This book examines the practices of actors involved in the media reportage of war, and the ways in which these practices may influence the conduct of modern military operations. War is a complex phenomenon which raises numerous questions about the organization of society that continue to challenge all those involved in its study. Increasingly, this includes the need to engage theoretically and empirically with the progressive collapse between the ways in which wars are conducted and the manner in which they are reported in the media. Drawing on the work of Erving Goffman, Military Media Management offers a distinctly new approach to our appreciation of the dynamic relationship between war and media; one that is fundamentally a product of social relations between those engaged in reporting war, and those conducting war campaigns. By exploring how and why the military manage information in particular ways, the text succeeds in providing a framework through which wider sociological investigation of this relationship can be understood. This book will be of much interest to students of military and security studies, media studies, war and conflict studies and IR in general.

During what some have called the 'most televised war in history, ' did journalistic objectivity fall by the wayside? Were the experiences of embedded journalists in Iraq markedly different from reporters who went on their own? Reporting from the Front is a provocative look at media and the Iraq War-spanning issues from basic reporting and coverage to ethical dilemmas, personal safety, and training with the military. Featuring interviews with journalists such as Anne Garrels and Ivan Watson of NPR and Bob Schieffer and Byron Pitts of CBS, among others, Reporting from the Front offers personal insights from a wide range of correspondents, producers, editors, photojournalists, media managers, and military and defense officials about reporting on Iraq as well as on previous wars and other conflicts

This is the first academic analysis of the role of embedded media in the 2003 Iraq War, providing a concise history of US military public affairs management since Vietnam. In late summer 2002, the Pentagon considered giving the press an inside view of the upcoming invasion of Iraq. The decision was surprising, and the innovative "embedded media program" itself received intense coverage in the media. Its critics argued that the program was simply a new and sophisticated form of propaganda. Their implicit assumption was that the Pentagon had become better at its news management and had learned to co-opt the media. This new book tests this assumption, introducing a model of organizational learning and redraws the US military’s cumbersome learning curve in public affairs from Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, the Balkans to Afghanistan, examining whether past lessons were implemented in Iraq in 2003. Thomas Rid argues that while the US armed forces have improved their press operations, America’s military is still one step behind fast-learning and media-savvy global terrorist organizations. War and Media Operations will be of great interest to students of the Iraq War, media and war, propaganda, political communications and military studies in general.

The first comprehensive study of the contentious issue of the public's right to know in time of war or limited conflict. The book traces the uneasy relations between the military and a generally unprepared and gullible media, from the Crimea to the present day. It shows how the advent of nuclear warfare has outlawed the nationalistic wars of survival of the past, and freed the citizen from his age-old obligations in time of war, able to make up his or her own mind on the merits of the situation. It is here that the battle lies, in the struggle for public opinion as a necessary precursor to war. This book details how the military discovered the secret of media and public manipulation in the Falklands, tested it in Grenada, and refined it in Panama before deploying it in all its glory during the Gulf. This book is essential reading for every soldier and journalist, or any student of military history as it points the way to the future.

Because of the public and political nature of peace operations, it has become essential for the commander to make effective operational use of the mass media in order to achieve his objectives. To do so, the operational commander and his staff must have a thorough understanding of the media's historical and potential role in military operations, an appreciation for the operational value of media reporting and, most important of all, sufficient focused guidance to permit them to integrate media management into operational plans. Although significant progress has been made in developing a good working relationship between the media and the military, much work remains to be done. Legal precedent and joint doctrine compel the military to provide access to the media, but the existing joint doctrine hierarchy does not adequately address the means by the which the commander manages the media to best operational effect in peace operations. Available doctrine largely treats the media as an entity the military must 'survive'. Joint doctrine for media management must answer the operational commander's concerns regarding operational security, bad press, and mission interference due to the media's presence in theater. Furthermore, it must outline the operational contribution of the media to satisfaction of the six principles of Military Operations Other Than War as they apply to peace operations. Finally, joint guidance for media management must provide sufficient practical guidance to permit the commander and his staff to integrate the media challenge into operational plans. The commander in peace operations cannot afford to rely upon ingenuity and upon selective applications of lessons learned in an effort to minimize his public affairs losses and limit damage to his mission.

Surveys the US Army's approach to media relations from the Spanish-American War to the first Gulf War. The relationship between the Army and the media is considered in the broader context of the US Government's approach to information management. Given the growing importance of information operations in 21st century warfare, this study provides a succinct overview of how the US Army has approached its relations with the media over the previous century. The study highlights the recurrent tension that exists in both the Army and the US Government's information management writ large. This tension arises from the need for operational security and effective deception and psychological operations and the need to provide transparency to secure public acceptance and support for military operations. The long-running debate over how the Government's information management should be organized and operated reflects this tension. Thus, since World War I a number of bureaucratic manifestations of information management have been tried in wartime, including the Committee on Public Information, the Office of War Information, the Psychological Strategy Board, the United States Information Agency, and, most recently, the Office of Global Communications. With the exception of the United States Information Agency, whose tenure spanned the period from 1953 to 1999, all the other manifestations of bureaucratic information management rose and fell during the wars in which they were created. The growing pains of these organizations sometimes colored the Army's relationship with the media. The need for units in the field to participate in information management is a major challenge for future operations. This study reminds us that those commanders who have gone out of their way to engage the media have, in many cases, had the greatest success with information management.

This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. Surveys the U.S. Army¿s approach to media relations from the Spanish-American War to the first Gulf War. The relationship between the Army and the media is considered in the broader context of the U.S. Government¿s approach to info. mgmt. (IM) Here is an overview of how the U.S. Army has approached its relations with the media over the previous century. Since World War I a number of bureaucratic manifestations of IM have been tried in wartime. With the exception of the U.S. Info. Agency, whose tenure spanned the period from 1953 to 1999, all the other manifestations of bureaucratic IM rose and fell during the wars in which they were created. The need for units in the field to participate in IM is a major challenge for future operations. Illus.