Includes 8 maps and more than 20 illustrations Armies appear to learn more from defeat than victory. In this regard, armed forces that win quickly, decisively, and with relative ease face a unique challenge in attempting to learn from victory. The Israel Defense Forces certainly fell into this category after their dramatic victory over the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the Six Day War of June 1967. This study analyzes the problems that beset Israel in the aftermath of its decisive victory in the Six Day War over the Arabs. In the 1973 War, Anwar Sadat, Egypt’s president, was able to exploit Israeli vulnerabilities to achieve political success through a limited war. An important lesson emerges from this conflict. A weaker adversary can match his strengths against the weaknesses of a superior foe in a conventional conflict to attain strategic success. Such a strategic triumph for the weaker adversary can occur despite serious difficulties in operational and tactical performance. The author suggests a striking parallel between the military triumphs of Israel in 1967 and the United States in 1991. In both cases, success led to high expectations. The public and the armed forces came to expect a quick and decisive victory with few casualties. In this environment, a politically astute opponent can exploit military vulnerabilities to his strategic advantage. Sadat offers a compelling example of how this can be done.

Reports findings of a December 1973 Jerusalem Symposium assessing the trauma among the world's Jews (and non-Jews) during and following the October war.

Based on an insider's knowledge of weaponry and of actual Israeli and Egyptian battle strategies, this book examines how two of the strongest regional militaries would likely fight a high intensity war in the Middle East. The book examines how the various factors in play - the battle for air superiority, air-ground bombardment, armor, and infantry collisions - would shape the outcome of the conflict, discussing each factor separately in order to highlight its importance. The analysis draws on previous (mainly Arab-Israeli) conflicts, and also on the author's 20 years of experience in studying and doing research on Israel's national strategy and military doctrine. Fascinating new issues are looked at, such as the demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula and both armies being largely equipped with US military hardware. How would the lack of military infrastructure in the Peninsula dictate the course of the conflict? What issues of identification and friendly fire would the similarity of equipment bring? The book also examines the variety of confrontations that Israel might face - such as high intensity, hybrid, and low intensity wars - and the corresponding responses and strategies it might choose in defense. This will be essential reading for anyone interested in modern high intensity warfare, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the possible future of the Middle East. *** 'Eilam presents a very cogent, judicious and compelling analysis of what the future military confrontation between Israel and Egypt in Sinai could look like.' -- Hillel Frisch, Professor of Political and Middle East Studies, Bar-Ilan University [Subject: Israeli studies, Middle East Studies, Military Studies, Politics]

In 1967, the Israeli Defense Forces defeated the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in a mere six days. This remarkable military accomplishment would, however, have the ultimate effect of creating an albatross around the neck of the Israeli Army, as Israelis would now expect the next conventional war with the Arabs to achieve similar results: a quick, decisive victory with relatively few casualties. Although Egyptian forces were militarily inferior to those of Israel, President Anwar Sadat developed a successful limited war strategy designed to exploit this unrealistic expectation. Rather than aiming to achieve a military victory or to seize strategic terrain, Sadat merely sought to break a diplomatic stalemate with a major military operation designed to soften Israeli intransigence toward negotiations and to force a change in U.S. foreign policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. In support of these political aims, the Egyptian Armed Forces set out to discredit the Israeli Army's prowess by inflicting heavy casualties in a limited war. Sadat's success in regaining the entire Sinai without another armed struggle holds an important lesson for the United States. After its dramatic victory in Desert Storm, American armed forces feel compelled to win the next conventional war quickly, decisively, and with relatively few casualties, much like the challenge that faced Israel after the 1967 war.

This report describes how the Israel Defense Force fought an adaptive hybrid adversary in a dense urban setting under intense public scrutiny during its wars in Gaza and draws lessons from the Israeli experience for the U.S. Army and the joint force.

A scathing and brilliant revisionist history, Defending the Holy Land is the most comprehensive analysis to date of Israel's national security and foreign policy, from the inception of the State of Israel to the present. Book jacket.