This collection of essays by international experts in military history reassesses the war plans of 1914 in a broad diplomatic, military, and political setting.

The origins of the First World War remain one of the greatest twentieth century historical controversies. In this debate the role of military planning in particular and of militarism in general, are a key focus of attention. Did the military wrest control from the civilians? Were the leaders of Europe eager for a conflict? What military commitments were made between the various alliance blocks? These questions are examined in detail here in eleven essays by distinguished historians and the editor’s introduction provides a focus and draws out the comparative approach to the history of military policies and war plans of the great powers.

The original version of this text was published in 1984 as a textbook on military history for officers in the U.S. Army. The revised version includes an appendix of terms and acronyms, and concepts are explained in nontechnical terms, making it more comprehensible to the general reader. Also incorporated is a description of combined arms warfare from the late-1970s to the end of the 20th century, which takes into account developments that were not obvious in 1984. The main topics are how the major armies of the world fight on the battlefield; what concepts, weapons, and organizations have developed for this purpose; and how the different armies have influenced each other in these developments. House is a former military officer and analyst for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. c. Book News Inc.

The essays, commentaries, and speeches which form this volume were presented at the Eleventh Military History Symposium, held at the United States Air Force Academy on 10-12 October 1984. This conference is a biennial event sponsored jointly by the Department of History and the Association of Graduates of the United States Air Force Academy. Begun in 1967, the series seeks to address problems in military history which have received limited attention and to provide a forum in which scholars may present the results of their research. In this manner we hope to stimulate and encourage interest in military history among civilian and military scholars, members of the armed forces, and the cadets of the United States Air Force Academy.

The essays, commentaries, and speeches which form this volume were presented at the Eleventh Military History Symposium, held at the United States Air Force Academy on l0-l2 October 1984. This conference is a biennial event sponsored jointly by the Department of History and the Association of Graduates of the United States Air Force Academy. Begun in 1967, the series seeks to address problems in military history which have received limited attention and to provide a forum in which scholars may present the results of their research. In this manner we hope to stimulate and encourage interest in military history among civilian and military scholars, members of the armed forces, and the cadets of the United States Air Force Academy.

The author explores the defense administration, with thorough criticism of the National Security Council, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the armed services as governmental organizations. His book is a substantial reinterpretation of the history of the military organization of the U.S. from 1900 to 1960. Originally published in 1961. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

From British bombing in Iraq in the early 1920s to the most recent conflicts in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon, this detailed analysis explores the history of indiscriminate bombing, examining the fundamental questions of how strategies of mass killing originated and have been employed for decades. The book includes contributions from scholars in the US and Europe as well as a bold new argument by Japanese historian Tsuyoshi Hasegawa claiming that it was the Soviet invasion rather than atomic bombing that led to the Japanese surrender of the Pacific.