Many secrets of nature have been discovered since we have a better understanding of microstructures, for example subatomic spheres in physics and genetic structures in biochemistry. This book is set to convey an overview of the history, methods, findings and theoretical accounts of microgenetic research in consciousness and experimental psychology. The reader will find information about how conscious percepts unfold within only a fraction of a second. In a sense, and according to the microgenetic hypothesis, our subjectively experienced perceptual image undergoes formation similar to the process of developing a photograph. Yet the time scale of the awareness-related perceptual development is much finer and therefore accessible only to observation armed with special experimental procedures that are exposed in this book. In addition, the author presents empirical findings and theoretical interpretations from his own lab. Professor Talis Bachmann has been active in microgenetic research on attention, perception and consciousness for more than 25 years. (Series B)

Many secrets of nature have been discovered since we have a better understanding of microstructures, for example subatomic spheres in physics and genetic structures in biochemistry. This book is set to convey an overview of the history, methods, findings and theoretical accounts of microgenetic research in consciousness and experimental psychology. The reader will find information about how conscious percepts unfold within only a fraction of a second. In a sense, and according to the microgenetic hypothesis, our subjectively experienced perceptual image undergoes formation similar to the process of developing a photograph. Yet the time scale of the awareness-related perceptual development is much finer and therefore accessible only to observation armed with special experimental procedures that are exposed in this book. In addition, the author presents empirical findings and theoretical interpretations from his own lab. Professor Talis Bachmann has been active in microgenetic research on attention, perception and consciousness for more than 25 years. (Series B)

The chapters in this volume attempt to establish some foundational principles of a theory of the mind/brain grounded in evolutionary and process theory. From this standpoint, the book discusses some main problems in philosophical psychology, including the nature and origins of the mind/brain state, experience and consciousness, feeling, subjective time and free will. The approach -- that of microgenesis -- holds that formative phases in the generation of the mental state are the primary focus of explanation, not the assumed properties of logical solids. For microgenesis, the process leading to a conscious end point is, together with the final content, part of an epochal state, the outcome of which, an act, object or word, incorporates earlier segments of that series, such as value, meaning and belief.

How can one investigate phenomenal consciousness? As in other areas of science, the investigation of consciousness aims for a more precise knowledge of its phenomena, and the discovery of general truths about their nature. This requires the development of appropriate first-person, second-person and third-person methods. This book introduces some of the creative ways in which these methods can be applied to different purposes, e.g. to understanding the relation of consciousness to brain, to examining or changing consciousness as such, and to understanding the way consciousness is influenced by social, clinical and therapeutic contexts. To clarify the strengths and weaknesses of different methods and to demonstrate the interplay of methodology and epistemology, the book also suggests a number of “maps” of the consciousness studies terrain that place different approaches to the study of consciousness into a broader, interdisciplinary context. (Series A).

Is there an internal relationship between consciousness and intentionality? Can mental content be described in such a way so as to avoid dualism? What is the influence of social context upon consciousness, conceptions of self and mental content?This book considers questions such as these and argues for a conception of consciousness, mental content and intentionality that is anti-Cartesian in its major tenets. Focusing upon the rule governed nature of concepts and the grounding of the rules for concept use in the practical world, intentional consciousness emerges as a phenomena that depends upon social context. Given that dependence, the authors consider and set aside attempts to reduce human consciousness and intentionality to phenomena explicable at biological or neuroscientific levels. (Series A)

Combining phenomenological insights from Brentano and Sartre, but also drawing on recent work on consciousness by analytic philosophers, this book defends the view that conscious states are reflexive, and necessarily so, i.e., that they have a built-in, “implicit” awareness of their own occurrence, such that the subject of a conscious state has an immediate, non-objectual acquaintance with it. As part of this investigation, the book also explores the relationship between reflexivity and the phenomenal, or “what-it-is-like,” dimension of conscious experience, defending the innovative thesis that phenomenal character is constituted by the implicit self-awareness built into every conscious state. This account stands in marked contrast to most influential extant theories of phenomenal character, including qualia theories, according to which phenomenal character is a matter of having phenomenal sensations, and representationalism, according to which phenomenal character is constituted by representational content. (Series A)

Recent advances in cognitive neuroscience make possible an understanding of the neural events that are associated with different forms of consciousness. To fully understand and unveil the mystery of consciousness inside the brain we require examination of the concept of neural basis of conscious mind.This book provides a systematic exploration of consciousness and gives an overview of neural and quantum basis of conscious mind through careful explanation of proposed models and extends these theories challenging some generalised views on consciousness. Each chapter provides a review of the findings and theoretical accounts related to neural basis of consciousness and the mechanisms of the different varieties of consciousness. Professor Naoyuki Osaka (Kyoto University) has been active in experimental research on consciousness and attention for more than 15 years. (Series B)

The notion of stratification has played an important role in linguistics and evolutionary studies for some time, but its role in cognitive science has not yet been well articulated and identified. What is meant by stratification? What is the role and value of stratification in the contemporary study of cognition and consciousness? This collective volume speaks to these questions. The twelve articles in the book cover a range of relevant issues including (a) the vertical dimension and modularity of visual processing, search and attention, (b) the stratification of encoding and retrieval processes in memory, (c) the hierarchical nature of conscious and unconscious components of memory, and (d) the levels of awareness and varieties of conscious experience. The volume presents stimulating and self-contained articles for researchers and students of experimental psychology and neuroscience, and is suitable for an advanced university course. (Series B)

These new studies by prominent neuroscientists, psychologists and philosophers work toward a coherent framework for understanding emotion and its contribution to the functioning of consciousness in general, as an aspect of self-organizing, embodied subjects. Distinguishing consciousness from unconscious information processing hinges on the role of motivating emotions in all conscious modalities, and how emotional brain processes interact with those traditionally associated with cognitive function. Computationally registering/processing sensory signals (e.g. in the occipital lobe or area V4) by itself does not result in perceptual consciousness, which requires subcortical structures such as amygdala, hypothalamus, and brain stem. This interdisciplinary anthology attempts to understand the complexity of emotional intentionality; why the role of motivation in self-organizing processes is crucial in distinguishing conscious from unconscious processes; how emotions account for 'agency'; and how an adequate approach to emotion-motivation can address the traditional mind-body problem through a holistic understanding of the conscious, behaving organism. (Series B)

Higher-Order (HO) theories of consciousness have in common the idea that what makes a mental state conscious is that it is the object of some kind of higher-order representation. This volume presents fourteen previously unpublished essays both defending and criticizing this approach to the problem of consciousness. It is the first anthology devoted entirely to HO theories of consciousness. There are several kinds of HO theory, such as the HOT (higher-order thought) and HOP (higher-order perception) models, and each is discussed and debated. Part One contains essays by authors who defend some form of HO theory. Part Two includes papers by those who are critics of the HO approach. Some of the topics covered include animal consciousness, misrepresentation, the nature of pain, subvocal speech, subliminal perception, blindsight, the nature of emotion, the difference between perception and thought, first-order versus higher-order theories of consciousness, and the relationship between nonconscious and conscious mentality. (Series A)