This paper was prepared to present an approach to managing Joint Staff preparations for the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR 2001), which we developed in working with the staff of the Studies and Analysis Management Division (SAMD) of the Joint Staff G-8). The lessons learned from the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR 1997) included the need for leadership guidance and integration of analytic activities to sort through the myriad issues that are always confronting the Department of Defense. The "Goldwater-Nichols"legislative changes to Title X statutes expanded the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and tasked him with the formal responsibilities of reviewing and commenting on defense matters that require analytic support as well as military judgment. The J-8 should assist the Chairman by managing a process that can provide credible and timely analysis to support high- level review of important issues.

The problems and issues that the research team tracked during QDR 1997 are far from being resolved and there is no clear guidance on what will be demanded in QDR 2001. The services remain skeptical of the Joint Staff dealing with tough issues that could redirect their own programmatic decisions. Although there is promise of improvement in organization and process, the most glaring problems are the lack of a comprehensive approach to treating resources and understanding the effects of resources on strategy adn transformation alternatives. It is essential that good working relationships be established now with a clear understanding of the different responsibilities and capabilities of the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). It will be important to identify an appropriate set of mega-issues (with an appropriate set of supporting specific issues) and initiate studies and analysis on the most important ones.

As an After-action report, this documented briefing summatizes analysis performed for the Joint STaff in preparation for and in support of the second Quadrennial Defense Review(QDR). The authors concluded that QDR 2001 like QDR 1997, was useful inproviding information on requirements for military capabilties and resource. The report recommend that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff use existing processes to routinely address cross-cutting issues from a military perpective.

Congress mandated that every 4 years the Dept. of Defense (DoD) conduct a review to examine the national defense strategy and its implications for force structure, modernization, infrastructure and the budget. Because the 2001 review, which was issued on Sept. 30, 2001, will have a significant impact on the DoD's planning and budget, the General Accounting Office (GAO) was asked to assess: (1) the strengths and weaknesses of DoD's conduct and reporting of the review, and (2) whether changes in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) legislation could improve the usefulness of future reviews. Charts and tables.

This publication is designed to be both an introduction to the world of defense systems acquisition management for the newcomer and a summary level refresher for the practitioner who has been away from the business for a few years. It focuses on Department of Defense-wide management policies and procedures, not on the details of any specific defense system.

The Department of Defense (DOD) is required by law to conduct a comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force structure, modernization plans, infrastructure, and budget every 4 years including an assessment of the force structure best suited to implement the defense strategy at low-to-moderate level of risk. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), completed in February 2006, represents the first comprehensive review that DOD had undertaken since the military forces have been engaged in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. GAO was asked to assess (1) the strengths and weaknesses of DOD's approach and methodology for the 2006 QDR and (2) what changes, if any, in the QDR legislation could improve the usefulness of the report, including any changes that would better reflect 21st century security conditions. To conduct its review, GAO analyzed DOD's methodology, QDR study guidance, and results from key analyses and also obtained views of defense analysts within and outside of DOD. DOD's approach and methodology for the 2006 QDR had several strengths, but several weaknesses significantly limited the review's usefulness in addressing force structure, personnel requirements, and risk associated with executing the national defense strategy. Key strengths of the QDR included sustained involvement of senior DOD officials, extensive collaboration with interagency partners and allied countries, and a database to track implementation of initiatives. However, GAO found weaknesses in three key areas. First, DOD did not conduct a comprehensive, integrated assessment of different options for organizing and sizing its forces to provide needed capabilities. Without such an assessment, DOD is not well positioned to balance capability needs and risks within future budgets, given the nation's fiscal challenges. Second, DOD did not provide a clear analytical basis for its conclusion that it had the appropriate number of personnel to meet current and projected demands. During its review, DOD did not consider changing personnel levels and instead focused on altering the skill mix. However, a year after the QDR report was issued, DOD announced plans to increase Army and Marine Corps personnel by 92,000. Without performing a comprehensive analysis of the number of personnel it needs, DOD cannot provide an analytical basis that its military and civilian personnel levels reflect the number of personnel needed to execute the defense strategy. Third, the risk assessments conducted by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which are required by the QDR legislation, did not fully apply DOD's risk management framework because DOD had not developed assessment tools to measure risk. Without a sound analytical approach to assessing risk, DOD may not be able to demonstrate how it will manage risk within current and expected resource levels. As a result, DOD is not in the best position to demonstrate that it has identified the force structure best suited to implement the defense strategy at low-to-moderate risk. Through discussions with DOD officials and defense analysts, GAO has identified several options for refining the QDR legislative language that Congress could consider to improve the usefulness of future QDRs, including changes to encourage DOD to focus on high priority strategic issues and better reflect security conditions of the 21st century. Congress could consider options to clarify its expectations regarding what budget information DOD should include in the QDR and eliminate reporting elements for issues that could be addressed in different reports. For example, the requirement to assess revisions to the unified command plan is also required and reported under other legislation. Further, some reporting elements such as how resources would be shifted between two conflicts could be eliminated in light of DOD's new planning approach that focuses on capabilities to meet a range of threats rather than on the allocation of forces for specific adversaries. GAO also presents an option to have an advisory group work with DOD prior to and during the QDR to provide DOD with alternative perspectives and analyses.

Although DOD has made progress toward establishing a management framework for overall business transformation, the framework currently focuses on business systems modernization and does not fully address broader business transformation efforts. In 2005, DOD set up the Defense Business Systems Management Committee to review and approve the business enterprise architecture a transformation blueprint and new business systems modernization investments. It also established the Business Transformation Agency, which currently reports to the Vice Chair of the Defense Business Systems Management Committee, to coordinate and lead business transformation across the department. Despite these steps, DOD has not clearly defined or institutionalized interrelationships, roles and responsibilities, or accountability for establishing a management framework for overall business transformation. For example, differences of opinion exist within DOD about the roles of various senior leadership committees. Until DOD's business transformation management framework is institutionalized and encompasses broad responsibilities for all aspects of business transformation, it will be challenging for DOD to integrate related initiatives into a sustainable, enterprise-wide approach to successfully resolve weaknesses in business operations that GAO has shown are at high risk of waste, fraud, and abuse.

Includes publications previously listed in the supplements to the Index of selected publications of the Rand Corporation (Oct. 1962-Feb. 1963).