The Middle Ages are commonly divided into three periods--early, high or central, and late. Each period was marked by its own crises and wars, and the weapons and fighters reflected the technological and other advancements being made. This book is a richly illustrated history of warfare in Western Europe during those years. Part One, the early Middle Ages, covers the late Romans, the Germanic invaders and Byzantines, the Franks, the Vikings and Hungarians, and the Anglo-Saxons and Normans in England. Part Two, the high or central Middle Ages, considers the feudal system, knights and chivalry, knights at war, infantrymen, land warfare, siege and naval warfare, crusades in Palestine, templars and hospitalers, the Reconquista in Spain, and the Teutonic knights. Part Three, the late Middle Ages, discusses the evolution of new types of armor and weapons, the Hundred Years' War, mercenaries, and firearms.

The Medieval era was a period of huge variety and invention in siege warfare. Before the use of cannon and other gun-powder artillery, siege engines relied on assorted sources of power, from torsion 'energy storage' systems to man-power, counter-balances and others. This book reveals how technological traditions from the Graeco-Roman world, Persia, India and above all China made a massive contribution to siege warfare techniques. It also covers developments in military engineering, such as mining, counter-mining, the breaking of walls, the use of noxious and chemical fumes and the use of fire-weapons.

In medieval and Renaissance Europe, mercenaries--professional soldiers who fought for money or other rewards--played violent, colorful, international roles in warfare, but they have received relatively little scholarly attention. In this book a large number of vignettes portray their activities in Western Europe over a period of nearly 900 years, from the Merovingian mercenaries of 752 through the Thirty Years' War, which ended in 1648. Intended as an introduction to the subject and drawing heavily on contemporary first-person accounts, the book creates a vivid but balanced mosaic of the many thousands of mercenaries who were hired to fight for various employers.

Osprey's elite title on the rise and fall of European medieval cavalry during an 800 year period. After the fall of the Western Roman Empire there was a decline in professional cavalry forces, and infantry dominated in the Germanic successor barbarian kingdoms. In the Carolingian and Norman periods from the 9th to the 11th centuries, under the impact of Viking, Saracen and Magyar advances, the cavalry arm gradually expanded from the small remaining aristocratic elite. Even so, the supposedly complete dominance of the knight in the 12th and 13th centuries is grossly exaggerated, as integrated cavalry and infantry tactics were nearly always the key to success. This is the first in a two-part treatment of medieval tactics, covering developments in both cavalry and infantry tactics. Throughout the period there was a steady evolution of training in both individual and unit skills, of armor and weapons, and thus of tactics on the battlefield. This book covers key moments in this story of evolution from Hastings in 1066 to Legnano in 1176. It also details the later development of cavalry versus cavalry tactics and the two key set piece battles of Bouvines in 1214 and Pelagonia in 1259, the former an example of abject failure of cavalry tactics and the latter a stunning success.

Castles, Battles, and Bombs reconsiders key episodes of military history from the point of view of economics—with dramatically insightful results. For example, when looked at as a question of sheer cost, the building of castles in the High Middle Ages seems almost inevitable: though stunningly expensive, a strong castle was far cheaper to maintain than a standing army. The authors also reexamine the strategic bombing of Germany in World War II and provide new insights into France’s decision to develop nuclear weapons. Drawing on these examples and more, Brauer and Van Tuyll suggest lessons for today’s military, from counterterrorist strategy and military manpower planning to the use of private military companies in Afghanistan and Iraq. "In bringing economics into assessments of military history, [the authors] also bring illumination. . . . [The authors] turn their interdisciplinary lens on the mercenary arrangements of Renaissance Italy; the wars of Marlborough, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon; Grant's campaigns in the Civil War; and the strategic bombings of World War II. The results are invariably stimulating."—Martin Walker, Wilson Quarterly "This study is serious, creative, important. As an economist I am happy to see economics so professionally applied to illuminate major decisions in the history of warfare."—Thomas C. Schelling, Winner of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics

Longbows, crossbows, heavy spears, swiss pikes, catapaults, and especially gunpowder artillery and handheld guns such as the arquebus gradually but profoundly changed European warfare. By about 1260 the steady rise of the European heavily armoured mounted knight to the predominant role in most pitched battles was complete. But though he dominated the actual day of battle, he did not dominate warfare - there were plenty of vital though unglamorous tasks for which footsoldiers were still necessary, 'cleaning up round the edges'. With the development in the 13th century of co-operative tactics using crossbowmen and heavy spearmen, deployed together to compensate for each others' vulnerabilities, circumstance began to arise in which the charge by Muslim horse-archers, and then by European armoured knights, could be defied. Infantry were far cheaper and easier to train than knights, and potentially there were far more of them. Slowly, tactics emerged by which more numerous and more varied infantry played an increasing part in battles. The best-known examples of this 'democratization of the battlefield' are the English longbowmen who won battles against French knights in the Hundred Years' War, and the massed Swiss spearmen and halberdiers who did the same in wars against the Dukes of Burgundy. Illustrated with specially commissioned full-colour artwork depicting the tactical formations of the era, this book traces these and other examples of this 'jerky' and uneven process through its regional differences, which were invariably entwined with parallel cavalry developments - the balanced army of 'mixed arms' was always the key to success. By the time serious hand-held firearms appeared on battlefields in large numbers in about 1500, the face of medieval warfare had been transformed.

By the 11th century the French King had lost control of border regions, while local warfare had grown alarmingly frequent. In fact the energies of the French military élite were now focused on petty internal squabbles and external adventures like the Norman conquest of England. Nevertheless, the population and economy both expanded, although it was not until the 12th century that the crown rebuilt its power-base. Despite its slow start when compared with neighbours like England, the Kingdom of France had, by the 13th century, risen to become the most powerful state in Western Europe. This title describes the organisation, history and tactics of French medieval armies.

He begins by analysing the sources for our knowledge of the military history of the period, assessing their reliability: some chroniclers exaggerate, others are careful observers or have access to official records. There follows an examination of the constituent parts of the medieval army, knights and footsoldiers, equipment and terms of service, behaviour on the field, and psychology, before the problematic question of medieval tactics is addressed through analysis of accounts of a series of major battles. Strategy is discussed in the context of these battles: whether to seek battle, fight a defensive war, or attempt a war of conquest.

This text examines the nature of war in the period 1000-1300 A.D. and argues that is was primarily shaped by the people who conducted war - the landowners.