This book provides a wide-ranging and in-depth reappraisal of the relation between Marx’s economic theory in Capital and Hegel’s Logic by leading Marxian economists and philosophers from around the world. The subjects dealt with include: systematic dialectics, the New Dialectics, materialism vs. idealism, Marx’s ‘inversion’ of Hegel, Hegel’s Concept logic (universality-particularity-singularity), Hegel’s Essence logic (essence-appearance), Marx’s levels of abstraction of capital in general and competition, and capital as Hegelian Subject. The papers in this volume were originally presented at the 22nd annual meeting of the International Symposium on Marxian Theory at Mount Holyoke College in August 2011. The twelve authors are divided between seven economists and five philosophers, as is fitting for the interdisciplinary subject of the relation between Marx’s economic theory and Hegel’s logic. Contributors are: Chris Arthur, Riccardo Bellofiore, Roberto Fineschi, Gastón Caligaris, Igor Hanzel, Juan Iñigo Carrera, Mark Meaney, Fred Moseley, Patrick Murray, Geert Reuten, Mario Robles, Tony Smith, and Guido Starosta.

Beginning with "value" and "commodity" at the start of Volume I in Marx's major work, and progressing step-by-step to the end of Volume III, Smith establishes in detail that Capital is a systematic theory of socio-economic categories ordered according to dialectical logic. At each stage in his analysis of the theory Smith makes Marx's arguments more accessible. He also considers in depth the objections to Marx's employment of dialectical logic that have been formulated by Hegelians (especially those presented in Klaus Hartmann's Die Marxsche Theorie). Smith presents a persuasive case against this whole range of Marx criticisms, many of which have also been proposed from non-Hegelian standpoints.

This book argues that the dialectic of Marx's Capital has a systematic, rather than historical, character. It sheds new light on Marx's great work, while going beyond it in many respects.

This book demonstrates that the basic concepts of the three volumes of Capital come under different categories of time: "time of production" in the first volume is linear, “time of circulation” in the second is circular, while in the third volume “organic time” is the unity of the two. Capitalist relations emerge as a definite organisation of social time that obeys its own intrinsic criteria and operates as an autonomous, social subject. Reading Capital from this perspective, it becomes possible to restore its dialectical (Hegelian) logic – not in order to reveal the “real” Marx, but as a means to contribute to the understanding of the real, capitalist world with its present-day fetishes, its explosive contradictions and its ever deeper crises.

Marx’s Capital has of course been widely read; this revival of a systematic study by Geoffrey Pilling, originally published in 1980, argues powerfully that, in order to understand Capital fully, it is necessary to have read and understood Hegel’s Logic. This argument leads to a detailed examination of the opening chapters of Capital, and a re-examination of their significance for the work as a whole. Pilling emphasizes the fundamental nature of the break between Marx’s Capital and all forms of classical political economy, and stresses the revolutionary nature of Marx’s critique of political economy as one of the foundations of Capital. He also lays particular emphasis on the philosophical aspects of the work, so often neglected by British commentators, and puts forward the view that Marx’s notion of fetishism, often looked upon as incidental to his work, is in fact central to his entire critique of political economy.

Marx’s Grundrisse is acknowledged as the vital link between Marx’s early and late work. It is also a crucial text in elucidating Marx’s debt to the idealist philosopher G.W.F. Hegel. This book, first published in 1988, is the first full-length study of that relationship, in a thorough textual analysis which makes the connections explicit and also the Grundrisse’s relations to the works of Adam Smith and Aristotle. This book argues that Marx’s critique of political economy, and his critique of Hegel, are double interrelated. Not only did Marx adapt Hegelian logic in order to analyse the economic categories crucial to modern society but it is argued that those logical categories were themselves seen as reflections of the productive processes of contemporary commercial society. Uchida reveals a conceptual structure common to the apparently rarefied world of Hegelian conceptual logic and to the supposedly common-sensical world of economic science. Demonstrating this is a considerable achievement, and it allows us to consider precisely what is valuable today in Marx’s critical commentary on this conceptual structure and on the type of society in which it is manifested. Uchida’s subject, like Marx’s, is ‘the force of capital on modern life’.

This ambitious book presents a comprehensive new 'macro-monetary' interpretation of Marx’s logical method in Capital, based on substantial textual evidence, which emphasises two main points: (1) Marx’s theory is primarily a macroeconomic theory of the total surplus-value produced in the economy as a whole; and (2) Marx’s theory is a monetary theory from beginning to end and the circuit of money capital – M - C - M’ – is the logical framework of Marx’s theory. It follows from this 'macro-monetary' interpretation that, contrary to the prevailing view, there is no 'transformation problem' in Marx’s theory; i.e., Marx did not 'fail to transform the inputs of constant capital and variable capital' in his theory of prices of production in Part 2 of Volume III.

In Marx ́s Capital, Method and Revolutionary Subjectivity, Guido Starosta develops a materialist inquiry into the social and historical determinations of revolutionary subjectivity. Through a methodologically-minded critical reconstruction of the Marxian critique of political economy, from the early writings up to the Grundrisse and Capital, this study shows that the outcome of the historical movement of the objectified form of social mediation, which has turned into the very alienated subject of social life (i.e., capital), is to develop, as its own immanent determination, the constitution of the (self-abolishing) working class as a revolutionary subject. A crucial element in this intellectual endeavour is the focus on the intrinsic connection between the specifically dialectical form of social science and its radical transformative content.

In How Language Informs Mathematics Dirk Damsma shows how Hegel’s and Marx’s systematic dialectical analysis of mathematical and economic language helps us understand the structure and nature of mathematical and capitalist systems. More importantly, Damsma shows how knowledge of the latter can inform model assumptions and help improve models. His book provides a blueprint for an approach to economic model building that does away with arbitrarily chosen assumptions and is sensitive to the institutional structures of capitalism. In light of the failure of mainstream economics to understand systemic failures like the financial crisis and given the arbitrary character of most assumptions in mainstream models, such an approach is desperately needed.

For a century now Marxists have been searching for a 'rational kernel' of Hegelian 'dialectics' inside the 'mystical shell' of the Hegelian system. As against this entire tradition, Rosenthal insists that Hegelian philosophy is mysticism all the way through. He argues that Marx's supposed `dialectic method' is simply a myth propagated by academics and proposes the provocative thesis that it is not, after all, Hegel's 'method' of which Marx made use in Capital but rather precisely Hegel's mysticism. The role of money in Marx and Hegel is examined in detail.