This book examines international military interventions that have supported stability in four communities in Afghanistan and Nepal, in an attempt to analyse their success and improve this in future. This is the first in-depth village-level assessment of how local populations conceive of stability and stabilisation, and provides a theory and model for how stability can be created in communities during and after conflict. The data was collected during field research from 2010-12. In Afghanistan the conflicts examined include the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1979, the civil war from 1992 and the rise and fall of the Taliban. In Nepal the research examined the origins of the Maoist movement and the start of the People’s War in 1996 to its completion in 2006 and the subsequent Madeshi Andolan in 2007. The book argues that international, particularly Western, notions of stability and stabilisation processes have failed to grasp the importance of local political legitimacy formation, which is a vital aspect of contemporary statebuilding of a ‘non-Westphalian’ nature. The interventions, across defence, diplomatic and defence lines, have also at times undermined one another and in some cases contributed to instability. The work argues that the theories that structure interventions to address threats to international stability in ‘fragile’ states are insufficient to explain or achieve the goal of stability. This book will be of interest to students of stabilisation operations, statebuilding, peacebuilding, counterinsurgency, war and conflict studies and security studies in general. Christian Dennys is lecturer at Cranfield University/UK Defence Academy and has a PhD in International Relations.

Claude Chabrol's second film follows the fortunes of two cousins: Charles, a hard-working student who has arrived in Paris from his small hometown; and Paul, the dedicated hedonist who puts him up. Despite their differences in temperament, the two young men strike up a close friendship, until an attractive woman comes between them.

UN peace operations are increasingly asked to pursue stabilization mandates with lofty expectations of being able to stabilize conflict zones, achieve national reconciliation, and rebuild state legitimacy. This book investigates the relationship between UN stabilization mandates and the concept of ‘human security’. The book is divided into three parts. Part I outlines the emergence of stabilization and other trends in peacekeeping practice and outlines an analytical framework of human security. Part II applies the analytical framework to case studies of MINUSMA, MINUSCA, and UNMISS examining issues, such as human rights, empowerment, protection, and vulnerability. In Part III the book draws out several concerns that arise from stabilization mandates, including the militarisation of UN peace operations and the consequences under international humanitarian law, the risks of close cooperation with the host state and engagement in counter-terror activities, and the potential clash between peacebuilding activities and militarisation. The book will be a valuable resource for academics, policymakers and practitioners working on UN peacekeeping generally, and those specifically looking at stabilization, from the perspective of international relations, international law, peace and conflict studies, security studies and human rights.

This edited volume offers a first thorough review of peacekeeping theory and reality in contemporary contexts, and attempts to align the two to help inform practice.

This edited volume provides a critical overview of the new stabilization agenda in international relations. The primary focus of so-called stability operations since 9/11 has been Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. Covering the wider picture, this volume provides a comprehensive assessment of the new agenda, including the expansion of efforts in Latin America, the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa and South and Southeast Asia. By harnessing the findings of studies undertaken in Brazil, Colombia, Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan and Sri Lanka, the volume demonstrates the impacts – intended and otherwise – of stabilization in practice. The book clarifies the debate on stabilization, focusing primarily on the policy, practice and outcomes of such operations. Rather than relying exclusively on existing military doctrine or academic writings, the volume focuses on stabilization as it is actually occurring. Drawing on the reflections of scholars and practitioners, the volume identifies the origins and historical antecedents of contemporary operations, and also examines how the practice is linked to other policy spheres – ranging from peacebuilding to statebuilding. Finally, the volume reviews eight practical cases of stabilization in disparate regions around the globe. This book will be of much interest to students of war and conflict studies, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, statebuilding, development studies and international relations in general.

