This book deals with the cognitive foundation of the theory of social action. The social sciences are still guided by models of social action, far from the empirical reality of the psychology of action. While economics seems to have made greater progress in accepting the changes to the theory of action derived from cognitive science (see, for example, the 2002 Nobel prize for economics awarded to Daniel Kahneman), sociology is still being oriented on the dualism of hermeneutics vs. structuralism, which leaves very little room for a cognitive theory of social action. The unique features of the book are its combination of epistemology, philosophy of mind and cognitive science in order to renew and overcome the limits of the current methodologies of social science and in particular methodological individualism. Methodological cognitivism is proposed as an alternative to the holistic character of structuralism, to the intentionalist and rationalist features of methodological individualism, and to the relativistic character of hermeneutics and ethnomethodology.

B.F. Skinner has been praised as one of the most influential psychologists of the 20th century, but was also attacked by a variety of opponents within and outside the field of psychology.

This book covers a broad spectrum of topics, from experimental philosophy and cognitive theory of science, to social epistemology and research and innovation policy. Following up on the previously published Volume 1, “Mind, Rationality, and Society,” it provides further applications of methodological cognitivism in areas such as scientific discovery, technology transfer and innovation policy. It also analyzes the impact of cognitive science on philosophical problems like causality and truth. The book is divided into four parts: Part I “Experimental Philosophy and Causality” tackles the problem of causality, which is often seen as straddling metaphysics, ontology and epistemology. Part II “Cognitive Rationality of Science” deals with the cognitive foundation of scientific rationality, starting from a strong critique of the neopositivist rationality of science on the one hand and of the relativist and social reduction of the methodology of science on the other. Part III “Research Policy and Social Epistemology” deals with topics of social epistemology, science policy and culture of innovation. Lastly, Part IV “Knowledge Transfer and Innovation” addresses the dynamics of knowledge generation, transfer and use in technological innovation.

While methodological individualism is a fundamental approach within the social sciences, it is often misunderstood. This highlights the need for a discursive and up-to-date reference work analyzing this approach’s classic arguments and assumptions in the light of contemporary issues in sociology, economics and philosophy. This two-volume handbook presents the first comprehensive overview of methodological individualism. Chapters discuss historical and contemporary debates surrounding this central approach within the social sciences, as well as cutting edge developments related to the individualist tradition with philosophical and scientific implications. Bringing together multiple contributions from the world’s leading experts on this important tradition of theorizing, this collective endeavor provides teachers, researchers and students in sociology, economics, and philosophy with a reliable and critical understanding of the founding principles, key thinkers and intellectual development of MI since the late 19th century.

This book offers a systematic view of social analysis that will advance the communication of results between different academic disciplines. It overcomes misunderstandings that are due to the use of an unstructured variety of methodological traditions in the analysis of complex socioeconomic and political processes. The book focuses on the special features of human society: humans as subjects, non-repetitiveness and irreversibility of social actions and the peculiar relations between necessity and possibility in human action. It defines methodological criteria, procedures and rules that enable researchers to select and classify realistic hypotheses to derive general principles and basic organizational features. It then applies these criteria in critical reviews of major theories and interpretations of society and history, offering clarifications and alternative proposals with regard to crucial aspects of anthropological, political, juridical, sociological and religious thought.

III. Language & Thought: Sharon Thompson-Schill (Volume Editor) (Topics covered include embodied cognition; discourse and dialogue; reading; creativity; speech production; concepts and categorization; culture and cognition; reasoning; sentence processing; bilingualism; speech perception; spatial cognition; word processing; semantic memory; moral reasoning.)

Originally published in 1987, this book presents papers from the First Conference of European Clinical Psychologists, held at the University of Kent Canterbury in July of that year. It shows some of the most exciting and recent developments in research and innovations in professional practice from many European countries with an overall theme of the WHO strategy of ‘Health for all by the year 2000.’ The whole range of clinical psychology is covered, including: cognitive therapy, clinical psychology and WHO strategy, the mental health of ethnic minority groups, health psychology, care in the community, and many other topics. The book is likely to be of interest for anyone concerned with the recent history and policies in clinical psychology.

B.F. Skinner died in August 1990. He had been praised as one of the most influential psychologists of the 20th century, but was also attacked by a variety of opponents within and outside the field of psychology. This introduction to his work is first of all a guide to a correct reading of his writings, a reading devoid of the distortions and misinterpretations often conveyed by many commentators, including psychologists. It frames Skinner's contributions with reference to major European traditions in psychological sciences, namely Pavlov, Freud, Lorenz and Piaget. Crucial aspects of Skinner's theory and methodological stands are discussed in the context of contemporary debates: special attention is devoted to the relationship of psychology with biology and the neurosciences, to the cognitivist movement, to the status of language and to the explanation of novelty and creativity in human behaviour.; Finally, Skinner's social and political philosophy is presented with an emphasis on the provocative aspects of an analysis of current social practices which fail to solve most of the urgent problems humankind is confronted with today. Both in science proper and in human affairs at large, Skinner's thought is shown to be not behind, as is often claimed, but ahead of the times, be it in his interactive view of linguistic communication, in his very modern use of the evolutionary analogy to explain the dynamics of behaviour, or in his vision of ecological constraints.

"Does knowledge matter to politics?" is the main question the book tries to answer. The analysis is interdisciplinary and covers a wide range of topics: a social epistemology assessment of the efficacy of political institutions in promoting the generation and the diffusion of science and technology; the proposal of the alternative concept of satisfying rationality to found the theory of social knowledge; the roles of social knowledge in the constitution making and the transitional justice; the arguments in favor of decentralized knowledge in social problem solving and its empowerment through devolution, de-bureaucratization and deregulation; the means to ensure the independency of knowledge from power and at the same time its social utility; the knowledge justified to inform the voters in political campaigns; the critique to technocracy as the wrong solution to deal with the crisis of complexity in contemporary society.

There is a basic perplexity in our times. On the one hand, we ?nd a blind trust in technology and rationalism. In our neo-liberalistically dominated world only what can be rapidly exploited and commercialized seems to count. The only opposing reaction to this kind of rationalism is an extreme rejection of all kinds of reasoning, and sometimes attendant religious fundamentalism. But instead of re?ecting on the limits and possibilites of reasoning, dialogue is replaced by a demagogic struggle between cultures. One cause of the blind trust in technology is misunderstandings about the sign- cance and the application of theories in the reception of the so-called Enlightenment. The Enlightenment is essentially characterized by two forces: (i) the conception of society as a social contract and (ii) the new science (New- nian physics, etc.). But as a result we lost ground: Atomistic individualism nourished the illusion of a self-contained ego prior to man’s entering into a shared inter-subjective world. And in the new science, our constructions of reality became autonomous and indep- dent of our interventions. Thus we became caught in the inherent dynamism of our computational constructions of reality. Science, as it is applied today, operates with far too simple parameters and model-theoretic constructions – erroneously taking the latter (the models) as literal descriptions of reality.