Since World War I, Cyprus has played a crucial role in British defence strategy. Panagiotis Dimitrakis here introduces new research which reveals the true role of British intelligence on the island throughout the twentieth century, particularly during World War II, the 1955-59 Archbishop Makarios and EOKA-led revolt and the 1974 Turkish invasion. He sheds fresh light on the stance of both Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Foreign Secretary James Callaghan towards Greece and Turkey in the turbulent 1970s, and provides important new perspectives on the 1978 Egyptian hostage crisis at Larnaca Airport and the research is based throughout on primary sources including previously unpublished declassified papers from British diplomats and intelligence officers. This is a valuable study for scholars of contemporary strategy and military history and for those interested in military intelligence and the history of Cyprus.

Uncovers the world of secret diplomacy, military intelligence and foreign policy skulduggery.

In 1974 the Greek colonels ousted the Greek-Cypriot leader of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, and Turkey retaliated by invading and seizing a third of the island. Cyprus remains split in two, like Berlin before the wall came down, bristling with troops and spying bases, and permanently policed by the United Nations. Henry Kissinger claimed he could do nothing to stop the coup because of the Watergate crisis, but this book presents evidence to support the view that it was no failure of American foreign policy, but the realization of a long-term plot. The authors describe the strategic reasons for Washington's need to divide the island. Their account encompasses an international cast of characters that includes Eden, Eisenhower, Nixon, Kissinger, Wilson, Callaghan, Grivas, and the leaders of the two halves of the divided island, Clerides and Denktas.

Drawing upon a wide range of unpublished sources, including files from the recently-released Foreign and Commonwealth Office 'migrated archive', Fighting EOKA is the first full account of the operations of the British security forces on Cyprus in the second half of the 1950s. It shows how between 1955 and 1959 these forces tried to defeat the Greek Cypriot paramilitary organisation, EOKA, which was fighting to bring about enosis, that is the union between Cyprus and Greece. By tracing the evolving pattern of EOKA violence and the responses of the police, the British army, the civil administration on the island, and the minority Turkish Cypriot community, David French explains why the British could contain the military threat posed by EOKA, but could not eliminate it. The result was that by the spring of 1959 a political stalemate had descended upon Cyprus, and none of the contending parties had achieved their full objectives. Greek Cypriots had to be content with independence rather than enosis. Turkish Cypriots, who had hoped to see the island partitioned on ethnic lines, were given only a share of power in the government of the new Republic, and the British, who had hoped to retain sovereignty over the whole of the island, were left in control of just two military enclaves.

Martin Bell, the former BBC was reporter and Independent MP, served as a soldier in the Suffolk Regiment during the Cyprus emergency between 1957 and 1959. In a chocolate box in the attic many years later he found more than 100 letters that he had sent home to his family. He was not a journalist then, but the letters give a vivid impression of what it was like to be a conscript on active service during the EOKA rebellion against British rule. They describe road blocks and cordons and searches, murders and explosions and riots and a strategy of armed repression that ultimately failed. From this beginning he has written The End of Empire.His narrative is a powerful and personal account of the violent process of decolonization, of the character of the British Army at the time and the impact of National Service on young men who were not much more than kids in uniform. It also gives a graphic insight into the ultimate futility of the use of force in wars among people and it reveals the true story of the insurgency and the campaign to defeat it.By drawing on recently declassified documents, he shows that Cyprus in the late 1950s was run not by the governor but by a military junta. The army commanders were looking for the knockout blow that would deliver victory, but their misguided tactics served only to strengthen support for their enemy.So The End Of Empire is much more than a personal reminiscence. It is an absorbing account of the experience of army life from the perspective of a private soldier, and it is the inside story of how Britain tried to crush a violent rebellion sixty years ago.

The UK has been involved in Cyprus for over 125 years. Strategically placed in the Eastern Mediterranean, it was initially ideal for protection of the Suez Canal and more recently as a 'listening post' for the troubled Middle East and southern flank of NATO. The British faced two serious problems - the first, the Greek Cypriots' desire for Enosis, (union with Greece) and, second, the intense rivalry and antipathy between the Greek and Turkish communities. In 1955 the former resulted in a bitter EOKA terrorist campaign led by Colonel George Grivas. This resulted in the deaths of over 100 British servicemen. Nicosia's 'Murder Mile' was the scene of many shootings. The Governor Field Marshal Harding narrowly escaped assassination in his residence. Even British families were targeted. The next phase was the Turkish Government's military intervention in 1974 to prevent what they saw as the Greek takeover. In a bloody invasion which saw widespread 'ethnic cleansing' and displacement of communities, the Island was divided into two sectors policed by the United Nations. This exists today, as do the British Sovereign Base areas at Dhekalia and Atrokiri/Episkopi. This book describes the most troubled years of this beautiful island which is so well known to British servicemen, their families and holiday makers.

In this new, updated edition of Hughes-Wilson's controversial book, the long-serving military intelligence officer explores and exposes the often disastrous misunderstanding and mishandling of crucial intelligence both by politicians and seasoned generals in recent times.

Most of the Cypriot population, especially the lower classes, remained loyal to the British cause during the Great War and the island contributed significantly to the First World War, with men and materials. The British acknowledged this yet failed to institute political and economic reforms once the war ended. The obsession of Greek Cypriot elites with enosis (union with Greece), which only increased after the war, and the British dismissal of increasing the role of Cypriots in government, bringing the Christian and Muslim communities closer, and expanding franchise to all classes and sexes, led to serious problems down the line, not least the development of a democratic deficit. Andrekos Varnava studies the events and the impact of this crucial period.

'A cracking good read... I will recommend this book to anyone' - Professor Richard Holmes, CBE 'The Falklands, Yom Kippur, Tet and Pearl Harbor? Avoidable intelligence blunders or much worse? Altogether a compelling read from someone who knows the business' - Nigel West This book is a professional military-intelligence officer's - and controversial insider's - view of some of the greatest intelligence blunders of recent history. It includes the serious developments in government misuse of intelligence in the US-led coalition's 2003 war with Iraq, as well as failures of intelligence in Ukraine following Russia's invasion in February 2022. Colonel John Hughes-Wilson analyses not just the events that conspire to cause disaster, but why crucial intelligence is so often ignored, misunderstood or spun by politicians and seasoned generals alike. This book analyses: how Hitler's intelligence staff misled him in a bid to outfox their Nazi Party rivals; the bureaucratic bungling behind Pearl Harbor; how in-fighting within American intelligence ensured they were taken off guard by the Viet Cong's 1968 Tet Offensive; how overconfidence, political interference and deception facilitated Egypt and Syria's 1973 surprise attack on Israel; why a handful of marines and a London taxicab were all Britain had to defend the Falklands; the mistaken intelligence that allowed Saddam Hussein to remain in power until the second Iraq War of 2003; the truth behind the US failure to run a terrorist warning system before the 9/11 WTC bombing; and how governments are increasingly pressurising intelligence agencies to 'spin' a party-political line.