This book suggests a new explanation for why international peace interventions often fail to reach their full potential. Based on several years of ethnographic research in conflict zones around the world, it demonstrates that everyday elements - such as the expatriates' social habits and usual approaches to understanding their areas of operation - strongly influence peacebuilding effectiveness. Individuals from all over the world and all walks of life share numerous practices, habits, and narratives when they serve as interveners in conflict zones. These common attitudes and actions enable foreign peacebuilders to function in the field, but they also result in unintended consequences that thwart international efforts. Certain expatriates follow alternative modes of thinking and acting, often with notable results, but they remain in the minority. Through an in-depth analysis of the interveners' everyday life and work, this book proposes innovative ways to better help host populations build a sustainable peace.

Stabilization as the New Normal in International Interventions provides the first comprehensive analysis of stabilization, which constitutes the new reference point for international intervention in unruly parts of the Global South. The notion of ‘stabilization’ and the practice of ‘stability operations’ experienced a revival over the last decade. The United Nations, the European Union, NATO, as well as most member states of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development have embraced these terms in their foreign policy bureaucracies. The general disillusionment with the achievements of large-scale peacebuilding operations in countries like Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the failures of the so-called Arab Springs, contributed to the success of this new discourse. Yet, while widely mentioned and endorsed, stabilization is rarely defined. This volume identifies common elements to stabilization doctrines and examines how they are applied in practice. It dissects how stabilization emerged and unfolds, how different actors adopt it and for what purposes, and how it is linked to the broader security and development discourses. Stabilization as the New Normal in International Interventions will be of great interest to scholars of Peacebuilding, International Intervention and International Relations more generally. The chapters were originally published as a special issue of Ethnopolitics.

After war, police forces are often unable or unwilling to put pressure on suspected war criminals, organized crime groups, and other spoilers of sustainable peace. This book sheds light on the role of international military forces in post-conflict law enforcement. Drawing on numerous interviews, it shows that EU and NATO military forces have not systematically fought serious crime in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. International actors need to better balance their own interests as well as the requirement to separate military and police functions with the urgent need to protect individuals in war-torn countries. The policy recommendations in the book are aimed at contributing to more effective, efficient, and legitimate peace operations in the Balkans and beyond.

This book is a critical political and institutional reflection on UN peace operations. It provides constructive suggestions as to how the UN and the international system can evolve to remain relevant and tackle the peace and security challenges of the 21st century, without abandoning the principles that the UN was founded upon and on which the legitimacy of UN peace operations rests. The author analyses the evolving politics on UN peace operations of the five veto powers of the UN Security Council, as well as major troop-contributing countries and western powers. He investigates the move towards peace enforcement and counter-terrorism, and what consequences this development may have for the UN. Karlsrud issues a challenge to practitioners and politicians to make sure that the calls for reform are anchored in a desire to improve the lives of people suffering in conflicts on the ground—and not spurred by intra-organizational turf battles or solely the narrow self-interests of member states. Finally, he asks how the UN can adapt its practices to become more field- and people-centered, in line with its core, primary commitments of protecting and serving people in need.

Using an original data set of 145 ground, air, and naval interventions from 1898 through 2016, this report identifies those factors that have made U.S. military interventions more or less successful at achieving their political objectives. While these objectives were often successfully achieved, about 63 percent of the time overall, levels of success have been declining over time as the United States has pursued increasingly ambitious objectives. The research combines statistical analysis and detailed case studies of three types of interventions -- combat, stability operations, and deterrence. The research highlights that the factors that promote the successful achievement of political objectives vary by the nature of the objective and the intervention. For example, sending additional ground forces may help to defeat adversaries in combat missions but may have a more contingent effect on success in institution-building in stability operations, where nonmilitary resources and pre-intervention planning may be especially vital. The report offers five main policy recommendations. First, planners should carefully match political objectives to strategy because factors that promote success vary substantially by objective type. Second, sending more forces does not always promote success, but for certain types of objectives and interventions, greater capabilities may be essential. Third, policymakers should have realistic expectations regarding the possibility of achieving highly ambitious objectives. Fourth, pre-intervention planning is crucial. Finally, policymakers should carefully evaluate the role that might be played by third parties, which is often under appreciated.