MALAYA 16th. June 1948. Early in the morning, 3 murders of Rubber Planters took place. All within the area of Taiping Perak North Malaya. The names of the Planters were: - Mr. Arthur Walker. Manager of the Elphin Rubber Estate. and Mr J.M. Allison, along with Mr. I.D. Christian of the Phin Soon Rubber Estate. The two gangs of Murderers all Chinese, were Members of the Malaya Communist Party, under the then Party Chairman Chin Peng. Chin Peng had been trained and fought alongside the British Special Operations Executive Force 136. During the Japanese Occupation of Malaya from 1942 until 1945. Chin Peng’s objective was, to create a Communist Dictatorship in Malaya, after the cessation of hostilities. Then take over from the British Government in Malaya, The Malaya Communist Party, began to cause unrest creating strikes and acts of murder amongst the law-abiding Malayan people, whose population was mainly of Chinese origin. In February 1947. Under a Treaty arranged by the British Government. The Federated and Unfederated States of Malaya became one. Much against the Malayan Communist Party’s wishes. Retaliating, they creating more havoc and unrest amongst the civilians, until finally decided to. ‘Take up Arms’ against the British Government. The murders of the three Planters, had the British High Commissioner Sir. Edward Gent forced to take action. Initiated a State of Emergency in Perak, quickly followed throughout other States. Chin Peng ‘Declared War’ against the British. Subsequently, the atrocities spread throughout Malaya. The Civil Police were unable to control the speeding violence and mayhem. Necessitating, the existing British and Gurkha Troops to take control. Nevertheless, the Communist had taken their fight into the jungles of Malaya. Where for the next 12 years, a Bloody War took place. It was called ‘THE EMERGENCY’ by the British Government, due to the possible Insurance claims from both the Rubber Plantation and Tin Mines Owners. It cost the lives of 1,818. Commonwealth Forces. & 1,026 Federation of Malaya Police. Over the following 12 years, it is estimated that in excess of 22,000, lost their lives consisting of, Commonwealth Forces of the three Service’s, Federation of Malaya Police. Civilians, including the Chinese Communist Terrorist. Chin Peng survived, escaped with the remains of his beaten Army, numbering less than 400 across the Malay border into Thailand to remain an exile.

Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances. Differences in organizational culture is the primary reason why the British Army learned to conduct counterinsurgency in Malaya while the American Army failed to learn in Vietnam. The American Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency during the course of the Vietnam Conflict, preferring to treat the war as a conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War or World War II. The British Army, because of its traditional role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics that its history and the national culture created, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. This is the first study to apply organizational learning theory to cases in which armies were engaged in actual combat.

In June 1948 Communist insurgent forces commenced a guerrilla war to end British rule in Malaya. During the ensuing 12 years of conflict there were 8750 reported 'contacts' between units of the Security Forces and the Communist enemy. Eventually Malaya was made independent, and the British and their Commonwealth allies emerged victorious. Written and illustrated by infantry veterans of the campaign, this book examines the Malayan Emergency, detailing the forces involved and the harsh jungle conditions in which they fought. The text is complete with firsthand accounts from the contributors themselves and numerous illustrations depicting the forces' uniforms.

The career of John Davis was inextricably and paradoxically intertwined with that of Chin Peng, the leader of the Malayan Communist Party and the man who was to become Britain’s chief enemy in the long Communist struggle for the soul of Malaya. When the Japanese invaded Malaya during WWII, John Davis escaped to Ceylon, sailing 1,700 miles in a Malay fishing boat, before planning the infiltration of Chinese intelligence agents and British officers back into the Malayan peninsula. With the support of Chin Peng and the cooperation of the Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army, Davis led SOE Force 136 into Japanese-occupied Malaya where he operated from camps deep in the jungle with Freddy Spencer Chapman and fellow covert agents. Yet Davis was more than a wartime hero. Following the war, he was heavily involved in Malayan Emergency affairs: squatter control, the establishment of New Villages and, vitally, of tracking down and confronting his old adversary Chin Peng and the communist terrorists. Historian and biographer Margaret Shennan, born and raised in Malaya and an expert on the British in pre-independence Malaysia, tells the extraordinary, untold story of John Davis, CBE, DSO, an iconic figure in Malaya’s colonial history. Illustrated with Davis’ personal photographs and featuring correspondence between Davis and Chin Peng, this is a story which truly deserves to be told.

