George examines seven cases--from Pearl Harbor to the Persian Gulf--in which the United States has used coercive diplomacy in the past half-century.

With nearly sixty percent of Americans initially against a pre-emptive war without sanction from the United Nations, and even higher anti-war numbers in most other nations of the world, the 2003 war against Iraq quickly became an enormous public relations challenge for the George W. Bush administration. The subject of Weapons of Mass Persuasion is a war in which American patriotism became so mired in commercial jingoism that the demarcations between entertainment and political conduct disappeared completely. In this engaging and disturbing book, Paul Rutherford shows how the marketing campaign for the war against Iraq was constructed and carried out. He argues that not only was the campaign a new chapter in the presentation of real-time war as pop culture, but that its deeper implications have now come to constitute part of the history of modern democracy. Situating the war against Iraq within an existing tradition of war as narrative, spectacle, and, more broadly, commodity, Rutherford offers a brief overview of the history of civic advertising and propaganda, then examines in detail the different dimensions of three weeks of war presented to North Americans as it became a branded conflict, processed and cleansed to appeal to the well-established tastes of veteran consumers of popular culture. Including incisive analyses of visual material - speeches, editorial cartoons, and media political commentary, but particularly news reports of such sound bite events as the bombing of Baghdad, the toppling of the Hussein statue, and the rescue of captured soldier Private Jessica Lynch - as well as extensive polling data from around the world and interviews with the actual consumers of war, Weapons of Mass Persuasion chronicles the making of a Hollywood war: fast-paced and heroic, pitting the forces of good against the forces of evil to achieve a triumphant, sanitized, and commodified outcome. Not since Naomi Klein's No Logo have the gods of marketing and the art of commercialism been so thoroughly disrobed. Electronic Format Disclaimer: Images removed at the request of the rights holder.

Although considerable attention has been paid to deterrence theory and crisis management, the equally important topic of ending wars has been virtually ignored. Conflict termination is the stepchild of U.S. strategy for a number of reasons. Thinking about how wars should end presupposes acceptance of the fact that war—especially nuclear war— is possible. Further, analyzing options for ending conflicts implies less-than-total victory, a concept that not only runs counter to the U.S. approach to warfare but also raises the specter of “limited war,†an approach that fell into disfavor following Korea and Vietnam. Finally, defining conflict termination objectives assumes that we think more about ends than means, that we know what is important to us and why, and thus understand the risks we will accept to defend specific interests and objectives. The contributors examine a wide variety of topics, ranging from Soviet and U.S. views on conflict termination to past, present, and future U.S. military service contributions. Their aim is to demonstrate the importance of careful evaluation of conflict termination goals during peacetime because when war begins passions and emotions will cloud decisionmaking.

Can great powers ensure the political outcomes they want and prevent political developments they oppose, by stationing their military forces in distant regions during peacetime? If so, what kinds of military capabilities yield this sort of peacetime political leverage? And what kinds of political goals can-and, just as importantly, cannot-be achieved through "forward military presence?" In the post-9/11 world, as the United States seeks to use its unrivalled global military predominance to build a safer, better world by preventing terrorism and encouraging societies around the world to embrace democracy, these questions take on enormous importance. Presence, Prevention, and Persuasion addresses these issues by looking at British, French, and American experiences in the Middle East, South America, the Caribbean basin, and Africa over the last two centuries. The authors' findings will have a significant impact on scholarship but, more importantly, on American decision-making communities. An essential volume for anyone working in the field of international relations whether it is policy making, diplomacy, military planning or the private sector.

The Gulf War of 1991 was the highest profile media war in history. Never before had so many journalists attempted to cover a war from both sides of the conflict. This book traces the role of the media in the Gulf War and examines the attempts by both the coalition and Iraq to influence public opinion through propaganda and persuasion. Philp Taylor asks how much the public was being told and how much was held back. Analyzing the key news stories of the conflict he looks at the efforts of the American-led coalition to persuade television audiences and newspaper readers to take a "right view" of what was happening and of the Iraqi government's propaganda campaigns concerning civilian damage and the "Mother of all Battles."

