are far more visionary and relevant to contemporary discussions than has been suspected. A case in point is a new interpretation of Wittgenstein's theory of meaning that is shown to illuminate the views of a series of philosophers, including Brentano, the early Russell, Chomsky, Fodor, Katz, Kripke, Malcolm, and Dummett. McDonough's interpretation sheds new light on the connection between Wittgenstein's work and the nineteenth- and twentieth-century German philosophical tradition, and it facilitates a clear resolution of the controversy over the relation between Wittgenstein's own early and later philosophies. The Argument of the "Tractatus" is an excellent introduction to the field of twentieth-century analytical philosophy. It treats a wide range of authors and topics, including the foundations of logic, the theory of meaning, the disputes concerning atomistic versus holistic conceptions of language, the nature of the mental, the foundations of psycho-linguistics, the theory of communication, and the nature of philosophical systems.

Originally written during the Cultural Revolution, this book introduces and interprets Kant’s critical philosophy through the lens of its author Li Zehou’s own philosophical approach: anthropological historical ontology. Li argues that the process of human development begins with and is shaped by the practical material activities associated with making and using tools in primitive societies. Over millions of years, these ever-evolving practices accumulate and become sedimented into archetypical forms that shape history, social relationships, and human psychology. Li’s views draw upon Marx’s theory of practice and, as those familiar with his work will recognize, his reinterpretation of Confucian thought with its emphasis on material life and worldly existence. Beginning with the assumption that the question at heart of Kant’s philosophy is “What is the human being?” Li offers a highly original answer by arguing that the root of Kant’s “transcendental” knowledge, universal forms, moral autonomy, and aesthetics can be found in the practical and social activities associated with tool-making. Li offers a new reading not only of Kant but of modern European philosophy, including Hegel and Marx, that forces us to rethink our understanding of the relation between individuals and communities and challenges us to ask ourselves how we can best achieve both harmony and freedom in our shared human future.