This paper furthers understanding of agency costs by simultaneously examining management entrenchment and the potential disciplining force of the managerial labor market. I show that the labor market's ability to constrain rent seeking activities depends upon the precision of measures of management ability provided by current firm performance. The paper emphasizes how noise in the economic environment adds to imprecision and provides a shield for entrenchment activities, managers hiding their entrenchment behind the noise. Applying the model, I suggest that the identity of the owners of a firm affects the noise in the economic environment. The crux of the argument is that the labor market has a more difficult time discerning the objectives conveyed to managers in state-owned firms than in private-sector firms. Optimally, the labor market places a lower weight on current firm performance relative to previous signals of management ability in state-owned firms, thus encouraging more entrenchment activity. The paper suggests mechanisms to improve the efficiency of the labor market and helps rationalize differences in the restrictions placed on management discretion between state owned and private-sector firms.

Why does corporate governance--front page news with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat--vary so dramatically around the world? This book explains how politics shapes corporate governance--how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. It combines a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and detailed narratives of country cases. This book differs sharply from most treatments by explaining differences in minority shareholder protections and ownership concentration among countries in terms of the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions. It explores in particular the crucial role of pension plans and financial intermediaries in shaping political preferences for different rules of corporate governance. The countries examined sort into two distinct groups: diffuse shareholding by external investors who pick a board that monitors the managers, and concentrated blockholding by insiders who monitor managers directly. Examining the political coalitions that form among or across management, owners, and workers, the authors find that certain coalitions encourage policies that promote diffuse shareholding, while other coalitions yield blockholding-oriented policies. Political institutions influence the probability of one coalition defeating another.

The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agency problems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100 percent small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combined with small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empirical validity of this dichotomy. In fact, one-third of publicly listed firms in Europe have multiple large owners, and the market value of firms with multiple blockholders differs from firms with a single large owner and from widely-held firms. Moreover, the relationship between corporate valuations and the distribution of cash-flow rights across multiple large owners is consistent with the predictions of recent theoretical models.

Diploma Thesis from the year 2004 in the subject Business economics - Business Management, Corporate Governance, grade: 1.1, European Business School - International University Schloß Reichartshausen Oestrich-Winkel, language: English, abstract: Empirische Diplomarbeit die mit einer multivariaten Regression untersucht, ob sich die beobachtete Variabilität der Kapitalstrukturen von Unternehmen durch unterschiedliche Eigentümerstrukturen erklären lässt.

Explore the interplay between corporate governance and strategic decision-making in this startling new resource In Understanding and Managing Strategic Governance, strategy and management experts Dr. Wei Shi and Robert E. Hoskisson deliver an insightful exploration of the influence that governance actors, like the board of directors, activist investors, institutional investors, and securities analysts, have on important strategic decisions. Based on surveying the latest research and analyzing unique datasets compiled by the authors, the book explains the impact that governance actors have on a firm’s strategic choices and the quality of such choices as well as the unintended consequences of that impact. The authors also describe how executives can manage the conflicting interests of multiple governance actors and leverage the influence of these actors to make effective strategic decisions. In this book, you’ll discover: How to avoid the strategic pitfalls that arise from governance actor influence and harm firms’ long-term competitiveness The effect that governance actors can have on corporate strategy, competitive strategy, corporate innovation strategy, global strategy, stakeholder strategy, and more The latest trends in corporate governance and their implications for managers, regulators, and policy makers in this area Perfect for C-level executives, board of directors, and institutional investors as well as students of corporate governance and strategy, Understanding and Managing Strategic Governance is a revealing and original examination of the interplay between corporate governance and firm strategy and how to manage that interplay to create sustainable competitive advantages.

