This manuscript examines relations between China and the Middle East in historical context. It highlights some of the most important events that characterize the ties between China and the Middle East, and examines their relationship in key areas that include energy, trade, arms sales, culture and politics. The centre of China's relations with Israel is arms sales and advanced technology, while the core of Sino-Saudi relations is oil. Iran and China are tied with deep historical, civilizational, cultural and political relations, but China's current interests in Iran centre on oil. Relations between China and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) centre on trade. The UAE serve as a primary hub for Chinese business corporations not only in the Gulf or the wider Middle East, but also in Africa and the world. China's relations with Algeria have been based on political co-ordination since the early days of the Algerian War of Independence and the early days of the People's Republic of China. China provided Algeria with political, diplomatic and military support to accomplish its national liberation from France. Since then, their partnership has developed. Finally, the book develops a tridimensional approach in which China's ties with Middle Eastern countries are viewed as an outcome of interaction between three actors in each situation. The book reaches the conclusion that China's national interests in the Middle East are only increasing, and it is anticipated that Sino-Middle Eastern relations and strategic partnerships will be enhanced in the near future, provided that China is not perceived as undermining the Arab Spring. Key Features Offers an in-depth analysis of Chinese-Middle Eastern relations Assists students and scholars in understanding the uniqueness of the Chinese model of engagement in the Middle East Explains why most Middle Easterners prefer China's engagement to Western engagement Explores the future of Sino-Middle Eastern relations

It is the new way of war: Everywhere our military tries to make inroads, insurgents flout us—and seem to get the better of the strategists making policy and battle plans. In this book, an expert with both scholarly and military experience in the field looks at cases of counterinsurgency gone wrong. By examining the failures of strategies against insurgents in Algeria, Cyprus, Vietnam, and Iraq, Lieutenant Colonel James S. Corum offers rare and much-needed insight into what can go wrong in such situations—and how these mistakes might be avoided. In each case, Corum shows how the conflict could have been won by the major power if its strategy had addressed the underlying causes of the insurgency it faced; not doing so wastes lives and weakens the power’s position in the world. Failures in counterinsurgency often proceed from common mistakes. Bad Strategies explores these at strategic, operational and tactical levels. Above all, Corum identifies poor civilian and military leadership as the primary cause for failure in successfully combating insurgencies. His book, with clear and practical prescriptions for success, shows how the lessons of the past might apply to our present disastrous confrontations with insurgents in Iraq.

'I suppose you know who I am? I was in charge of the actions in Germany and Poland and Czechoslovakia. I am prepared to sell you one million Jews: Goods for blood ... Blood for goods.' These were the chilling words uttered by one of the most notorious Nazi bureaucrats, SS Colonel Adolf Eichmann, to a young Jewish businessman called Joel Brand in the spring of 1944. Brand embarked on a desperate mission to persuade the Allies to barter with Eichmann – and failed. At the same time, the SS deported hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz-Birkenau packed in cattle trains. The majority were gassed, then incinerated. For decades after 1945, many blamed the Allies for callously abandoning a million Hungarian Jews to their fate. In Deception, Christopher Hale presents a new account of the 'Brand Mission' based on evidence in the national archives of Germany, Hungary, Britain and the United States. Hale reveals that Eichmann's offer formed one part of a monstrous deception designed to outwit the leaders of the last surviving Jewish community in Europe. The deception was more complex and – from the German point of view – more successful than any operation mounted by the secret services of the Allied governments.