When the world held its breath It is 25 years since the end of the Cold War, now a generation old. It began over 75 years ago, in 1944long before the last shots of the Second World War had echoed across the wastelands of Eastern Europewith the brutal Greek Civil War. The battle lines are no longer drawn, but they linger on, unwittingly or not, in conflict zones such as Iraq, Somalia and Ukraine. In an era of mass-produced AK-47s and ICBMs, one such flashpoint was Malaya By the time of the 1942 Japanese occupation of the Malay Peninsula and Singapore, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) had already been fomenting merdeka independence from Britain. The Japanese conquerors, however, were also the loathsome enemies of the MCPs ideological brothers in China. An alliance of convenience with the British was the outcome. Britain armed and trained the MCPs military wing, the Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), to essentially wage jungle guerrilla warfare against Japanese occupying forces. With the cessation of hostilities, anti-Japanese became anti-British, and, using the same weapons and training fortuitously provided by the British army during the war, the MCP launched a guerrilla war of insurgency.Malaya was of significant strategic and economic importance to Britain. In the face of an emerging communist regime in China, a British presence in Southeast Asia was imperative. Equally, rubber and tin, largely produced in Malaya by British expatriates, were important inputs for British industry. Typically, the insurgents, dubbed Communist Terrorists, or simply CTs, went about attacking soft targets in remote areas: the rubber plantations and tin mines. In conjunction with this, was the implementation of Maos dictate of subverting the rural, largely peasant, population to the cause. Twelve years of counterinsurgency operations ensued, as a wide range of British forces were joined in the conflict by ground, air and sea units from Australia, New Zealand, Southern and Northern Rhodesia, Fiji and Nyasaland.

The Malayan Emergency (1948–60) was the longest war waged by British and Commonwealth forces in the twentieth century. Fought against communist guerrillas in the jungles of Malaya, this undeclared 'war without a name' had a powerful and covert influence on American strategy in Vietnam. Many military historians still consider the Emergency an exemplary, even inspiring, counterinsurgency conflict. Massacre in Malaya draws on recently released files from British archives, as well as eyewitness accounts from both the government forces and communist fighters, to challenge this view. It focuses on the notorious 'Batang Kali Massacre' – known as 'Britain's My Lai' – that took place in December, 1948, and reveals that British tactics in Malaya were more ruthless than many historians concede. Counterinsurgency in Malaya, as in Kenya during the same period, depended on massive resettlement programmes and ethnic cleansing, indiscriminate aerial bombing and ruthless exploitation of aboriginal peoples, the Orang Asli. The Emergency was a discriminatory war. In Malaya, the British built a brutal and pervasive security state – and bequeathed it to modern Malaysia. The 'Malayan Emergency' was a bitterly fought war that still haunts the present.

For over four years in the Swinging Sixties the armed forces of the UK were engaged in a little publicized but crucial jungle war against communist aggressive on the vast island of Borneo.At any one time up to 50,000 troops (half of the Armys strength today) were deployed along a 1,000 mile front. Their enemy were the communist led Indonesians whose leaders were determined to seize the states of Sarawak, Sabah and the oil rich Brunei, all of whom for their part wished to maintain their Commonwealth links. The catalyst for the war was the 1962 uprising in Brunei which was quickly crushed by the bold intervention of British army units.The arrival of Major General Walter Walker, himself a controversial figure, gave the subsequent campaign a clear direction. Indonesian incursions were rigorously defended and ruthlessly pursued. Top Secret Claret operations took the fight to the enemy with cross border operations initially using Special Forces and later with Chindit-style long range patrols. The outcome was a text book military victory thus avoiding a British Vietnam debacle.

This paper clearly shows the immediate relevancy of historical study to current events. One of the most common criticisms of the U.S. plan to invade Iraq in 2003 is that too few troops were used. The argument often fails to satisfy anyone for there is no standard against which to judge. A figure of 20 troops per 1000 of the local population is often mentioned as the standard, but as McGrath shows, that figure was arrived at with some questionable assumptions. By analyzing seven military operations from the last 100 years, he arrives at an average number of military forces per 1000 of the population that have been employed in what would generally be considered successful military campaigns. He also points out a variety of important factors affecting those numbers-from geography to local forces employed to supplement soldiers on the battlefield, to the use of contractors-among others.

A true story of 1930s Malaysia, of jungle operations, submarines and spies in WWII, and of the postwar Malayan Emergency, as experienced by an extraordinary man. Rubber planter Boris Hembry was a part of Freddy Spencer Chapman’s covert Stay Behind Party in Japanese-occupied Malaya, a member of the Secret Intelligence Service, and he formed the first Home Guard unit in Malaya during the Emergency. Required reading for this period of Southeast Asian history.