American law schools extol democracy but teach little about its most basic institution, the Congress. Interpreting statutes is lawyers’ most basic task, but law professors rarely focus on how statutes are made. This misguided pedagogy, says Victoria Nourse, undercuts the core of legal practice. It may even threaten the continued functioning of American democracy, as contempt for the legislature becomes entrenched in legal education and judicial opinions. Misreading Law, Misreading Democracy turns a spotlight on lawyers’ and judges’ pervasive ignorance about how Congress makes law. Victoria Nourse not only offers a critique but proposes reforming the way lawyers learn how to interpret statutes by teaching legislative process. Statutes are legislative decisions, just as judicial opinions are decisions. Her approach, legislative decision theory, reverse-engineers the legislative process to simplify the task of finding Congress’s meanings when statutes are ambiguous. This theory revolutionizes how we understand legislative history—not as an attempt to produce some vague notion of legislative intent but as a surgical strike for the best evidence of democratic context. Countering the academic view that the legislative process is irrational and unseemly, Nourse makes a forceful argument that lawyers must be educated about the basic procedures that define how Congress operates today. Lawmaking is a sequential process with political winners and losers. If lawyers and judges do not understand this, they may well embrace the meanings of those who opposed legislation rather than those who supported it, making legislative losers into judicial winners, and standing democracy on its head.

Judges and legal scholars talk past one another, if they have any conversation at all. Academics criticize judicial decisions in theoretical terms, which leads many judges to dismiss academic discourse as divorced from reality. Richard Posner reflects on the causes and consequences of this widening gap and what can be done to close it.

In this work, Anna Harvey reports evidence showing that the Supreme Court is in fact extraordinarily deferential to congressional preferences in its constitutional rulings.

This volume brings together an international group of legal scholars to discuss different approaches to lawmaking. As well as reflecting the diversity of legisprudence as a re-emerging academic field, it offers a broad overview of current developments and challenges in the theory of legislation, and aspires, moreover, to counterbalance some questionable ideas or misconceptions, widespread among jurists, on what making laws entails. The book is organized into three parts. The first comprises a sample of ‘ways and models of legislation’, ranging from classic legislative ideals to contemporary forms of regulation. The essays in this part, variances of focus notwithstanding, revolve around the notions of legislative rationality, quality, effectiveness, and legitimacy, which may be regarded as the cornerstones of legisprudence. Interwoven with these notions is another core legisprudential concern: the justification of laws. We address it separately in the next part by exploring the connection between lawmaking, argumentation and constitutional democracy: under the heading ‘legislation in a culture of justification’, a number of aspects of this connection are tackled that have not been sufficiently considered so far in legisprudential literature, such as the intricacies of legislative reasoning and balancing, or the justificatory problems posed by special-interest legislation. The under privileged status of legisprudence in legal studies and the need for socially attentive and citizen-oriented legislative research come to the fore in the third part of the book which turns to the relationships between ‘legisprudence, lawyers, and citizens’. All in all, the thirteen articles gathered here provide a stimulating insight into the theory of legislation, and can hopefully contribute to the reconciliation of the study of law and the study of its making.

Any contemporary state presents itself as committed to the “rule of law”, and this notion is perhaps the most powerful political ideal within the current global discourse on legal and political institutions. Despite being a contested concept, the rule of law is generally recognised as meaning that government is bound in all its actions by fixed and public rules, and that these rules respect certain formal requirements and are enforced by an independent judiciary. This book focuses on formal legality and the question of how to achieve good laws—a topic that was famously addressed by the 18th century enlightened thinkers, but also by prominent legal scholars of our time. Historically, the canon of “good legislation” demanded generality, publicity and accessibility, and comprehensibility of laws; non-retroactivity; consistency; the possibility of complying with legal obligations and prohibitions; stability; and congruency between enacted laws and their application. All these are valuable ideals that should not be abandoned in today’s legal systems, particularly in view of the silent revolution that is transforming our legality-based “states of law” into jurisdictional states. Such ideals are still worth pursuing for those who believe in representative democracy, in the rule of law and in the dignity of legislation. The idea for the book stemmed from the author’s parliamentary and governmental experience; he was responsible for the Government of Spain’s legislative co-ordination from 1982 to 1993, which were years of intensive legislative production. The more than five hundred laws (and thousands of decrees) elaborated in this period profoundly changed all sectors of the legal order inherited from Franco’s dictatorship, and laid the foundations of a new social and democratic system. For an academic, this was an exciting experience, which offered a unique opportunity to put the theory of legislation to the test. Reflecting and elaborating on this experience, the book not only increases scholarly awareness of how laws are made, but above all, improves the quality of legislation and as a result the rule of law.