The second European edition of Financial Markets and Corporate Strategy provides comprehensive coverage of financial markets and corporate finance, brought to life by real world examples, cases and insights. Placed in a truly international context, this new and updated edition takes an academic and practical view-point to guide students through the challenges of studying and practicing finance. Aimed specifically at an international audience, this edition boasts hundreds of references to new and relevant non-US research papers from top finance journals. Whilst retaining the well respected structure of the successful US text, Professor David Hillier has also made a number of additions which include: Fully updated research, data and examples in every chapter. Coverage of the global financial crisis, the impact it made on the financial markets and the lessons being learnt by the finance industry. A stronger emphasis on corporate governance and agency theory. Updates on accounting standards, bankruptcy laws, tax rules and tax systems.

The paper analyzes the choice between public and private debt by an entrenched manager. The model shows that when the firm’s credit risk is low, management issues public bonds because of the value gains from increased flexibility rather than reduced restrictions and monitoring. In fact, management’s expected private gains decrease as initial private debt restrictions are selectively relaxed. In contrast, when credit risk is high, management issues private debt because of the value gains and private benefits from renegotiating more stringent restrictions. When the maturity of private debt is shortened, however, privately and publicly placed bonds can be preferred to bank debt.

"Magnificent."—The Economist From the Nobel Prize–winning economist, a groundbreaking and comprehensive account of corporate finance Recent decades have seen great theoretical and empirical advances in the field of corporate finance. Whereas once the subject addressed mainly the financing of corporations—equity, debt, and valuation—today it also embraces crucial issues of governance, liquidity, risk management, relationships between banks and corporations, and the macroeconomic impact of corporations. However, this progress has left in its wake a jumbled array of concepts and models that students are often hard put to make sense of. Here, one of the world's leading economists offers a lucid, unified, and comprehensive introduction to modern corporate finance theory. Jean Tirole builds his landmark book around a single model, using an incentive or contract theory approach. Filling a major gap in the field, The Theory of Corporate Finance is an indispensable resource for graduate and advanced undergraduate students as well as researchers of corporate finance, industrial organization, political economy, development, and macroeconomics. Tirole conveys the organizing principles that structure the analysis of today's key management and public policy issues, such as the reform of corporate governance and auditing; the role of private equity, financial markets, and takeovers; the efficient determination of leverage, dividends, liquidity, and risk management; and the design of managerial incentive packages. He weaves empirical studies into the book's theoretical analysis. And he places the corporation in its broader environment, both microeconomic and macroeconomic, and examines the two-way interaction between the corporate environment and institutions. Setting a new milestone in the field, The Theory of Corporate Finance will be the authoritative text for years to come.

Written by leading scholars from various disciplines, this book presents current research on topics such as public choice, game theory, and political economy. It features contributions on fundamental, methodological, and empirical issues around the concepts of power and responsibility that strive to bridge the gap between different disciplinary approaches. The contributions fall into roughly four sub-disciplines: voting and voting power, public economics and politics, economics and philosophy, as well as labor economics. On the occasion of his 75th birthday, this book is written in honor of Manfred J. Holler, an economist by training and profession whose work as a guiding light has helped advance our understanding of the interdisciplinary connections of concepts of power and responsibility. He has written many articles and books on game theory, and worked extensively on questions of labor economics, politics, and philosophy.

Most research about financial stability and sustainable growth focuses on the financial sector and macroeconomics and neglects the real sector, microeconomics and psychology issues. Real-sector and financial-sectors linkages are increasing and are a foundation of economic/social/environmental/urban sustainability, given financial crises, noise, internet, “transition economics”, disintermediation, demographics and inequality around the world. Within complex systems theory framework, this book analyses some multi-sided mechanisms and risk-perception that can have symbiotic relationships with financial stability, systemic risk and/or sustainable growth. Within the context of Regret Minimization, MN-Transferable Utility and WTAL, new theories-of-the-firm are developed that consider sustainable growth, price stability, globalization, financial stability and birth-to-death evolutions of firms. This book introduces new behaviour theories pertaining to real estate and intangibles, which can affect the evolutions of risk-taking and risk perception within organizations and investment entities. The chapters address elements of the dilemma of often divergent risk perceptions of, and risk-taking by corporate executives, regulators and investment managers.