After more than seventy years, the Palestinian refugee problem remains unsolved. But if a deal could have been reached involving the repatriation of Palestinian refugees, it was in the early years of the Arab-Israeli conflict. So why didn't this happen? This book is the first comprehensive study of the international community's earliest efforts to solve the Palestinian refugee problem. Based on a wide range of international primary sources from Israeli, US, UK and UN archives, the book investigates the major proposals between 1948 and 1968 and explains why these failed. It shows that the main actors involved – the Arab states, Israel, the US and the UN – agreed on very little when it came to the Palestinian refugees and therefore never got seriously engaged in finding a solution. This new analysis highlights how the international community gradually moved from viewing the Palestinian refugee problem as a political issue to looking at it as a humanitarian one. It examines the impact of this development and the changes that took place in this formative period of the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as the limited influence US policy makers had over Israel.

This volume examines the status of the Palestinian citizens in Israel and explores ethnic privileging and the dynamics of social conflict.

Since the 1970s, the Latin Based on new or newly interpreted Israeli, British and Arab documents, this book attempts to integrate present controversies concerning the development of the Jewish-Palestinian war from December 1947 to mid-May 1948 and the consecutive Israeli-Arab war. It follows the organization of both sides at the beginning of the war and the shaping of their respective war policies. Further, it describes the creation of the invading coalition and its disintegration in the wake of the Arab armies' military failure. The book stresses mainly the processes that led Palestinian society to its collapse and mass flight and the Israeli reactions and policies that turned this temporary escape into a long-lasting refugee problem. Emphasizing the different historical and cultural perspectives of the adversaries and the context of the war's development, it criticises the approach of the Israeli 'New Historians' who tend to isolate the refugee problem from the broader issues of the war and treat it separately. Includes a glossary of Arab/Israeli wartime operations.

Around 1952, the United Nations allowed the Arab refugee problem to become a protracted irritant both to the Arab states and to Israel. From 1949 to 1952 the Arab states steadfastly refused to consider peace negotiations with Israel unless all the Arab refugees were permitted to return to their former homes. Israel maintained that it was a false humanitarianism to promote repatriation when former homes no longer existed - to raise false hopes only to produce disillusionment.

Hauptbeschreibung Der Band bietet einen Einblick in die Vielfalt des Judentums in Asien zwischen Mumbai und Manila. Einige Beiträge behandeln Fragen der untrennbaren Verflechtungen zwischen Politik und Judentum, andere scheinen auf den ersten Blick primär Lokalstudien zu jüdischen Gemeinden in Südasien, Südostasien und China zu sein. Aber es ist unverkennbar, dass auch solche lokalen Gemeinden immer in ein Netzwerk des globalen Judentums eingebettet sind, zugleich aber in Interaktion mit den dominierenden Religionen in den jeweiligen asiatischen Ländern stehen und dadurch interkultu.

With half of this book, first published in 1986, being given over to Neil Caplan’s detailed analysis and half to the collection of the original documents, the second volume in Futile Diplomacy provides another essential resource for the understanding of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In Arab-Zionist Negotiations and the End of the Mandate a key period in the negotiations between the two parties is examined, as attempts were made by both sides to reach a peaceful, negotiated settlement.

This book, first published in 1997, provides a careful and balanced behind-the-scenes account of the intricate diplomatic activity of the period between the first and second Arab-Israeli wars. The author examines the recurring deadlocks in terms of the motives and calculations of the various parties, and reveals how new incentives of pressures offered by outsiders proved incapable of reversing the serious deterioration of Arab-Israeli relations as the region headed for war at Suez. The text of this volume comprises both an in-depth analysis of the period and events, and a selection of primary documents from archival sources.

These four volumes provide a careful and balanced behind-the-scenes account of the intricate diplomatic activity of the period between 1913 and 1956. Exploiting a range of available archive sources as well as extensive secondary sources, they provide an authoritative analysis of the positions and strategies which the principal parties and the would-be mediators adopted in the elusive search for a stable peace. The text of each volume comprises both analytical-historical chapters and a selection of primary documents from archival sources, providing an essential reference source for the student of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its long history.