Contemporary legal reasoning has more in common with fictional discourse than we tend to realize. Through an examination of the U.S. Supreme Court’s written output during a recent landmark term, this book exposes many of the parallels between these two special kinds of language use. Focusing on linguistic and rhetorical patterns in the dozens of reasoned opinions issued by the Court between October 2014 and June 2015, the book takes nonlawyer readers on a lively tour of contemporary American legal reasoning and acquaints legal readers with some surprising features of their own thinking and writing habits. It analyzes cases addressing a huge variety of issues, ranging from the rights of drivers stopped by the police to the decision-making processes of the Environmental Protection Agency—as well as the term’s best-known case, which recognized a constitutional right to marriage for same-sex as well as different-sex couples. Fiction and the Languages of Law reframes a number of long-running legal debates, identifies other related paradoxes within legal discourse, and traces them all to common sources: judges’ and lawyers’ habit of alternating unselfconsciously between two different attitudes toward the language they use, and a set of professional biases that tends to prevent scrutiny of that habit.

This book seeks to explore the potential and actual value of parliamentary debates as a source of legislative justification. Drawing on a sample of recent Spanish legislation, the papers collected here analyse (critically) the rationale of several laws or legislative measures as it can be reconstructed from the respective parliamentary discussions. All issues covered have given rise to intense political, legal and social controversy: they range from the combat against gender violence, the legal status of bullfighting, the protection of crime victims and the so-called ‘push-backs’ at the border, to the regulation of euthanasia, the minimum living income, underage girls’ access to abortion, and joint child custody. The volume is organised into two main parts. The first group of case studies adopt a legisprudential perspective and examine parliamentary deliberations in the light of the theory and methodology of legislative justification; the contributions in the second part follow approaches that fall outside – but are largely compatible with –legisprudence, and deal with aspects such as the rhetorical strategies employed by MPs when debating bills, and the role of elected legislators as constitutional interpreters.

Are the general and the particular separated in legal rhetorics? What is the function of singular events, facts, names in legal argumentation and what is their relationship to legal normativity? Bringing together an international range of legal scholars, this collection takes a diachronic approach and addresses these questions from the perspective of contemporary legal discourse. It explores the changes in legal form and transmission that have been generated both by globalisation and by common law's irreversible encounter with the civilian methods of European law. It explores how, in the contemporary legal discourse, exemplarity - and all rhetoric processes based on the general-particular dichotomy more generally - regained relevance. In doing so, it highlights the centrality of the example and proposes the development of new rhetorical approaches better suited to today's legal practices which operate in a globalised field.

Justice Antonin Scalia (1936–2016) was the single most important figure in the emergence of the “new originalist” interpretation of the US Constitution, which sought to anchor the court’s interpretation of the Constitution to the ordinary meaning of the words at the time of drafting. For Scalia, the meaning of constitutional provisions and statutes was rigidly fixed by their original meanings with little concern for extratextual considerations. While some lauded his uncompromising principles, others argued that such a rigid view of the Constitution both denies and attempts to limit the discretion of judges in ways that damage and distort our system of law. In this edited collection, leading scholars from law, political science, philosophy, rhetoric, and linguistics look at the ways Scalia framed and stated his arguments. Focusing on rhetorical strategies rather than the logic or validity of Scalia’s legal arguments, the contributors collectively reveal that Scalia enacted his rigidly conservative vision of the law through his rhetorical framing.

This book provides an accessible introduction to the emerging field of behavioral public choice economics and the law. This field studies how public officials, lawmakers, and judges fall prey to their own biases and heuristics, and how constitutions and judicial doctrines can be structured to mitigate these cognitive shortcomings. Written lucidly in plain language, this book is invaluable to all students, scholars, and general readers interested in behavioral economics, law and economics, and political economy.