A harrowing account of brainwashing’s pervasive role in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries This gripping book traces the evolution of brainwashing from its beginnings in torture and religious conversion into the age of neuroscience and social media. When Pavlov introduced scientific approaches, his research was enthusiastically supported by Lenin and Stalin, setting the stage for major breakthroughs in tools for social, political, and religious control. Tracing these developments through many of the past century’s major conflagrations, Dimsdale narrates how when World War II erupted, governments secretly raced to develop drugs for interrogation. Brainwashing returned to the spotlight during the Cold War in the hands of the North Koreans and Chinese. In response, a huge Manhattan Project of the Mind was established to study memory obliteration, indoctrination during sleep, and hallucinogens. Cults used the techniques as well. Nobel laureates, university academics, intelligence operatives, criminals, and clerics all populate this shattering and dark story—one that hasn’t yet ended.

Since the end of World War II, protests against U.S. military base and related policies have occurred in several Asian host countries. How much influence have these protests had on the p;olicy regarding U.S. military bases? What conditions make protests more likely to influence policy? Protests Against U.S. Military Base Policy in Asia answers these questions by examining state response to twelve major protests in Asia since the end of World War II—in the Philippines, Okinawa, and South Korea. Yuko Kawato lays out the conditions under which protesters' normative arguments can and cannot persuade policy-makers to change base policy, and how protests can still generate some political or military incentives for policy-makers to adjust policy when persuasion fails. Kawato also shows that when policy-makers decide not to change policy, they can offer symbolic concessions to appear norm-abiding and to secure a smoother implementation of policies that protesters oppose. While the findings will be of considerable interest to academics and students, perhaps their largest impact will be on policy makers and activists, for whom Kawato offers recommendations for their future decision-making and actions.

Explains how and when public and non-public warnings about future conflicts affect decision-making in Western states and international organisations.

In Russia and Armed Persuasion, Stephen J. Cimbala argues that Russia's war planners and political leaders must make painful adjustments in their thinking about the relationship between military art and policy in the twenty-first century. Russia must master the use of force for persuasion, not just destruction. As the author shows, military persuasion requires that Russian leaders master the politico-military complexity of crisis management, deterrence and arms control, and the limitation of ends and means in war. Russia now has scarce resources to devote to defense and can no longer afford the stick-only diplomacy and strategy that have characterized some of its recent past. Russian and Soviet military thinking historically emphasized the blunderbuss and total war: overwhelming mass, firepower, and conflicts of annihilation or prolonged attrition. However, historical experience also forced Russia and the Soviet Union to come to grips with crisis management and with limited aims and means in the conduct of war. On the one hand, Russia failed the test of military persuasion in its management of the July 1914 crisis that plunged Europe into World War I. On the other hand, the Soviet Union did adjust to the requirements of the nuclear age for crisis management, deterrence, and limited war. Using this mixed record of Russian and Soviet success and failure in twentieth century experience, Cimbala argues that Russia can, and must, improve in the twenty-first century. According to the author, the first decades of this century will pose at least three immediate challenges to Russia's military persuasion. Russia must continue to pursue strategic nuclear arms control and arms reductions, with the United States and avoid re-starting the Cold War by means of an ill-considered race in missile defenses. Second, Russia must maintain a surer grip on the military information revolution, especially as it pertains to the management of Russia's nuclear deterrent. Third, Russia must develop forces that are more flexible in small wars and peace operations: its recent experiences in Chechnya show that it has a long way to go in using economy of force as a military persuader. Cimbala's original analysis demonstrates the similar features in apparently dissimilar, or even opposite, events and processes. For example, he shows how the problem of military persuasion applies equally to the challenge of managing a nuclear crisis and the problem of low-intensity war. In each case, the dilemma is calibrating the military means to the political ends. Controversially, the author argues against both military and academic traditionalists, contending that the complexity of the force-policy relationship in the next century will reward the subtle users of military power and that others will be subject to a 'Gulliver effect' of diminishing returns.