An explanation of France's deflationary policy during the Depression.

This study is a scholarly biography of one of France's foremost political leaders. In a career which ran from the 1880s to the 1930s, one of the most formative periods of modern French history, Poincaré held the principal offices of state. He played crucial roles in France's entry into the Great War, the organisation of the war effort, the peace settlement, the reparations question, the occupation of the Ruhr and the reorganisation of French finances in the 1920s. His life and work is surrounded by controversy and myth, from 'Poincaré-la-guerre' to 'Poincaré-le-franc', which this book dissects. Using a host of new archival material, Professor Keiger explores the historiography of the man and his times and reveals, somewhat surprisingly, how animal rights and feminism could be as important to him as party politics and public finance.

Since 1914, the French state has faced a succession of daunting and at times almost insurmountable crises. The turbulent decades from 1914 to 1969 witnessed near-defeat in 1914, economic and political crisis in 1926, radical political polarization in the 1930s, military conquest in 1940, the deep division of France during the Nazi Occupation, political reconstruction after 1944, de-colonization (with threatening civil war provoked by the Algerian crisis), and dramatic postwar modernization. However, this tumultuous period was not marked just by crises but also by tremendous change. Economic, social and political "modernization" transformed France in the twentieth century, restoring its confidence and its influence as a leader in global economic and political affairs. This combination of crises and renewal has received surprisingly little attention in recent years. The present collection show-cases significant new scholarship, reflecting greater access to French archival sources, and focuses on the role of crises in fostering modernization in areas covering politics, economics, women, diplomacy and war.

Capitalism in Chaos explores an often-overlooked consequence and paradox of the First World War—the prosperity of business elites and bankers in service of the war effort during the destruction of capital and wealth by belligerent armies. This study of business life amid war and massive geopolitical changes follows industrialists and policymakers in Central Europe as the region became crucially important for German and subsequently French plans of economic and geopolitical expansion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Based on extensive research in sixteen archives, five languages, and four states, Máté Rigó demonstrates that wartime destruction and the birth of "war millionaires" were two sides of the same coin. Despite the recent centenaries of the Great War and the Versailles peace treaties, knowledge of the overall impact of war and border changes on business life remains sporadic, based on scant statistics and misleading national foci. Consequently, most histories remain wedded to the viewpoint of national governments and commercial connections across national borders. Capitalism in Chaos changes the static historical perspective by presenting Europe's East as the economic engine of the continent. Rigó accomplishes this paradigm shift by focusing on both supranational regions—including East-Central and Western Europe—as well as the eastern and western peripheries of Central Europe, Alsace-Lorraine and Transylvania, from the 1870s until the 1920s. As a result, Capitalism in Chaos offers a concrete, lively history of economics during major world crises, with a contemporary consciousness toward inequality and disparity during a time of collapse.

During the 1930s and 1940s, and again in the 1970s and 1980s, most European nations, indeed most industrial nations, undertook major changes in macroeconomic policy orientation and financial regulation. The contributors to this volume, historians, political scientists, and economists, identify the forces which drove these major policy shifts, and explore their implications for other areas of economic and social policy. Douglas J. Forsyth is teaching at Bowling Green State University. Ton Notermans is senior researcher for the Advanced Research on the Europeanization of the Nation-State (ARENA) Program of the Norwegian Research Council.

Economic historians have established a new orthodoxy attributing the onset and severity of the Great Depression to the flawed workings of the international gold standard. This interpretation returns French gold policy to centre stage in understanding the origins of the Depression, its rapid spread, its severity and its duration. The Gold Standard Illusion exploits new archival resources to test how well this gold standard interpretation of the Great Depression is sustained by historical records in France, the country most often criticized for hoarding gold and failure to play by the rules of the gold standard game. The study follows four lines of inquiry, providing a history of French gold policy in its national and international contexts from 1914 to 1939, an analysis of the evolution of the Bank of France during this period and the degree to which gold standard belief retarded the adoption of modern central banking practice, a re-examination of interwar central bank cooperation in the period and its role in the breakdown of the gold standard, and a study of how gold standard rhetoric fostered misperceptions of financial and monetary problems. The French case was exceptional, marked by absolute and tenacious faith in the gold standard, by the import and accumulation of a vast hoard of gold desperately needed as reserves to prevent monetary contraction abroad, and by adamant claims for the need to return to gold after most countries had left the gold standard, which had become, in the words of John Maynard Keynes, 'a curse laid upon the economic life of the world'. The Gold Standard Illusion explains French gold standard belief and policy, the impact of French policy at home and abroad, and reassesses the gold standard interpretation of the Great Depression in the light of French experience.

The French call them 'the Dark Years'... This definitive new history of Occupied France explores the myths and realities of four of the most divisive years in French history. Taking in ordinary people's experiences of defeat, collaboration, resistance, and liberation, it uncovers the conflicting memories of occupation which ensure that even today France continues to debate the legacy of the Vichy years.

Study of the impact of Britain's economic and financial crises on currency and monetary policy-making in India between the wars, analysing colonial policies during Anglo-US efforts to reconstruct the international financial system and Britain's struggle to restore the pre-eminence of sterling and the City.

In Appeasing Bankers, Jonathan Kirshner shows that bankers dread war--an aversion rooted in pragmatism, not idealism. "Sound money, not war" is hardly a pacifist rallying cry. The financial world values economic stability above all else, and crises and war threaten that stability. States that pursue appeasement when assertiveness--or even conflict--is warranted, Kirshner demonstrates, are often appeasing their own bankers. And these realities are increasingly shaping state strategy in a world of global financial markets. Yet the role of these financial preferences in world politics has been widely misunderstood and underappreciated. Liberal scholars have tended to lump finance together with other commercial groups; theorists of imperialism (including, most famously, Lenin) have misunderstood the preferences of finance; and realist scholars have failed to appreciate how the national interest, and proposals to advance it, are debated and contested by actors within societies. Finance's interest in peace is both pronounced and predictable, regardless of time or place. Bankers, Kirshner shows, have even opposed assertive foreign policies when caution seems to go against their nation's interest (as in interwar France) or their own long-term political interest (as during the Falklands crisis, when British bankers failed to support their ally Margaret Thatcher). Examining these and other cases, including the Spanish-American War, interwar Japan, and the United States during the Cold War, Appeasing Bankers shows that, when faced with the prospect of war or international political crisis, national financial communities favor caution and demonstrate a marked aversion to war.

This book is about the history of thought and policy on the international adjustment mechanism. Economics emerged as a discipline in its own right largely out of the accumulated reflections, analyses and judgements of a group of writers from the sixteenth to the early nineteenth century who shared a common perspective on matters relating to the adjustment of the balance of payments. The present survey starts with the development of the doctrine at that time and continues the story up to the present debate on economic and monetary union in Europe.